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I. INTRODUCTION 
Questions about procedural justice are remarkably persistent. From the 
Court of Star Chamber in the fourteenth century1 to Guantanamo Bay in the 
twenty-first,2 the common law tradition is no stranger to the notion that 
procedural rights may be sacrificed on the altar of substantive advantage. 
Legal sophisticates will hardly be surprised to learn that academics in the 
utilitarian tradition have argued that procedural fairness can be reduced to 
 
 1. See CORA LOUISE SCOFIELD, A STUDY OF THE COURT OF STAR CHAMBER (Burt Franklin ed., 
1969) (1900) (finding references to Star Chamber as early as 1356); William Hudson, A Treatise of the 
Court of Star Chamber, in COLLECTANEA JURIDICA 1 (Francis Hargrave ed., 1980) (1792) (stating that 
Star Chamber dates from the twelfth century reign of Henry II). For more information on the Court of 
Star Chamber, see Frank Riebli, Note, The Spectre of Star Chamber: The Role of an Ancient English 
Tribunal in the Supreme Court’s Self-Incrimination Jurisprudence, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 807 
(2002). 
 2. See Gherebi v. Bush, 374 F.3d 727 (9th Cir. 2004); K. Elizabeth Dahlstrom, The Executive 
Policy Toward Detention and Trial of Foreign Citizens at Guantanamo Bay, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 
662 (2003); Michael Ratner, Moving Away from the Rule of Law: Military Tribunals, Executive 
Detentions and Torture, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1513 (2003). 
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the calculation of costs and benefits,3 including, perhaps, a taste for 
participation.4 Even the United States Supreme Court seems to have 
suggested that the most basic procedural rights, notice and an opportunity 
to be heard, may be denied if the balance of interests does not favor them.5 
But the ascendancy of consequentialist reasoning in the courts and the 
academy has not laid the question of procedural justice to rest. Whenever 
life, liberty, or property is taken without affording the affected individual a 
meaningful opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process, the 
cry of procedural unfairness is heard. The thesis of this Article is that such 
cries are grounded in reason as well as passion. While procedural justice is 
concerned with the benefits of accuracy and the costs of adjudication, it is 
not solely concerned with those costs and benefits. Rather, procedural 
justice is deeply entwined with the old and powerful idea that a process that 
guarantees rights of meaningful participation is an essential prerequisite for 
the legitimate authority of action-guiding legal norms. Meaningful 
participation requires notice and opportunity to be heard, and it requires a 
reasonable balance between cost and accuracy. 
My case for these simple and intuitively plausible claims is elaborated 
in the form of a theory of procedural justice for a system of civil dispute 
resolution. It is a commonplace of procedure scholarship to observe that 
theories of procedural justice are “thinly developed.”6 My aim is to begin 
the process of remedying this defect by providing a fully articulated and 
defended theory of procedural justice for a system of civil adjudication. 
A. WHERE TO BEGIN? EX ANTE AND EX POST PERSPECTIVES 
Where can we begin? We need a point of entry into the question, 
“What makes a procedure just?” One obvious way to approach this 
 
 3. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare: Notes on the Pareto 
Principle, Preferences, and Distributive Justice, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 331 (2003); Louis Kaplow, The 
Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 307 (1994) 
[hereinafter Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication]. 
 4. See David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in Mass-
Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210 (1996). 
 5. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347–49 (1976) (using a balancing approach to 
resolve the question of whether the denial of an opportunity to be heard violates due process); Mullane 
v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313–14 (1950) (using a balancing approach to 
resolve the question of whether due process requires notice of a proceeding). 
 6. See Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with Contractarian Theories of 
Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 485, 488–89 (2003). See also Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3, at 
228 n.6 (noting the lack of developed theories of procedural justice); Jon O. Newman, Rethinking 
Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 YALE L.J. 1643, 1646–47 (1985) (noting that 
fairness arguments about procedure are limited and narrow). 
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question is to take up the ex post perspective.7 Imagine that a legal 
proceeding is complete and a final judgment has been entered. From the ex 
post perspective, we care about the outcomes of civil proceedings. Some 
outcomes are substantively just; others are unjust on the merits. Some 
judgments are legally correct; others are in error. Some findings of fact are 
true; others are false. We want outcomes that are substantively just, 
judgments that are legally correct, and findings that are factually true. 
What then about procedures? Do they matter and, if so, why? Without 
further reflection, one might be attracted to the view that, while outcomes 
matter in a deep way, procedures do not. What real difference does a 
supposedly fair procedure make, we might ask, if it results in an unjust 
outcome? What solace can procedural justice be to someone who has 
suffered a substantive wrong?8 Posing the questions in this manner 
suggests an answer: only substantive outcomes really count and only 
substantive rules or their application can truly be said to be just or unjust. 
This answer deflates the claims of procedural fairness and cautions against 
“the ugly spectre of procedural rights.”9 The implication of this conclusion 
is that the very notion of procedural justice as an independent criterion of 
fairness is empty. 
Even if we were to accept this deflationary view of procedural justice 
as our starting point, it would not follow that procedures are unimportant. If 
we begin with criteria for a just outcome, then it follows that our system of 
dispute resolution should be designed to decide controversies in accord 
with these criteria. From the bare premise that outcomes count from the ex 
post perspective, we can derive a minimal notion of procedural justice. A 
perfectly just procedure would guarantee correct outcomes; a procedure 
would be more or less fair or just insofar as it approximates this ideal. If we 
take the rules of substantive law (torts, contracts, property, and so forth) as 
applied to the facts (the state of the world) as the criteria for just outcomes, 
 
 7. See Bruce L. Hay, Procedural Justice—Ex Ante vs. Ex Post, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1803 (1997) 
(distinguishing between the ex post and ex ante perspectives on procedural justice). 
 8. Alice Kaswan provides a very clear example of this sort of argument: 
If the issue is framed as one of “procedural justice,” then decision-makers might argue that 
they have solved the “fair treatment” problem through the creation of procedures that ensure 
participation of all groups in decision-making processes. It is not clear, however, that 
procedural requirements enhancing public participation will necessarily lead to substantive 
decisions that are more responsive to public opinion. While enhancing participation 
procedures to equalize opportunities is an important step in creating the preconditions for 
political justice, it provides no guarantee that the substantive decision will embody political 
justice. 
Alice Kaswan, Distributive Justice and the Environment, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1031, 1046–47 (2003). 
 9. Randy E. Barnett, “Justice Entrepreneurship in a Free Market”: Comment, 3 J. 
LIBERTARIAN STUD. 427, 427 (1979). 
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then the ideal procedure would discern the truth about the facts and apply 
the law to those facts with 100% accuracy. From the modest premise that 
outcomes matter, we can derive the view that procedural justice is a 
function of accuracy. 
There are, however, obvious problems with this simple theory. Even 
from the ex post perspective, formal legal outcomes, such as judgments for 
plaintiffs and defendants, are not the only effects of adjudication. Dispute 
resolution systems impose costs on the parties to the dispute and on society 
at large. If we enlarge our view of outcomes to encompass all of the costs 
and benefits imposed by the litigation system, then our view of procedural 
justice will be enlarged as well. An outcome that includes a damage award 
that reflects an accurate application of the substantive law to the facts 
might nonetheless be unjust if the plaintiff who was entitled to prevail had 
to pay more in attorneys’ fees than the value of the judgment. A dispute 
resolution system that achieved 100% accuracy would be viewed as 
monstrously unfair if it required each disputant to devote her entire life to a 
painstaking process of fact-finding and consumed the great bulk of the 
social product to finance the enterprise.10 The addition of these 
uncontroversial premises to our modest assumption that outcomes matter 
yields the conclusion that even from the ex post perspective a fair 
procedure must, at a minimum, strike a fair or reasonable balance between 
the benefits of accurate outcomes and the costs imposed by the system of 
procedures.11 
Procedural perfection is unattainable. No conceivable system of 
procedure can guarantee perfect accuracy. Approaching procedural 
perfection is unaffordable because a system that achieved the highest 
 
 10. Henry Friendly makes the point well: 
It should be realized that procedural requirements entail the expenditure of limited resources, 
that at some point the benefit to individuals from an additional safeguard is substantially out-
weighed by the cost of providing such protection, and that the expense of protecting those 
likely to be found undeserving will probably come out of the pockets of the deserving. 
Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1276 (1975). 
 11. The claim made in the text requires qualification. It might be argued that the costs of 
accuracy (and, for reasons that are established below, the value of participation, see infra Part V) are 
external to the concept of procedural justice. On this view, procedural fairness is one thing and the costs 
of procedure quite another. For an analagous argument in the context of distributive justice, see G.A. 
Cohen, Rescuing Justice from Constructivism, at http://users.ox.ac.uk/~magd1534/JDG/cohen2.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 8, 2004). The assumption underlying this argument is that procedural justice should answer 
to the morally relevant properties that are internal to procedure. Morally relevant properties external to 
procedure may well be relevant to the question of what should be done, all things considered, but are 
outside the domain of procedural justice. Even on this view, however, it could be argued that procedural 
systems impose direct costs that are properly considered as internal to procedure. Such direct costs 
include, for example, the monetary and nonmonetary cost of participation in the procedural system—
time spent, attorneys’ fees, filing fees, and so forth. 
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possible degree of accuracy would be intolerably costly. Even the 
application of an elaborate system of error-correction mechanisms (for 
example, a system with motions for a new trial, appeals, and, for some 
types of errors, collateral attacks) would result in many cases with 
substantively unjust outcomes—lawsuits in which fact-finding went awry 
or the applicable rule of law was not correctly identified. Litigants 
themselves make procedural mistakes that thwart their own substantive 
rights. And litigants are bound by erroneous judgments that are truly final, 
beyond all further correction of mistake. This is a fact about procedure in 
the actual world, which we might call the fact of irreducible procedural 
error. 
So far, our view of procedural fairness has been entirely ex post. This 
view, however, is incomplete for many reasons, not the least of which is 
the fact that final judgments are not the end of the story. From the ex ante 
perspective, the role of law is to provide a mechanism for the coordination 
of human conduct. Substantive rules of law define rights and 
responsibilities that provide reasons for action. Property law tells us who 
has what dominion over which resources. Tort and criminal law define our 
obligations toward others. Contract law enables us to create and enforce 
new obligations. Law is action guiding. From the ex post point of view, 
however, it appears that the action-guiding work of law is done by 
substance and not by procedure. Is that conclusion correct? 
To test the adequacy of the ex post view of procedural fairness, we 
need to ask the following question: can the substantive law perform its 
action-guiding function without the aid of procedure? Given certain 
idealizing (counterfactual) assumptions, the answer to this question would 
be yes. Were we to assume (a) that citizens have perfect information about 
the state of the world and the content of the law, (b) that the content of the 
law is fully specified, and (c) that each and every citizen viewed the law 
and the facts impartially, then the rules of substantive law could perform 
their action-guiding function without the aid of a system of procedure. In 
the actual world, however, none of these three idealizing assumptions holds 
true. Instead, the actual world is characterized by three problems of 
compliance with substantive legal norms: (1) the problem of imperfect 
knowledge of law and fact, (2) the problem of incomplete specification of 
legal norms, and (3) the problem of partiality.12 Notice that these three 
 
 12. Cf. RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY (1998) (discussing analagous 
problems of knowledge, interest, and power). 
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problems would exist even if citizens saw themselves as obligated by the 
content of the substantive legal norms. 
Each of these three problems requires a few words of explanation. 
How does the actual world differ from the idealized world of perfect 
information, fully specified laws, and impartiality? First, the actual world is 
characterized by the problem of imperfect knowledge of law and fact. No 
one citizen has perfect information about the content of the law or the state 
of the world. Indeed, each of us knows only a small fraction of the 
information that would be required for perfect compliance with our legal 
obligations. Moreover, given human capacities, knowledge is local; 
different parties to a dispute may each possess different information about 
the facts. Without some process that can supply the parties to a dispute with 
a common understanding of the law and the facts, even citizens who 
attempt to use the law to coordinate their behavior may be unable to do so. 
Second, the actual world is characterized by the problem of 
incomplete specification of legal norms. Legal rules are constructed using 
the tools provided by natural human languages. For rules to guide conduct, 
they must be comprehensible, and, hence, they must be framed in relatively 
general and abstract language. As a consequence, the substantive law is 
inherently incomplete and ambiguous. Without a procedure whereby its 
content can be specified and disambiguated, different citizens will 
inevitably have different views about the content of the law. 
Third, the actual world is characterized by the problem of partiality. 
Citizens are inevitably partial to their own interests, to the interests of their 
friends and families, and to the interests of causes and ideologies to which 
they are committed. The problem of partiality interacts with the problem of 
incomplete information about law and fact and the problem of incomplete 
specification of the law. So, citizens will be likely to form views about the 
content of the laws and the state of the world that favor the interests to 
which they are partial. Without a procedure whereby conflicting partial 
perspectives can be reconciled, different citizens will inevitably disagree 
about which actions the law requires. 
Given the problems of imperfect knowledge, incomplete specification, 
and partiality, legal disputes will arise. Conversely, with perfect 
knowledge, complete specification, and impartiality, almost every dispute 
could settle.13 From the ex post perspective, the role of procedure is to 
 
 13. The sentiment that every dispute could settle is an exaggeration. Settlement might be 
thwarted if the legal system provided incentives for delay, for example, if the defendant was not 
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resolve these disputes, but from the ex ante point of view, procedure has 
another role—to guide action after the formal legal proceedings have ended 
and the judgment has become final. 14 This is the real work of procedure—
to guide primary conduct after the judgment is rendered. The real work of 
procedure does not begin until the trial is over, the appeals exhausted, and 
the judgment has become final. Legal proceedings communicate 
information about law and fact to parties and others. They also specify the 
content of general and abstract legal rules. Legal proceedings provide 
authoritative resolutions of the differences in perspective generated by 
partial interests. Procedure provides the information, specificity, and 
impartiality that is required for citizens to conform their behavior to the 
requirements of the law. 
This point can easily be missed. The action-guiding role of procedure 
is not always transparent. Indeed, in the context of criminal procedure, the 
action-guiding role of procedure is almost totally opaque. One might easily 
imagine that the role of a system of criminal procedure is to impose just 
punishments and that direct application of the coercive power of the state is 
the necessary and sufficient means to this end. Criminal defendants are 
coerced by force, not guided by legal norms specified by a procedure. We 
should not, however, overgeneralize from the criminal context. On the civil 
side, there are contexts in which the action-guiding role of procedure is 
crystal clear. One such context is the declaratory civil judgment.15 In an 
action for declaratory relief, a coercive order does not issue. Rather, the 
judgment simply declares the parties’ legal rights and obligations. 
Declaratory judgments can guide action without coercion, precisely 
because they provide information about law and fact that can overcome the 
 
required to pay the plaintiff prejudgment interest. More generally, a procedural system can (but need 
not) provide perverse incentives to litigate a frivolous case or defense. 
 14. This point is inspired by George Smith, Justice Entrepreneurship In a Free Market, 3 J. 
LIBERTARIAN STUD. 405 (1979). 
 15. See EDWIN BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 12–13 (2d ed. 1941) (“The more highly 
organized a society becomes, the less occasion there is to display force in order to secure obedience to 
its decrees and adjudications. . . . The mere authoritative declaration of the reciprocal rights and 
obligations of the parties suffices to ensure obedience.”). See generally Edwin Borchard, The 
Declaratory Judgment—A Needed Procedural Reform, Part I, 28 YALE L.J. 1 (1918) (tracing the 
historical development of declaratory judgments); Edwin Borchard, The Declaratory Judgment—A 
Needed Procedural Reform, Part II, 28 YALE L.J. 105 (1918) (analyzing declaratory actions and 
judgments from the time to “determine the scope of and limitations upon” them); Edwin M. Borchard, 
Declaratory Judgments, in LECTURES ON LEGAL TOPICS 243, 245 (Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. 
ed., 1928); Edson R. Sunderland, The Courts as Authorized Legal Advisors of the People, 54 AM. L. 
REV. 161 (1920); Edson R. Sunderland, A Modern Evolution in Remedial Rights—The Declaratory 
Judgment, 16 MICH. L. REV. 69 (1917); Developments in the Law, Declaratory Judgments—1941–
1949, 62 HARV. L. REV. 787 (1949). 
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problems of imperfect knowledge, incomplete specification, and 
partiality.16 
The action-guiding role of procedure is important because it 
undermines an assumption that is implicit in the ex post view of procedural 
fairness. The ex post view assumes that there is a sharp division between 
the action-guiding role of substantive law (the rules of torts, contracts, and 
property) and the dispute-resolving role of procedural law (the rules of 
jurisdiction, pleading, discovery, trial, appeal, and preclusion). Once this 
assumption is exposed by the move to the ex ante view, we can begin to 
appreciate that the real work of procedure may be every bit as action 
guiding as is the work of substance. As we shall see, the action-guiding 
work of substantive law is inextricably entangled in the action-guiding 
work of procedural law. 
For adjudicative procedure to perform its action-guiding function well, 
procedures and their outcomes must be regarded as legitimate sources of 
authority for officials, third parties, and litigants. If adjudication works, the 
losing party may regard the judgment as authoritative and binding—that is, 
as providing good and sufficient reason to pay the judgment or obey the 
injunction. If adjudication fails and the losing party resists enforcement, 
further proceedings are required. Remedial proceedings will require either 
officials (a sheriff or marshal) or third parties (a bank or employer) to 
regard the outcome of an adjudication as a source of legitimate authority—
for example, as good enough reason to confiscate property, turn over bank 
accounts, or garnish wages. If a system of procedure is widely regarded as 
a source of legitimate authority, then it will succeed in guiding action. If 
the system is seen as illegitimate or without authority, then the system may 
fail. 
What is our basis for regarding procedures as the source of outcomes 
that are legitimately authoritative? We might begin with the assumption 
that the substantive rules of law are themselves legitimate. An accurate 
outcome would then derive its legitimate authority from the legitimacy of 
the underlying substantive rule. If a legitimate substantive rule of property 
law plus the true state of the world would result in awarding title to 
Blackacre to Smith, then a judgment that awards Blackacre to Smith might 
be said to be legitimate. This account of the legitimate authority of 
procedure is called the derivative theory of procedural legitimacy. 
 
 16. Of course, coercion is in the background. I am not claiming that coercion is never required 
for civil adjudication to do its work of guiding action. 
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But the derivative theory of procedural legitimacy immediately runs 
into an obstacle in the form of the fact of irreducible procedural error. As 
an official or a third party, I cannot know whether any particular verdict is 
accurate or not. I may have reason to believe that it is highly likely the 
verdict is accurate. But then again, I may not, for example, if I have some 
independent knowledge of the case. Litigants usually have independent 
knowledge of the merits of the proceedings to which they are parties. As a 
losing litigant, I may, even after discounting for my own self-interest, have 
a well-founded belief that the judgment against me is in error. Moreover, 
losing litigants will not always be able to discount for their self-interest, 
and hence will frequently have an ill-founded belief that unfavorable 
judgments are in error. 
So, a system of procedure cannot always confer legitimacy on 
outcomes by providing either objectively or subjectively adequate 
assurance that the outcomes the system produces are correct or even likely 
to be correct. The fact of irreducible procedural error raises what we might 
call the hard question of procedural justice: How can we regard ourselves 
as obligated by legitimate authority to comply with a judgment that we 
believe (or even know) to be in error with respect to the substantive merits? 
The deflationary view of procedural justice, which claims that procedural 
justice can be reduced to justice in outcomes, cannot easily provide an 
answer to this question. When we know the outcome to be unjust, the 
justice of the outcome cannot be the source of its legitimate authority. This 
conceptual point has a crucial corollary: only just procedures can confer 
legitimate authority on incorrect outcomes. 
Untangling the complex strands of argument that contain an answer to 
the hard question of procedural justice is the enterprise undertaken in this 
Article. But even at this early stage, we can glimpse the broad outlines of 
an answer. We can regard ourselves as legitimately bound by an erroneous 
judgment if it results from a procedure that affords us a meaningful 
opportunity to participate in a process that strikes a reasonable balance 
between the goal of accurate outcomes and the inevitable costs imposed by 
any system of dispute resolution. Procedural justice is the route to 
reconciliation with substantive error. Adjudicative procedures create legal 
norms and, like other norm-creating procedures, require rights of 
participation to establish legitimacy. This idea—which we shall call “the 
participatory legitimacy thesis”—will be explicated in due course.17 
 
 17. The participatory legitimacy thesis is developed and defended in Part V. 
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B. A ROADMAP TO THE ARGUMENT 
This Article responds to the challenge posed by the hard question of 
procedural justice. That theory is developed in several stages, beginning 
with some preliminary questions and problems. The first question—what is 
procedure?—is the most difficult and requires an extensive answer. Part II, 
“Substance and Procedure,” defines the subject of the inquiry by offering a 
new theory of the distinction between substance and procedure. This theory 
acknowledges the entanglement of the action-guiding roles of substantive 
and procedural rules while preserving the distinction between two ideal 
types of rules. Part III, “The Foundations of Procedural Justice,” lays out 
the premises of general jurisprudence that ground the theory and answers a 
series of objections to the notion that the search for a theory of procedural 
justice is a worthwhile enterprise. These two sections set the stage for the 
more difficult work of constructing a theory of procedural legitimacy. 
The work of constructing a theory of procedural legitimacy begins in 
Part IV, “Views of Procedural Justice,” which investigates the theories of 
procedural fairness found explicitly or implicitly in case law and 
commentary. After a preliminary inquiry that distinguishes procedural 
justice from other forms of justice, Part IV focuses on three models or 
theories. The first theory, the accuracy model, assumes that the aim of civil 
dispute resolution is a correct application of the law to the facts. The 
second theory, the balancing model, assumes that the aim of civil procedure 
is to strike a fair balance between the costs and benefits of adjudication. 
The third theory, the participation model, assumes that the very idea of a 
correct outcome must be understood as a function of a process that 
guarantees fair and equal participation. In Part V, “The Value of 
Participation,” the lessons learned from analysis and critique of the three 
models are then applied to the question of whether a right of participation 
can be justified for reasons that are not reducible to either participation’s 
effect on accuracy or its effect on the cost of adjudication. The most 
important result of Part V is the participatory legitimacy thesis, the idea 
that it is (usually) a condition for the fairness of a procedure that those who 
are to be finally bound shall have a reasonable opportunity to participate in 
the proceedings. 
The central normative thrust of the procedural justice theory is 
developed in Part VI, “Principles of Procedural Justice.” The first principle, 
the Participation Principle, stipulates a minimum (and minimal) right of 
participation, in the form of notice and an opportunity to be heard, that 
must be satisfied (if feasible) in order for a procedure to be considered fair. 
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The second principle, the Accuracy Principle, specifies the achievement of 
legally correct outcomes as the criterion for measuring procedural fairness, 
subject to four provisos, each of which sets out circumstances under which 
a departure from the goal of accuracy is justified by procedural fairness 
itself. In Part VII, “The Problem of Aggregation,” the Participation 
Principle and the Accuracy Principle are applied to the central problem of 
contemporary civil procedure—the aggregation of claims in mass litigation. 
Part VIII offers some concluding observations about the point and 
significance of procedural justice. 
II. SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 
The first question that any theory of procedural justice must face is the 
obvious one: what is procedure? The second question follows directly from 
the first: how can procedure be distinguished from substance? Without 
some account of the substance-procedure distinction, the subject matter of 
any theory of procedural justice is not well defined. But as we all know, the 
substance and procedure problem is a tough nut to crack. The purpose of 
this section is to put the theory of procedural justice on a solid foundation 
by providing a fully adequate account of the nature of procedure and the 
ways in which it is distinguishable from substance. 
A. SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE THROUGH THE LENS OF ERIE RAILROAD 
V. TOMPKINS 
The distinction between substance and procedure can be approached 
from many directions. We might attempt to begin a priori with a conceptual 
analysis, starting with general and abstract concepts of substance and 
procedure. Or we might begin a posteriori by compiling a list of legal rules 
that ordinary legal usage counts as procedural in nature, then moving 
inductively to general definitions. Yet another possible starting point is the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,18 the case 
that gave rise to the familiar idea that when federal courts hear state law 
claims, they are obligated to apply state substantive law but should apply 
the federal rules that are procedural in nature. Erie and its progeny created 
a task for courts and commentators, establishing criteria that sort substance 
 
 18. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Erie literature is vast. See, e.g., John Hart 
Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 722–25 (1974); Richard D. Freer, Erie’s 
Mid-Life Crisis, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1087 (1989) [hereinafter Freer, Mid-Life Crisis]; Richard D. Freer, 
Some Thoughts on the State of Erie after Gasperini, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1637 (1998) [hereinafter Freer, 
Some Thoughts]; Martin H. Redish & Carter G. Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search 
of the Appropriate Dilemma, 91 HARV. L. REV. 356, 364–65 (1977). 
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from procedure. Every lawyer educated in American procedure knows that 
this task created an enduring problem for judges and lawyers. Justice 
Reed’s concurring opinion in Erie stated that problem succinctly: “The line 
between procedure and substance is hazy . . . .”19 Hazy, indeed, as 
generations of American law students have learned to their chagrin. More 
than sixty years of Erie jurisprudence has yet to result in any clear 
consensus on the distinction between substance and procedure. 
1. Why Start with Erie? 
The Erie doctrine is notoriously complex and obscure; moreover, Erie 
is linked to considerations of federalism that are tangential to procedural 
justice. Nonetheless, Erie and its progeny have produced a substantial body 
of judicial opinions and scholarship that address what procedure is in a 
wide variety of concrete contexts. Additionally, because Erie has been the 
context in which the substance and procedure problem has arisen for 
procedure scholars in the United States, it provides a common conceptual 
vocabulary that is well suited to the task at hand.20 Any discussion of 
substance and procedure that does not start with Erie will nonetheless be 
interpreted by American judges, lawyers, and legal academics with Erie’s 
legacy in mind. In a sense, the question “What is procedure?” begins with 
Erie—whether we like it or not. 
Although proceduralists associate inquiry into the line between 
substance and procedure with Erie, that case itself did little more than 
introduce the problem. Erie addressed whether federal courts could 
substitute their own judgments about the content of the common law for the 
judgments of state courts. Justice Brandeis’s opinion for the Court 
answered this question in the negative: “There is no federal general 
common law.”21 The majority opinion in Erie uses the word “substantive” 
only once,22 and does not discuss procedure at all. The relationship 
between substance and procedure, however, was the subject of a famous 
 
 19. Erie, 304 U.S. at 92 (Reed, J., concurring). 
 20. Of course, there are other important contexts. Closely related to the vertical choice of law 
context in Erie is the horizontal choice of law. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 
122 (1971) (“A court usually applies its own local law rules prescribing how litigation shall be 
conducted even when it applies the local law rules of another state to resolve other issues in the case.”). 
See also Joseph P. Bauer, The Erie Doctrine Revisited: How a Conflicts Perspective Can Aid the 
Analysis, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1235 (1999) (examining how principles and methodologies of 
conflict of law analysis can “prove useful in the Erie setting”). The locus classicus is Walter Wheeler 
Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333 (1933). 
 21. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. 
 22. Id. 
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sentence in Justice Reed’s concurring opinion: “The line between 
procedural and substantive law is hazy,” goes the passage quoted in part 
above, “but no one doubts federal power over procedure.”23 So, what is the 
line between substance and procedure? Or, if these two sets are 
overlapping, what makes a legal rule substantive, procedural, both, or 
neither? More radically, must we accept Linda Mullenix’s conclusion that 
the line between substance and procedure “is inherently unresolvable”?24 
2. The Inadequacy of Intuitionist Formalism 
One approach to the substance-procedure distinction is the claim that 
substance and procedure have intuitively accessible meanings.25 We know 
that torts, contracts, and property are substance—these examples might 
serve as a premise for our reasoning. We could then add another premise: 
we know that jurisdiction, pleading, joinder, and discovery are 
procedures—again, we have paradigm cases. This general approach is 
illustrated by Richard Freer in the following passage: “[W]hatever 
‘substantive’ means, it clearly encompasses the standard of tort liability to 
an invitee, which was at issue in Erie.”26 Additionally, when courts are 
required to distinguish substance and procedure, they often fail to provide 
any criteria for their classifications.27 From these premises, we might 
conclude that the line between substance and procedure can be drawn in a 
fashion analogous to Justice Potter Stewart’s method for sorting 
pornography into the categories of works that are obscene and those that 
are not: we may know it when we see it.28 We might call this approach to 
the substance and procedure problem “intuitionist formalism.”29 
 
 23. Id. at 92 (Reed, J., concurring). 
 24. Linda S. Mullenix, The Constitutionality of the Proposed Rule 23 Class Action Amendments, 
39 ARIZ. L. REV. 615, 618 (1997). 
 25. The distinction between substance and procedure might be understood as purely nominal. A 
nominalist theory of procedure would hold that a given legal rule is procedural if and only if we call it 
“procedural.” If it is the case that the two sets of legal rules (substance and procedure) are nothing more 
than names given to arbitrary collections, then it should follow that there can be no adequate theory of 
procedural justice. 
 26. Freer, Mid-Life Crisis, supra note 18, at 1102. 
 27. Id. at 1108–10. 
 28.  Justice Stewart explained his method thus: 
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced 
within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. 
But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that. 
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 29. Michael Moore calls this approach “the paradigm case theory,” which he sees as one of the 
two “conventionalist theories of meaning.” Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 
58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 295 (1985). 
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Whatever the virtues of intuitionist formalism as a decision procedure 
for practical purposes, it will not do for the purpose of defining the scope of 
a theory of procedural justice. That purpose requires more than a set of 
paradigm cases of procedural and substantive rules, and it requires more 
than an ability to do ad hoc sorting of particular procedures because a 
theory of procedural justice must be formulated in abstract and general 
terms,30 the content of a theory of procedural justice necessarily requires a 
domain of application. 
Furthermore, there are good reasons to doubt the efficacy of 
intuitionist formalism as a practical decision procedure. If Erie has any 
lesson, it is Justice Reed’s observation about the line between substance 
and procedure being hazy, which has been vindicated by experience. No 
one familiar with the cases is likely to believe that we can sort substance 
from procedure because we know it when we see it. Quite the contrary, the 
lesson of Erie is that we often fail to see it even when we know it. Many of 
the settled issues in Erie jurisprudence remain hazy even after they are 
resolved.31 
Nonetheless, our intuitions (or better, our considered judgments) about 
particular cases are certainly relevant to the inquiry at hand. An adequate 
theory of substance and procedure must account for ordinary language and 
for the settled judgments of competent legal practitioners (like scholars, 
judges, and lawyers). A theory of substance and procedure must either 
count pleading and joinder as procedural and classify the duty of care in 
negligence as substantive, or offer a compelling explanation as to why our 
considered conviction about these paradigm cases is in error. 
3. Outcome Determination: Ex Ante and Ex Post 
Does the Supreme Court’s Erie jurisprudence have anything to teach 
us about substance and procedure? The first place to look is the case in 
 
 30. This is not to say that we could not offer microtheories that address the fairness of particular 
procedures. For example, we could articulate a microtheory of procedural fairness that took pleading 
rules as its domain. Such a theory would require criteria for what counts as a pleading rule, but it would 
not necessarily require an answer to whether and why pleading rules are procedural in nature. One 
might produce a microtheory for each and every legal rule that our intuitions count as procedural. The 
set consisting of these microtheories might then be said to comprise a “theory of procedural justice,” but 
it would be more natural to say that if microtheories are the best we can do, then there is no 
macrotheory of procedural justice. 
 31. Examples are numerous. Statutes of limitations are considered substantive for Erie purposes, 
see Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110–12 (1945), but intuitive formalism suggests the 
opposite result—that limitations periods are procedural rather than substantive in nature. 
SOLU12.DOC 11/30/2004 9:41 AM 
196 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:181 
which the Court itself first attempted to develop a deep answer to the 
question, Guaranty Trust Co. v. York.32 
a. Outcome Determination: Ex Post from Termination 
Simplifying greatly, the issue in York was whether a state statute of 
limitations or the federal equitable doctrine of laches applied to the 
plaintiff’s claim. This would determine whether an action for breach of 
fiduciary duty would be time-barred; the former doomed the claim, while 
the latter allowed it to go forward.33 Given Justice Reed’s statement in 
Erie, one might think that this would turn on whether statutes of limitations 
should be classified as substantive or procedural. Justice Frankfurter’s 
opinion for the Court in York suggests that this question is not well framed: 
Matters of ‘substance’ and matters of ‘procedure’ are much talked about 
in the books as though they defined a great divide cutting across the 
whole domain of law. But, of course, ‘substance’ and ‘procedure’ are the 
same keywords to very different problems. Neither ‘substance’ nor 
‘procedure’ represents the same invariants. Each implies different 
variables depending upon the particular problem for which it is used. 
And the different problems are only distantly related at best, for the 
terms are in common use in connection with situations turning on such 
different considerations as those that are relevant to questions pertaining 
to ex post facto legislation, the impairment of the obligations of contract, 
the enforcement of federal rights in the State courts and the 
multitudinous phases of the conflict of laws.34 
Justice Frankfurter’s suggestion is that the terms “substance” and 
“procedure” take on different meanings in different contexts. What is 
substantive in one context may be procedural in another. If that were all 
that Frankfurter said, then York might suggest that the search for a general 
theory of procedural fairness is doomed to failure, but that is not all he said: 
And so the question is not whether a statute of limitations is deemed a 
matter of ‘procedure’ in some sense. The question is whether such a 
statute concerns merely the manner and the means by which a right to 
recover, as recognized by the State, is enforced, or whether such 
statutory limitation is a matter of substance in the aspect that alone is 
relevant to our problem, namely, does it significantly affect the result of 
a litigation for a federal court to disregard a law of a State that would be 
 
 32. Id. at 99. 
 33. Id. at 100–01. See also id. at 107 (“[T]his case reduces itself to the narrow question whether, 
when no recovery could be had in a State court because the action is barred by the statute of limitations, 
a federal court in equity can take cognizance of the suit because there is diversity of citizenship between 
the parties.”). 
 34. Id. at 108 (citation omitted). 
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controlling in an action upon the same claim by the same parties in a 
State court?35 
The italicized clause might provide us with a test for the line between 
substance and procedure. That is, we might say that if a legal rule was 
outcome determinative ex post from the point of view of the termination of 
the litigation, then the rule is substantive; but, if a legal rule did not 
determine who won or lost from the ex post perspective, then it is 
procedural. In York, the choice between the federal equitable doctrine of 
laches and the state statute of limitations was outcome determinative; under 
the former rule, the action should have been allowed to go forward, but 
under the latter rule, the action would have been barred. 
Is this an adequate criterion for the sorting of legal rules into the 
categories of substance and procedure? The answer is no for reasons that 
were presented by Chief Justice Warren in Hanna v. Plumer.36 In Hanna, 
the plaintiff brought a state law claim in federal court on the basis of 
diversity jurisdiction. The defendant was served pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 4, which allowed process to be left at the defendant’s 
home with a responsible person.37 Under Massachusetts law, in-hand 
service was required.38 Is the choice between these rules outcome 
determinative? Chief Justice Warren answered thus: 
The difference between the conclusion that the Massachusetts rule is 
applicable, and the conclusion that it is not, is of course at this point 
“outcome-determinative” in the sense that if we hold the state rule to 
apply, respondent prevails, whereas if we hold that Rule 4(d)(1) governs, 
the litigation will continue. But in this sense every procedural variation 
is “outcome-determinative.” For example, having brought suit in a 
federal court, a plaintiff cannot then insist on the right to file subsequent 
pleadings in accord with the time limits applicable in the state courts, 
even though enforcement of the federal timetable will, if he continues to 
insist that he must meet only the state time limit, result in determination 
of the controversy against him.39 
Why does every procedural variation seem outcome determinative, post 
hoc, from the perspective of the termination of litigation? The assumption 
on which the reasoning of Hanna rests is that procedural rules are enforced 
 
 35. Id. at 109 (emphasis added). 
 36. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
 37. Id. at 461. 
 38. Id. at 462. 
 39. Id. at 468–69 (emphasis added). 
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through outcome-affecting rulings.40 That is, if you fail to serve process in 
compliance with the service of process rule, the sanction is that your action 
is dismissed. If you fail to plead in accordance with the pleading rules, then 
you are subject to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (or a 
demurrer). If you fail to properly join a defendant, your claim against that 
defendant will not be heard. This criticism of the York outcome-
determination test is generally considered to be decisive. For our purposes, 
the point is that outcome determination from an ex post perspective of the 
termination of the litigation will not serve as the criterion for what counts 
as procedure. In that context, the proper formulation of the test would be 
whether a given procedural rule could affect the outcome of the litigation. 
Application of the test will yield the conclusion that the set of procedural 
legal rules is empty.41 
b. Outcome Determination: Ex Ante from Initiation 
If Hanna provides the rationale for rejection of the ex post outcome 
determination test, it also articulates a substitute test. Rather than asking 
whether a given legal rule is outcome determinative ex post, we can instead 
ask whether it is outcome determinative ex ante from the point of view of 
the initiation of the action. As Chief Justice Warren put it, 
Though choice of the federal or state rule will at this point have a marked 
effect upon the outcome of the litigation, the difference between the two 
rules would be of scant, if any, relevance to the choice of a forum. 
Petitioner, in choosing her forum, was not presented with a situation 
where application of the state rule would wholly bar recovery; rather, 
adherence to the state rule would have resulted only in altering the way 
in which process was served.42 
The ex ante version of the outcome-determination test seems a more 
promising candidate for a general test of the line between substance and 
procedure. Our considered judgment is that the rules of tort, contract, and 
property law are substantive, and these rules are outcome determinative 
 
 40. There is an ambiguity in this formulation. Some rulings affect the outcome of a particular 
civil action, but do not preclude the claim. For example, a dismissal based on jurisdiction (personal or 
subject matter) may terminate the immediate civil action, but the claim may be refiled in another court. 
The general rule is that the claim preclusive (res judicata) effect is given only to judgments that are on 
the merits. See 18 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 131.30 (3d ed. 1997). 
 41. More precisely, the proposed test makes the classification of a legal rule as substantive or 
procedural depend entirely on the method by which the rule is enforced. Thus, pleading rules become 
substantive if enforced by dismissal and procedural if enforced by fines. Measured against our 
considered judgments, the ex post outcome-determination test is still inadequate. Pleading rules and 
joinder rules are paradigm cases of procedural rules, whether they are enforced by dismissal or by 
monetary sanctions. 
 42. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 469 (footnotes omitted). 
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from the point of view of a litigant choosing a forum ex ante at the time 
litigation is initiated. 
Consider the following example: Suppose there is a case where the 
choice is between two standards for the duty of care in negligence law. One 
jurisdiction employs Judge Learned Hand’s test and balances the cost of 
precaution against the cost of injury, discounted by the probability of its 
occurrence (the B<PL formula). Another jurisdiction asks whether the level 
of care falls below that of the ordinary citizen (the median level of care in 
the relevant community). For a wide range of cases, these standards of care 
will be identical, but, where they differ, the choice between them will be 
outcome determinative from the ex ante perspective. 
The ex ante version of the outcome-determination test also fits well 
with our considered judgments about the paradigm cases of procedure. For 
example, service of process, pleading, and joinder rules are considered 
procedural, but it would seem that none of these is outcome determinative 
from the point of view of a litigant choosing a forum. Take the Hanna case 
as an example. So long as the service of process rule is announced in 
advance, the plaintiff can comply with whatever rule is in effect. 
4. A Critique of Ex Ante Outcome Determination 
Despite the first blush attractiveness of Hanna’s ex ante version of the 
outcome determination test, it is, in the end, wholly unsatisfactory for our 
purposes. Ex ante outcome determination fails as the criterion for sorting 
rules into substance and procedure for at least four reasons: (1) it fails to 
account for the existence of procedural rules with substantive purposes, 
functions, and effects; (2) it cannot account for the ex ante outcome-
determinative nature of rule variations that systematically affect accuracy; 
(3) it is unable to account for the ex ante outcome-determinative nature of 
rule variations that systematically affect procedural costs; and (4) it 
classifies forum-selection rules (for example, venue and jurisdictional 
rules) as substantive. Each of these points deserves comment. 
a. Procedural Rules with Substantive Purposes, Functions, and 
Effects 
The first failure of ex ante outcome determination is that it fails to 
account for the fact that substantive rules can easily be cast in procedural 
guise. One way to illustrate this is to examine the text of the Rules 
Enabling Act,43 the federal statute that authorizes the Supreme Court to 
 
 43. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000). 
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create rules of procedure and evidence for the federal trial courts.44 The Act 
provides that 
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of 
practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United 
States district courts (including proceedings before magistrate judges 
thereof) and courts of appeals. 
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. 
All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect 
after such rules have taken effect.45 
Subsection (a) empowers the Supreme Court to create “general rules of 
practice and procedure” while subsection (b) prohibits the Court from 
making rules that “abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive rights.”46 If 
substance and procedure were two mutually exclusive categories, then § 
2072(b) would be mere surplusage. But as Paul Carrington succinctly 
expressed the point, “the terms ‘substance’ and ‘procedure’ are not 
mutually exclusive.”47 That is, it is possible for a procedural norm to alter a 
substantive right. 
How can procedure modify substance? Consider a simple 
hypothetical: suppose that a pleading rule requires that plaintiffs provide 
the sort of detailed and particularized information in their complaint that is 
usually under the control of the defendant. Drawing on the model of Rule 
9(b), which requires that fraud must be pled with particularity,48 we could 
imagine a rule that requires a level of particularity that is, in practice, 
unattainable. For example, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
199549 (“PSLRA”) provides pleading rules for securities fraud actions50 
 
 44. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1168–69 
(1982). See also Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 
DUKE L.J. 1251, 1282–86 (2002) (discussing the substance-procedure dichotomy and the federal rules 
scheme). 
 45. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)–(b). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Paul D. Carrington, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE 
L.J. 281, 287. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965). 
 48. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 49. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.). 
 50. See, e.g., William D. Browning, Comment on “The New Securities Fraud Pleading 
Requirement,” 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 709 (1996); William S. Lerach & Eric Alan Isaacson, Pleading 
Scienter Under Section 21D(b)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Motive, Opportunity, 
Recklessness, and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893 
(1996); Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of the Effect of the 
PSLRA’s Internal-Information Standard on ‘33 and ‘34 Act Claims, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 537 (1998); 
Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 903 (2002); Lynn A. Stout, Type I Error, 
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that are far more difficult for plaintiffs to meet than the transsubstantive 
rules of pleading contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.51 If the 
pleading burden is raised enough, the effect may be to change the substance 
of the law. A claim that cannot be successfully pled is, in one sense, no 
claim at all. Borrowing terminology from Meir Dan-Cohen,52 the point is 
that rules of procedure provide “decision rules” (directed at officials such 
as judges) that can change the meaning of the “conduct rules” (directed at 
ordinary citizens) with which they are associated. This change in meaning 
may take time because substance-affecting rules of procedure are less 
transparent to the public than are rules of substantive law. But as time 
passes and legal advice translates the substance-affecting procedural 
decision rules for those whose conduct is at issue, rules of procedure may 
become de facto rules of conduct. 
Before proceeding further, I should note that this criticism of the ex 
ante outcome-determination test is not aimed at the usefulness of the test 
for Erie purposes. Rather, my point is that this test cannot, by itself, 
provide the criterion by which we define substance and procedure. Why 
not? Because the ex ante outcome-determination test does not distinguish 
between the category of procedural rules with substantive effects and the 
category of purely substantive rules. This point is illustrated by Figure 1 
below. 
 
Type II Error, and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711 (1996); Elliott J. 
Weiss & Janet E. Moser, Enter Yossarian: How to Resolve the Procedural Catch-22 That the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act Creates, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 457 (1998); Elliott J. Weiss, Pleading 
Securities Fraud, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (2001); Elliott J. Weiss, The New Securities Fraud 
Pleading Requirement: Speed Bump or Road Block?, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 675 (1996); Michael B. Dunn, 
Note, Pleading Scienter after the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or, a Textualist Revenge, 84 
CORNELL L. REV. 193 (1998). 
 51.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 8–9. 
 52. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in 
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984). 
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FIGURE 1. Substance and procedure 
  
b. Accuracy Effects 
There is a second reason for rejecting the ex ante outcome 
determination test: it misclassifies rule variations that systematically affect 
the accuracy of a system of procedure. Consider the following hypothetical: 
a litigant is given the choice of two systems of procedure. The first system 
has hypertechnical pleading rules and allows for almost no pretrial 
discovery. The second system has simplified pleading rules and provides 
for extensive pretrial discovery. Assume for the purposes of the 
hypothetical that the first system places a very high premium on lawyering 
skills and that it therefore systematically produces inaccurate results in 
cases where the litigant with the worse case on the merits has the better 
lawyer. This system might well be viewed as outcome determinative from 
the point of view of a plaintiff choosing a forum. For example, a plaintiff 
with a weak case on the merits but a superb lawyer might prefer system 
one, whereas a plaintiff with a strong case on the merits but a weak lawyer 
might prefer system two. 
The point of the hypothetical is that procedural systems may vary in 
systematic and predictable ways with respect to accuracy. Because 
accuracy effects can be outcome determinative from the ex ante point of 
view, they would be classified as substantive by the Hanna ex ante 
outcome-determination test. But this result is inconsistent with many of our 
considered pretheoretical judgments about the line between substance and 
procedure. Discovery and pleading rules do not automatically become 
substantive because they can systematically affect accuracy. This 
conclusion needs to be qualified. If the rules of discovery or pleading are 
substance specific, so that they disfavor (or favor) particular plaintiffs with 
particular kinds of claims, then they can become quasi-substantive in 
Purely 
su b stantive 
rules 
Purely 
pr o cedural 
rules 
Procedural rules with 
substantive effects 
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nature. The difference between the less accurate procedure and the more 
accurate procedure is not a difference of substantive law, however, simply 
because procedural improvements can make the system more accurate in a 
predictable way. 
c. Procedural Costs 
The third failure of ex ante outcome determination is closely related to 
the second. Some procedural systems are more costly than others, and this 
fact may be viewed as outcome determinative from the point of view of a 
litigant choosing a forum. In this situation, as a plaintiff I must choose 
between two procedural systems, an expensive system that will require me 
to expend more than the value of the claim to get relief and a cheap system 
that will permit me to pursue my claim to judgment without such an 
expenditure; from my point of view, then, when I am choosing a forum, 
this choice is outcome determinative. Procedural systems impose a variety 
of costs, including directly-charged fees, the costs of representation, and 
the costs imposed by discovery. 
Even though litigation costs may be outcome determinative from the 
point of view of a litigant choosing a forum, it does not follow that costs 
transform procedure into substance. Once again, the outcome determination 
test seems to produce a false positive for substance, sweeping in variations 
that are procedural in nature. 
d. Forum Selection Rules 
The fourth failure of ex ante outcome determination is very specific 
but nonetheless quite telling. Rules of jurisdiction and venue are 
paradigmatic cases of procedural rules, but they are, of course, outcome 
determinative from the point of view of a litigant choosing a forum. If the 
court lacks venue or jurisdiction over a claim, it will be dismissed. Once 
again, the ex ante outcome-determination test fails to sort properly. 
e. Summary 
 In sum, Hanna’s ex ante version of the outcome determination test 
simply is not appropriate for the job of sorting substance from procedure. 
As Justice Harlan wrote in his Hanna concurrence, 
In turning from the “outcome” test of York back to the unadorned forum-
shopping rationale of Erie, however, the Court falls prey to like 
oversimplification, for a simple forum-shopping rule also proves too 
much; litigants often choose a federal forum merely to obtain what they 
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consider the advantages of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or to try 
their cases before a supposedly more favorable judge.53 
Both procedural rules and substantive rules may seem outcome 
determinative from the point of view of a litigant choosing a forum. 
5. Primary Conduct and Litigation Conduct 
Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Hanna suggests yet another approach 
to the substance-procedure dichotomy. Justice Harlan wrote, 
To my mind the proper line of approach in determining whether to apply 
a state or a federal rule, whether “substantive” or “procedural,” is to stay 
close to basic principles by inquiring if the choice of rule would 
substantially affect those primary decisions respecting human conduct 
which our constitutional system leaves to state regulation.54 
The key phrase is “primary decisions respecting human conduct.”55 This 
test, although never endorsed explicitly by the Supreme Court, has been 
influential in the Erie context.56 
The meaning of Justice Harlan’s phrase can be explicated by a 
metaphor. Procedure, we might say, regulates conduct inside the 
courtroom. Substance, on the other hand, regulates conduct outside the 
courtroom.57 By “inside the courtroom” we refer not only to literal 
courtrooms, but also to clerks’ offices, conference rooms where depositions 
are taken, lawyers’ offices where pleadings are drafted, and so forth. By 
“outside the courtroom” we refer to the full range of human conduct from 
driving automobiles to selling real estate and entering into contracts. Of 
course, this primary conduct may take place inside a courtroom where torts 
may be committed, property sold, or contracts made. The topographic 
metaphor—inside and outside the courtroom—stands for a larger 
distinction. 
 
 53. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. For example, Judge Posner equates “substantive” with “designed to shape conduct outside 
the courtroom and not just improve the accuracy or lower the cost of the judicial process.” S.A. Healy 
Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 60 F.3d 305, 310 (7th Cir. 1995). Posner does not cite Justice 
Harlan, but the connection is obvious, as has been noted by Freer. See Freer, Some Thoughts, supra note 
18, at 1661. For a discussion of the influence of Justice Harlan’s formulation, see Jed I. Bergman, Note, 
Putting Precedent in Its Place: Stare Decisis and Federal Predictions of State Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 
969, 975 n.33 (1996). See also Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1, 46 n.200 (1985) (using Justice Harlan’s definition of substantive rules). 
 57. See S.A. Healy Co., 60 F.3d at 310. 
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So, what distinction stands behind this metaphor? Serving process, 
drafting complaints, and taking depositions are just as much human 
conduct as speeding, buying a home, or entering into a personal services 
contract. Using Justice Harlan’s distinction, what marks out the latter as 
primary decisions respecting human conduct?58 The danger of circularity is 
apparent. We cannot use procedure or process, or substance or substantive, 
to mark the distinction because those are the terms for which we are 
seeking meaning. 
But a second look at the metaphor is, nonetheless, revealing. Courts 
(as well as other adjudicative institutions, such as administrative tribunals 
or arbitration firms) are themselves identifiable. We know which 
institutions are courts and which are not. We know what lawsuits are, and 
we know under what conditions parties become parties to disputes. We also 
know when parties are not engaged in litigation. So when we speak of 
litigation-related conduct, we are not begging the substance-procedure 
question. Rather, we are appealing to relatively certain usages that do not 
depend directly on the answer to the substance-procedure question. Once 
we are able to identify the contexts in which litigation occurs, we then are 
able to apply Justice Harlan’s primary conduct test. A rule is procedural if 
its function is to regulate adjudication-related conduct. A rule is substantive 
if its function is to regulate conduct that occurs outside the context of 
adjudication. A rule of law is both substantive and procedural if its function 
is to regulate both types of conduct. Rules that have both procedural and 
substantive functions may, nonetheless, have a function that dominates.59 
There is yet another technique for explicating the meaning of Justice 
Harlan’s phrase “primary decisions respecting human conduct.” When 
looking at the outcome-determination test, I employed two perspectives—
ex post (looking back from the end of litigation) and ex ante (looking 
forward from the point immediately prior to litigation). I can, however, 
move the ex ante perspective back in my stylized chronology of a dispute 
to the point in time that precedes the conduct that gave rise to the dispute. 
In other words, we can view a dispute ex ante from the point in time before 
 
 58. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 475 (Harlan, J. concurring). 
 59. In this Article, I use the word “function” in a crucial role, and I have chosen that word rather 
than effect or purpose. We might define the line between substance and procedure by referring to the 
effects of legal rules. For example, tort law affects primary conduct and pleading rules affect litigation-
related conduct. Or we might draw the same line by inquiring into the purpose of legal rules, for 
example, contract law is intended to regulate agreements outside of the litigation context, whereas 
joinder rules are intended to affect the way lawsuits are put together and taken apart. “Function” in this 
context implies that rules themselves have a purpose or telos, and the ends of the rules are revealed in 
part by the effects that the rules have. 
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the accident occurred, before the contract negotiations began, and so forth. 
From that perspective, we can ask whether the legal rule in question would 
have altered the ways the parties to the dispute would have behaved before 
litigation commenced. From this perspective, we might define substantive 
rules as those that would alter predispute (primary) conduct.60 
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws applies the ex ante 
perspective of a person deciding how to act before a dispute arises. In 
applying this perspective, it argues that a forum should apply its own 
procedural rules to a dispute in which the substantive law may be that of a 
different jurisdiction: 
Parties do not usually give thought to matters of judicial administration 
before they enter into legal transactions. They do not usually place 
reliance on the applicability of the rules of a particular state to issues that 
would arise only if litigation should become necessary. Accordingly, the 
parties have no expectations as to such eventualities, and there is no 
danger of unfairly disappointing their hopes by applying the forum’s 
rules in such matters.61 
The Restatement paints with too broad a brush. In practice, rules of judicial 
administration directly affect the way litigants behave before disputes arise. 
Strict pleading rules may assure potential defendants that they can engage 
in certain conduct with the confidence that claims against them based on 
such conduct will be dismissed at an early (and relatively low-cost) stage of 
litigation. 
B. A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT: ACOUSTIC SEPARATION OF SUBSTANCE 
AND PROCEDURE 
So far, our approach to the substance versus procedure question has 
been theoretically cautious and mostly doctrinal—closely tied to the 
 
 60. The focus on predispute conduct emphasizes an important fact about the relationship between 
procedure and conduct that occurs postdispute but before the complaint is filed. During this period, the 
parties may interact in a variety of ways: a demand letter may be dispatched, a settlement offer may be 
made and rejected, or informal mediation may occur. These activities take place “in the shadow of the 
law,” both substantive and procedural. When parties settle, they calculate their expected liability or 
expected recovery minus litigation costs. In a very real sense, this bargaining takes place in the shadow 
of procedure. Cf. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The 
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 993–95 (1979) (discussing the interplay between substantive and 
procedural law in divorce litigation); Phyllis Tropper Baumann, Judith Olans Brown & Stephen N. 
Subrin, Substance in the Shadow of Procedure: The Integration of Substantive and Procedural Law in 
Title VII Cases, 33 B.C. L. REV. 211 (1992) (discussing the interplay between substantive and 
procedural law in civil rights litigation). 
 61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 cmt. a (1971). 
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development of the Erie doctrine in the context of concrete cases with 
particular facts. But before proceeding further, we must grasp the abstract 
distinction between substance and procedure. Such a grasp is elusive 
precisely because of the entanglement of substance and procedure. By 
avoiding the complex particularity of the actual legal world, a thought 
experiment will allow us to see substance and procedure in a simplified 
legal environment. If the actual world of substance and procedure is a 
jungle, overgrown by intertwined strands of substance and procedure, we 
need a “desert landscape” so substance and procedure can stand in splendid 
isolation.62 
This thought experiment posits a world in which citizens know only 
the content of the substantive law, and only legal officials know the content 
of the procedural law. We will explore the thought experiment in two 
stages—informal and formal. The informal version aims to make the 
posited world vivid and simple enough for an immediate intuitive grasp. 
The formal version aims to make this possible world precise and 
transparent. 
1. The Informal Thought Experiment: The Cone of Silence 
Imagine a world in which legal institutions (judicial, legislative, and 
executive officials) are “acoustically separated” from ordinary citizens.63 
As an aid to your imagination, you might picture a giant cone of silence 
covering the government complex, preventing any transfer of information 
from legal institutions to ordinary citizens with only a few exceptions. 
What are the exceptions? First, a code of conduct regulating matters 
such as contract, criminal activity, property, and torts is promulgated by the 
legislature and allowed to pass through the cone to the outside world, 
where each citizen commits the code to memory. Second, information 
relevant to particular legal disputes, such as documents, deposition 
transcripts, exhibits, and witnesses, is allowed to pass through the cone into 
the legal system, where it is processed by legal representatives and judges 
using a code of procedure. Finally, judgments (orders to pay money 
damages, injunctions, and orders for incarceration) pass through the cone 
into the outside world. 
 
 62. Cf. Willard Van Orman Quine, On What There Is, in 2 REVIEW OF METAPHYSICS (1948), 
reprinted in WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW: LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICAL 
ESSAYS 1, 4 (2d revised ed. 1961) (using the “desert landscape” metaphor to contrast its pleasing 
aesthetic with an unattractive overpopulated universe). 
 63. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 52, at 630. 
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To those outside the cone of silence, the system of adjudication is a 
black box: information flows in and statutes and judgments flow out. The 
rules governing the operation of the courts inside the cone are the rules of 
procedure. The rules governing the conduct of citizens outside the cone are 
the rules of substance. Because of the acoustic separation between the 
institutions of adjudication and the outside world, the categories of 
substance and procedure are well defined and mutually exclusive. 
2. The Formal Thought Experiment: The Possible World of Acoustic 
Separation 
This informal version of the thought experiment can be made precise 
by carefully defining the conceptual tools used and by precisely specifying 
its conditions. To build the formal version, we need to avail ourselves of 
three conceptual tools: (1) H.L.A. Hart’s distinction between primary and 
secondary rules, (2) acoustic separation between conduct and decision 
rules, and (3) possible worlds’ semantics. Each of these three ideas requires 
brief explication: 
a. Primary Rules and Secondary Rules 
The first conceptual tool is the distinction between primary and secondary 
rules, made famous by H.L.A. Hart in his magisterial book, The Concept of 
Law.64 Hart’s distinction “discriminate[s] between two different though 
related types” of rules65: 
Under rules of the one type, which may well be considered the basic or 
primary type, human beings are required to do or abstain from certain 
actions, whether they wish to or not. Rules of the other type are in a 
sense parasitic upon or secondary to the first; for they provide that 
human beings may by doing or saying certain things introduce new rules 
of the primary type, extinguish or modify old ones, or in various ways 
determine their incidence or control their operations.66 
Secondary rules, in Hart’s sense, encompass the rules of contracts and 
trusts, which permit private individuals to create, modify, and extinguish 
primary obligations. The secondary rules encompass the rules that define 
the powers of legislatures and administrative agencies—powers to make 
general laws and rules that create, modify, or extinguish both primary 
obligations and secondary rules. Finally and crucially, secondary rules 
 
 64. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 80–99 (2d ed. 1994). 
 65. Id. at 80. 
 66. Id. at 81. 
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allow adjudicators to determine the incidence and control the operation of 
other primary and secondary rules in particular cases. 
b. Acoustic Separation Between Conduct Rules and Decision Rules  
The second distinction that we need to formalize our thought 
experiment is the idea of acoustic separation between conduct and decision 
rules—that is, the cone of silence. Formulated in a more rigorous way the 
idea of acoustic separation specifies domains, between which information 
of a certain type does not flow. Dan-Cohen has explored the idea of 
acoustic separation: 
The general public engages in various kinds of conduct, while officials 
make decisions with respect to members of the general public. Imagine 
further that each of the two groups occupies a different, acoustically 
sealed chamber. This condition I shall call “acoustic separation.” Now 
think of the law as a set of normative messages directed to both groups. 
In such a universe, the law necessarily contains two sets of messages. 
One set is directed at the general public and provides guidelines for 
conduct. These guidelines are what I have called “conduct rules.” The 
other set of messages is directed at the officials and provides guidelines 
for their decisions. These are “decision rules.” 67 
Dan-Cohen’s formulation is evocative but not formally complete. Acoustic 
separation is insufficient, for the purposes of our experiment, because 
information could flow between the realms of conduct and decision 
through visual, electronic, or other means. The formal requirement is that 
no information regarding decision rules should pass from the one zone to 
the other. 
c. Possible Worlds 
In the actual world, only limited acoustic separation exists between the 
officials who implement rules of decision and procedure, on the one hand, 
and the citizens whose actions are governed by rules of conduct, on the 
other. Our thought experiment requires that we posit a hypothetical 
situation or possible world68—to use the notion made famous by Gottfried 
Leibniz69 and developed by the contemporary philosophers Saul Kripke70 
 
 67. Dan-Cohen, supra note 52, at 630. 
 68. See generally JOHN DIVERS, POSSIBLE WORLDS (2002) (providing a comprehensive 
introduction to the issues raised by the philosophical idea of possible worlds). 
 69. See GOTTFRIED WILHELM FREIHERR VON LEIBNIZ, The Theodicy, in LEIBNIZ: SELECTIONS 
509, 509–11 (Philip P. Weiner ed., 1951) (introducing the idea of possible worlds). Leibniz used the 
idea of a possible world to answer the argument against the existence of an omnipotent and beneficent 
God from the problem of evil. The argument is not proven, Leibniz maintained, until it is shown that the 
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and David Lewis.71 The point of the thought experiment is neither that the 
actual world could become this possible world nor that this possible world 
is consistent with the laws of natural science and human psychology and 
sociology. The world of the thought experiment is simply one that 
resembles the actual world, except that acoustic separation obtains as 
specified. So long as we can imagine this possible world as required by the 
thought experiment, further questions, such as the precise mechanism by 
which acoustic separation would operate, need not be answered. 
The formal thought experiment can be stated in a stripped-down 
version, which contains key features, but abstracts from the complex details 
of actual legal systems. We can posit a possible world with the following 
characteristics: 
1. There is a single political entity, the State. 
2. All general rules of law are promulgated by a single unicameral 
legislature and integrated into a Code. 
3. All dispute resolution is accomplished through a unified 
judiciary that consists of a single trial court with a single judge 
and no jury. All legal proceedings terminate in a judgment, which 
is an order that requires specific actions by the parties to a dispute. 
All litigation costs including attorneys’ fees are borne by the 
State. 
4. The Code is divided into four parts: 
i. The Constitutional Code, which consists of secondary rules 
that confer power on the legislature to enact, modify, or 
terminate provisions of the Code. 
ii. The Code of Conduct, which consists entirely of conduct 
rules that are addressed to citizens, including primary rules, 
such as criminal prohibitions, and secondary rules, such as 
contract law. 
iii. The Code of Decision, which consists of decision rules 
addressed to legal officials, that attaches legal consequences 
to violations of the primary and secondary rules either 
contained in or authorized by the Code of Conduct. 
 
actual world is not the best of all possible worlds. Id. “World” here refers to the whole universe through 
time and not just the planet Earth. 
 70. See SAUL A. KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY (rev. ed. 1980) (summarizing Kripke’s 
philosophy of language and his mind-body problem theory). 
 71. See DAVID LEWIS, ON THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS (1986) (defending modal realism, which 
posits the existence of numerous alternate world universes). 
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vi. The Code of Adjudication, which consists of rules for 
conducting dispute resolution by the unified judiciary 
specified above. These rules include (a) conduct rules for the 
legal representatives of parties in civil and criminal actions 
and (b) decision rules for judges, which define the actions 
that judges must take in response to each possible action by 
the legal representatives for the parties. These rules are 
designed so that the relevant facts and provisions of the Code 
of Decision are accurately presented to the judge. 
5. The Constitutional Code requires the four-part division of the 
Code specified above. It further specifies that all legal rules 
aiming at the regulation of conduct shall be included in the Code 
of Conduct and that the content of the Code of Decision shall 
conform to the Code of Conduct. The Constitutional Code also 
requires the Code of Adjudication to maximize accuracy, that is, 
to maximize the extent to which findings of fact are in conformity 
with the state of the world and the extent to which the law is 
correctly applied to the facts. Legislators do, in fact, conform to 
the provisions of the Constitutional Code. 
6. The Code is fully specified. For every possible action by 
citizens that the Code permits, forbids, or requires, the Code 
specifies that the action can be permitted, forbidden, or required 
by a contract. For every possible action by the legal 
representatives of parties in the course of representation, the Code 
specifies a legal consequence. Every possible action by legislative, 
judicial, and executive officials is either required, prohibited, or 
permitted by the Code. 
7. Each natural person is either a citizen or an official. The class 
of officials includes members of the executive, legislative, and 
judicial branches, as well as lawyers and their staffs. Officials act 
only in their official capacity and act in full compliance with the 
provisions of the Code. 
8. There is acoustic separation between substance and procedure, 
specified as follows: (a) each citizen knows the content of Part ii 
of the Code, but no citizen is aware of the content of Parts i, iii, or 
iv of the Code; (b) legislative and executive officials are aware of 
the whole content of the Code; (c) judicial officials and lawyers 
are only aware of the content of Parts i, iii, and iv of the Code; (d) 
citizens have no knowledge of the content of legal proceedings 
except that parties to a dispute do know the content of the 
judgments of their legal proceeding; and (e) citizens make no 
attempt to infer the content of the Constitutional Code, the Code 
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of Decision, or the Code of Adjudication from the information 
they possess about the outcome of individual adjudications. 
The thought experiment can be made more concrete by imagining a 
particular case: 
Ben drives negligently and hits Alice’s automobile. The Code of 
Conduct contains a provision that specifies that negligent drivers 
will pay compensation to their victims. Alice contacts her legal 
representative by passing a message through the barrier 
establishing acoustic separation. Behind the barrier, Alice’s legal 
representative then initiates a proceeding against Ben in court as 
specified by Code of Adjudication. Also pursuant to the Code of 
Adjudication, Ben and Alice’s lawyers prepare pleadings, conduct 
discovery, participate in a trial, and so forth—resulting in findings 
of fact and conclusions of law that accurately represent the state of 
the world and the content of the Code of Decision. Information 
regarding Ben and Alice’s conduct flows into court, but the 
proceedings take place in secret, without information concerning 
their content flowing to Alice, Ben, or other citizens. At the end of 
the proceedings, the judge applies the law to the facts and issues a 
judgment requiring Ben to pay Alice $500 in damages. The 
judgment passes through the barrier and is then communicated to 
Ben and Alice. Ben pays Alice the $500. 
In the world of acoustic separation between substance and procedure, we 
have no difficulty drawing a precise bright line between substance and 
procedure. The substantive law is divided into two parts, the Code of 
Conduct and the Code of Decision.72 The procedural law is contained in the 
Code of Adjudication. Provisions are sorted into the Parts of the Code by 
reference to (1) the audience to whom they are addressed, and (2) the 
purposes for which they are enacted. Because of the provisions of the 
Constitutional Code and the fact of acoustic separation, no provision of the 
Code of Adjudication has any substantive effects or purposes. Because no 
officials are citizens, the substantive law only affects adjudication through 
the Code of Decision. 
 
 72. The Code of Conduct is clearly substantive because it is aimed at the regulation of primary 
conduct. The Code of Decision, however, is aimed at regulating the decisionmaking processes of 
judges. Our thought experiment assumes, however, that the content of the two codes is matched. Thus, 
if there is a provision in the Code of Conduct that says, “Murder is prohibited,” then there will be a 
matching provision in the Code of Decision that states, “If some person P, commits murder, then P shall 
serve a twenty year sentence in a prison.” Because provisions of the Code of Decision regulate 
litigaton-related conduct, there is an important sense in which they are also procedural. This point is 
explored below. See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing procedural functions of rules of decision). 
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Thus, the pleading rules that govern Ben and Alice’s dispute are 
purely procedural. The standard of care, on the other hand, is divided into 
two parts—a rule in the Code of Conduct that is available to Ben and Alice 
and a rule in the Code of Decision that is not available to Ben or Alice, but 
is available to attorneys and judges. 
3. Implications of the Thought Experiment 
Of course, the actual world is not the world of acoustic separation of 
substance and procedure. In the actual world, there is no guarantee of 
acoustic separation. Citizens can become aware of the content of the 
procedural rules and decision rules. In the actual world, legislatures can 
attempt to influence the primary conduct of citizens by varying the rules of 
procedure. Moreover, procedural rules may have the unintended 
consequence of affecting conduct to the extent that they may produce 
inaccurate results that can be systematically predicted. In the actual world, 
substance and procedure are entangled. 
Nonetheless, the thought experiment allows theorists to analyze the 
entanglement of the procedural and substantive dimensions of actual rules. 
For any particular entangled rule, we can imagine how that rule might be 
disentangled in the world of acoustic separation. By disentangling mixed 
rules into discrete rules of conduct, decision, and adjudication, we can 
identify their substantive and procedural aspects. The thought experiment 
allows us to see clearly the entangled strands of substance and procedure. 
In other words, the thought experiment provides a rigorous way of 
“inquiring if the choice of rule would substantially affect those primary 
decisions respecting human conduct.”73 The rigor of the method does not 
imply that it provides a determinate answer for every case. When we look 
at the history of actual rules, their functions may be difficult to discern. 
This is an epistemological problem stemming from our incomplete 
knowledge of legislative purpose and causal relationships in the actual 
world. This kind of epistemological problem may be of substantial practical 
significance, but it does not undermine the ontological status of the 
distinction between substance and procedure that is revealed by the thought 
experiment. 
Some further explanation is required. The view advanced here is that 
the line between substance and procedure is an idealization. Useful 
application of the idealization to the actual legal rules requires knowledge 
 
 73. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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about the world. When that knowledge is unavailable, characterizing a rule 
as procedural or substantive may be impossible. Furthermore, one may not 
be able to untangle the strands of substance and procedure. Nonetheless, 
even in these cases, the thought experiment provides a means of identifying 
the knowledge that would be decisive if it became available. 
The thought experiment performs another important function by 
providing a mechanism for distinguishing form from function in the 
context of the distinction between substance and procedure. In the world of 
the thought experiment, procedural form maps perfectly onto procedural 
function, and substantive form likewise maps perfectly onto substantive 
function. In the actual world, where acoustic separation and purity of 
procedural intention are counterfactual, perfect mapping does not hold. 
Nonetheless, the thought experiment provides a fairly precise and 
analytically rigorous mechanism for identifying the formal and functional 
dimensions of a given legal rule. In the actual world, we might then classify 
legal rules using a two-by-two matrix, as in Table 1. 
TABLE 1. Form and function 
 
 
 
 
Form 
 
 
 Substantive  Procedural 
Substantive  Pure substantive rule Procedural form with 
substantive function 
Function Procedural Substantive form 
with procedural 
function 
Pure procedural rule 
 
This distinction between form and function is reflected in actual practice. 
For example, legal rules are divided into codes of procedure (for example, 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) and codes of conduct (for example, 
the California Penal Code). 
Finally, the purpose of the thought experiment is not to provide a 
device that will allow actual rules to be sorted into rules of substance and 
rules of procedure—although in some cases a rough and ready 
approximation of such sorting may serve practical purposes. Quite the 
contrary, the point of the thought experiment is to demonstrate how 
substance and procedure are thoroughly entangled in the actual rules of 
existing legal systems. 
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C. THE ENTANGLEMENT OF SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 
The idea that substance and procedure are not mutually exclusive is a 
familiar one. As Justice Frankfurter articulated in the York case, “[n]either 
‘substance’ nor ‘procedure’ represents the same invariants. Each implies 
different variables depending upon the particular problem for which it is 
used.”74 The New Jersey Supreme Court has opined that “it is simplistic to 
assume that all law is divided neatly between ‘substance’ and 
‘procedure.’”75 Scott Matheson argued that “[l]aw is the product of 
interaction between substance and procedure, but the relationship between 
the two is more subtle and complex than simply their joinder in 
litigation.”76 And finally, Judge Easterbrook once wrote that “[s]ubstance 
and process are intimately related. The procedures used determine how 
much substance is achieved, and by whom. Procedural rules usually are just 
a measure of how much the substantive entitlements are worth, of what we 
are willing to sacrifice to see a given goal attained.”77 
If the idea that substance and procedure are entwined is well accepted, 
the task that remains is to explicate that entanglement with the aim of 
clarifying rather than muddying the distinction between substance and 
procedure. What are the modes of entanglement? How do substance and 
procedure overlap and interact? My answer to these questions proceeds in 
steps. The initial step involves sorting the obvious cases of overlapping 
substance and procedure into two heuristic categories: (a) substantive 
procedure and (b) procedural substance. The initial category includes rules 
of law that are primarily procedural in form, but have a substantive 
function: these are rules of substantive procedure. The other category 
includes rules of law that are primarily substantive in form, but have a 
procedural function: these are rules of procedural substance. The next step 
is an exposition of the core idea of the entanglement thesis: procedure is an 
essential component of the action-guiding function of substantive law. 
1. Substantive Procedure 
The idealization of a pure rule of procedure assumes that procedural 
rules regulate the sphere of adjudicative institutions. Similarly, the 
idealization of a pure rule of substance posits that the function of the 
 
 74. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945). 
 75. Busik v. Levine, 307 A.2d 571, 578 (N.J. 1973). 
 76. Scott M. Matheson, Jr., Procedure in Public Person Defamation Cases: The Impact of the 
First Amendment, 66 TEX. L. REV. 215, 223 (1987) (footnotes omitted). 
 77. Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 112–13. 
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substantive law is to regulate primary conduct—the whole of human 
activity outside adjudicative contexts. These idealizations allow us to 
identify the formal and functional characteristics of substance and 
procedure. For example, pleading rules are procedural in form because they 
address the litigation process and not primary conduct. However, rules that 
are formally procedural may have a substantive function. There are two 
types of rules that we might call “substantive procedure.” The first involves 
deliberate use of procedural forms to modify substantive decision rules. 
The second involves the action-guiding role of procedures that particularize 
general legal norms. Let us begin with type one, the simplest case of 
substantive procedure. 
a. Substantive Procedure: Type One—Procedural Rules with 
Intentionally Substantive Functions. 
In the world of acoustic separation, procedural rules are ill suited to 
the function of regulating primary conduct—citizens cannot modify their 
behavior to accord with procedural variations because they are acoustically 
isolated from the adjudicative institutions. In the actual world, however, 
policymakers can take acoustic leakage into account and manipulate 
procedural forms in order to achieve substantive goals.78 
A familiar example of a substantive rule cast in procedural form is the 
parol evidence rule, which excludes oral evidence of the content of a 
written contract. The parol evidence rule has the form of a rule of evidence, 
but it functions as a substantive rule of law. To confirm this conclusion, we 
can perform the thought experiment of disentangling the substantive and 
procedural elements of the rule. Suppose that we thought the parol 
evidence rule truly was a rule of evidentiary procedure. In that case, the 
parol evidence rule would appear solely in the Code of Adjudication in the 
possible world of acoustic separation. Contracting parties would be 
unaware of the rule, and hence might try to modify or supplement their 
written agreements by oral statements. On this interpretation, the parol 
evidence rule would fail to perform its substantive function. The actual 
parol evidence rule is addressed to contracting parties; the rule informs the 
parties that in the case of an integrated writing, oral modifications or 
 
 78. See generally Jeffrey A. Parness, Amy M. Leonetti & Austin W. Bartlett, The Substantive 
Elements in the New Special Pleading Laws, 78 NEB. L. REV. 412 (1999) (examining the interplay 
between procedural and substantive legal reform in the heightened federal pleading regime); Pamela J. 
Stephens, Manipulation of Procedural Rules in Pursuit of Substantive Goals: A Reconsideration of the 
Impermissible Collateral Attack Doctrine, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1109, 1131 (1993) (discussing whether 
court use of procedural law to address judicially perceived limitations in the substantive law 
undermines public confidence in the legal process). 
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supplements do not have legal force. That is, the parol evidence rule is a 
secondary rule of substantive law (in Hart’s sense of “secondary”). The 
parol evidence rule tells citizens what they must do to modify the primary 
rules of conduct provided by a contract. Thus, in the world of acoustic 
separation, the parol evidence rule would have two components: (1) a 
provision in the Code of Conduct addressed to contracting parties; (2) a 
provision in the Code of Adjudication addressed to judges. No special rule 
of evidence would be required, because parol evidence of oral supplements 
or modifications would be excluded by the general evidentiary rule of 
relevance. 
Another important example of a rule with substantive function and 
procedural form is provided by the pleading provisions of the PSLRA79 and 
its sibling, the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act.80 The PSLRA 
modifies the transsubstantive rules of pleading provided by the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and 9(b). 81 Rule 8(a)(2) embodies the 
principle of “notice pleading” and requires only “a short and plain 
statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”82 Rule 9(b) 
provides that allegations of fraud must be made with particularity.83 The 
general pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2) requires only a minimal level of 
factual detail.84 Even Rule 9(b)’s requirement that fraud be pled with 
particularity has been interpreted to allow plaintiffs to allege fraud by 
specifying only the statement or conduct that was the basis of the 
 
 79. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.). See generally Patricia J. Meyer, Note, What Congress 
Said About the Heightened Pleading Standard: A Proposed Solution to the Securities Fraud Pleading 
Confusion, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2517 (1998) (analyzing various interpretations of procedural pleading 
standards for securities fraud and their substantive function); Matthew Roskoski, Note, A Case-by-Case 
Approach to Pleading Scienter Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 97 MICH. L. 
REV. 2265 (1999) (same). 
 80. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). See also David M. Levine & Adam C. Pritchard, The 
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998: The Sun Sets on California’s Blue Sky Laws, 54 
BUS. LAW. 1 (1998) (discussing developments that led to the Act and analyzing its substantive effect on 
securities fraud law); Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State 
Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1998) (discussing how the Act preempts 
state substantive law). 
 81. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), 9(b). See generally Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 
81 TEX. L. REV. 551 (2002) (discussing the survival of the heightened pleading requirements despite the 
trend toward liberal pleading standards); Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading 
Practice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1749 (1998). 
 82. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 83. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 84. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. Form 9 (providing only sketchy information in the model complaint 
for negligence). 
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allegation.85 Not all false statements are fraudulent, however, and in the 
context of a securities fraud action, predictions of future business success 
may give rise to allegations of “fraud by hindsight” when a business 
experiences unanticipated turbulence. Defending securities fraud actions is 
expensive and the fact that the action is pending may create uncertainties 
that interfere with the defendant firm’s ability to raise capital. Because the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit extensive and time-consuming 
discovery and pretrial motion practice, claims that would eventually be 
defeated on the merits may, nonetheless, alter primary conduct—for 
example, the kinds of statements made on behalf of firms to potential 
investors. In addition, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establish tough 
standards for summary judgment86 and directed verdicts.87 
The PSLRA adopts pleading standards that are much tougher than 
those provided by Rule 8(a)(2) and Rule 9(b). For example, if the 
complaint alleges a state of mind, it must “state with particularity facts 
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required 
state of mind.”88 Commentators on the PSLRA have observed that this 
language seems designed for a substantive purpose. For example, Leslie M. 
Kelleher observes that 
[p]artisan rule reformers recognized the importance of a particularity 
requirement to the outcome of a case and bypassed the Advisory 
Committee completely, taking their proposals for procedural 
amendments directly to Congress. The strict pleading requirement of the 
PSLRA . . . is designed to favor defendants over plaintiffs in securities 
lawsuits, not to implement some carefully planned vision of the 
procedural system.89 
Kelleher concludes that 
[t]he PSLRA is a clear illustration of the latest stage in the politicization 
of procedure. With the PSLRA, Congress has gone further than ever in 
providing procedural benefits to a particular group in order to vindicate 
the substantive goals of the Act. As Congress and partisan lobbyists have 
discovered the usefulness of procedural provisions in effectuating 
substantive purposes, the hazy line between substance and procedure has 
 
 85. See Denny v. Carey, 72 F.R.D. 574, 578, 580 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (reasoning that the particularity 
requirement of Rule 9(b) is satisfied if a plaintiff identifies the circumstances constituting fraud so that 
a defendant can adequately answer the plaintiff’s allegations). 
 86. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
 87. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a). 
 88. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000). 
 89. Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking “Substantive Rights” (in the Rules Enabling Act) More Seriously, 
74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 60 (1998) (footnotes omitted). 
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been blurred further, and we should expect to see even more instances of 
statutory procedural provisions.90 
The PSLRA is just one of many examples of type one (functionally 
substantive rules cast in procedural form).91 The essential structure of this 
type of entanglement of substance and procedure can be analyzed using the 
model of acoustic separation. The PSLRA uses procedural rules (that is, 
rules that would be found in the Code of Adjudication) to indirectly modify 
substantive decision rules (that is, rules found in the Code of Decision). 
Because of acoustic leakage, these modifications can have the same effects 
as changes in the substantive conduct rules (the Code of Conduct). 
b. Substantive Procedure: Type Two—Particularized Conduct Rules 
The second type of substantive procedure is more fundamental and 
pervasive than the first. Every civil action involves procedures that are 
substantive in the sense that they function to communicate particular rules 
of primary conduct—in other words, they are procedures that are action 
guiding. The standard picture of substance and procedure is that substantive 
rules of law function to guide primary conduct, conduct that occurs outside 
the litigation process, whereas procedural rules function to guide litigation-
related conduct. But the standard picture omits an important action-guiding 
function of procedure—the particularization of general legal norms. Our 
exploration of type two of substantive procedure can begin with examples 
and then proceed to a more abstract analysis. 
A very clear example of the particularization function is the 
declaratory judgment.92 Declaratory judgments have two critical features: 
(1) they take a general legal rule and apply it to a particular factual context, 
and (2) they can resolve a dispute by guiding primary conduct. A 
declaration that A’s work does not infringe B’s copyright enables A to 
enter into an agreement with C to distribute the work; the opposite outcome 
would communicate a message to C that distribution of the work would be 
contrary to law. A declaratory judgment acts as a kind of particularized 
statute or ex post facto law; whereas statutes declare obligations in general 
and abstract form, declaratory judgments legislate for particular individuals 
(or entities) on particular occasions. 
 
 90. Id. at 61 (footnotes omitted). 
 91. See Parness et al., supra note 78, at 414–24 (listing federal securities claims, New Jersey and 
Georgia professional malpractice claims, medical malpractice claims, requests for punitive damages, 
childhood sexual abuse claims, and federal civil rights claims as examples of substantive rules cast in 
procedural form). 
 92. For a collection of sources on declaratory judgments, see supra note 15. 
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Declaratory judgments provide a perspicuous example of action-
guiding particularization of general legal norms, but they are not the only 
example. Injunctions perform the same function, supplementing the 
declaration of rights with a coercive order backed by the force of 
punishment. The action-guiding function of damage awards is not always 
as clear because, on the surface, damage awards appear to operate 
backward (ex ante). Sometimes a damage award only guides action to the 
extent that it requires an act of payment in satisfaction of the judgment, but 
this is not always the case. Sometimes a damage award guides behavior by 
informing the parties (and others) about their particular legal obligations 
toward one another. Similarly, the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue 
preclusion guide action by making judgments, findings, and rulings 
explicitly binding parties in contexts outside the four corners of a particular 
civil action.93 
These examples of the action-guiding particularization of general legal 
norms are not accidental or exceptional. In the Introduction, we established 
that the actual world is characterized by three problems of compliance with 
substantive legal norms: (1) the problem of imperfect knowledge of law 
and fact, (2) the problem of incomplete specification of legal norms, and 
(3) the problem of partiality.94 The possible world of acoustic separation of 
substance and procedure allows us to appreciate the significance of 
procedure’s particularization function. When we laid out the conditions of 
acoustic separation, we stipulated that action-guiding outcomes 
(declaratory judgments, injunctions, and damage awards) could pass 
through the acoustic barrier. This specification was necessary for law to 
function effectively. If citizens were not allowed to learn of judgments, 
then the substantive law would effectively be crippled by the problems of 
imperfect knowledge, incomplete specification, and partiality. This fact 
leads to an important conclusion about the relationship between substance 
and procedure: even an idealized model of substance and procedure 
requires procedures to play the substantive role of action-guiding 
particularization of legal norms. This conclusion is important because it 
demonstrates the essential entanglement of substance and procedure. 
 
 93. The doctrine of issue preclusion, for example, has the effect of transforming factual and legal 
determinations in every case into the functional equivalent of declaratory judgments. What is 
“declared” in a summary judgment, verdict, finding of fact, or conclusion of law in a prior adjudication 
becomes binding on the parties to that adjudication. 
 94. See supra Part I.A. 
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2. Procedural Substance 
The entanglement of substance and procedure takes another form. 
Rules that are substantive in form may serve procedural functions. In the 
world of acoustic separation, courtrooms are insulated from the general 
rules of primary conduct. In the real world, rules aimed at primary conduct 
also regulate the litigation process. There are two types of procedural 
substance. Type one involves particular court rules that directly impact the 
litigation process. Type two involves the more general relationship between 
conduct rules and decision rules. 
a. Procedural Substance: Type One—Formal Conduct Rules with 
Intentionally Procedural Functions 
In the world of acoustic separation, the Code of Conduct does not 
impinge on the system of adjudication. In the actual world, no acoustic 
barrier prevents application of general rules of primary conduct to 
litigation-related behavior. Given this fact, procedural functions can be 
performed by rules cast in substantive guise. Among the many examples of 
such rules are criminal statutes prohibiting obstruction of justice, witness 
tampering, and destruction of evidence, and the tort of spoliation of 
evidence.95 These rules are substantive in form—criminal law and tort law 
are classified as substantive—but these substantive rules have procedural 
functions—deterring the destruction of evidence and correcting the 
injustices caused by procedural irregularities. 
b. Procedural Substance: Type Two—Particularized Decision Rules 
In the world of acoustic separation, what we ordinarily call the 
substantive law was divided into two parts, the Code of  
Conduct addressed to citizens and the Code of Decision addressed to 
judges. But the actual world of litigation does not involve this sort of 
acoustic separation. In the actual world, the articulation of the substantive 
law by appellate courts (as opposed to legislatures) always takes place in a 
particular procedural context. 
One such context is the motion for judgment as a matter of law96 (the 
demurrer in some state systems or the 12(b)(6) motion in federal court97). 
 
 95. See generally JAMIE S. GORELICK, STEPHEN MARZEN & LAWRENCE SOLUM, DESTRUCTION 
OF EVIDENCE (2001); Stephen Marzen & Lawrence Solum, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal Control of the 
Destruction of Evidence, 36 EMORY L. J. 1085 (1987) (analyzing the destruction of evidence with 
proposals for a coherent judicial approach). 
 96. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a). 
 97. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
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Whether a demurrer is granted depends on the substantive law (the rules of 
conduct and decision), but the articulation of standards for granting or 
denying a demurrer will be phrased in terms of pleading. The pleading of 
some facts may be required for a particular cause of action; the pleading of 
other facts will defeat a claim. 
The summary judgment motion presents another context.98 Whether a 
summary judgment motion is granted depends on the substantive law, but 
the articulation of the standards for granting such motions will require 
appellate courts to decide when “a genuine issue of material fact” exists 
and when it does not. Operationally, summary judgment standards will 
require that affidavits, documents, or discovery responses containing 
certain types of facts be put before the court.99 Once again, the substantive 
law is translated into standards for resolution of a procedural question. 
A final example of the translation of substance into procedure is the 
jury instruction. Rules governing jury instructions are clearly procedural in 
the sense that they regulate conduct inside the courtroom. The rules 
governing jury instructions translate rules of conduct and decision into 
rules of procedure. When an appellate court reviews a trial court’s jury 
instruction, it performs a dual function. On the one hand, it reviews the 
substance of the instruction de novo. On the other hand, it reviews the form 
of the instruction for an abuse of discretion. This dual standard of review 
reflects the entanglement of substance and procedure that is inherent in the 
process of instructing a jury. Jury instructions are procedures, but they are 
procedures that transform the abstract and general principles of substantive 
law into concrete and particular guidelines for deliberation. 
D. THE ENTANGLEMENT THESIS 
We are now in a position to appreciate the various modalities of 
entanglement between substance and procedure. Rules and mechanisms 
that are formally procedural nonetheless perform substantive functions, for 
example, the PSLRA or declaratory judgments. Rules that are formally 
substantive perform procedural functions, for example, the spoliation tort 
or the substantive standards for demurrers and summary judgments. Table 
2 summarizes the modalities of entanglement. 
 
 
 98. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
 99. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
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TABLE 2. Modalities of entanglement 
 
 Substantive Form 
Procedural Function 
Procedural Form, 
Substantive Function 
Type I 
(Intentional) 
Formal Conduct Rules 
with Intentionally 
Procedural Functions 
(Example: spoliation 
tort) 
Procedural Rules with 
Intentionally 
Substantive Functions 
(Example: PSLRA) 
Type II 
(Particularized) 
Particularized 
Decision Rules 
(Example: 
particularized 
standard for summary 
judgment) 
Particularized 
Conduct Rules 
(Example: declaratory 
judgment) 
 
In both the case of substantive procedure and of procedural substance, 
entanglement comes in two types. The first kind of entanglement (“Type 
I”) is most easily recognized. When a legislature intentionally uses a 
procedural form to achieve a substantive end, the entanglement between 
substance and procedure becomes unmistakable. The PSLRA and the 
spoliation tort both involve a deliberate crossing of the line between 
substance and procedure. Type I entanglement is important because it 
draws our attention to the fact that substantive forms can be used to achieve 
procedural ends and vice versa. 
But the second type of entanglement (“Type II”) is more fundamental 
and pervasive. Type II entanglement implicates every rule of procedure and 
every substantive law. Every legal proceeding is the source of 
particularized conduct rules. Every rule of substantive law is transformed 
into rules of pleading, summary adjudication, and jury instructions. Type II 
entanglement involves two kinds of particularization. First, general and 
abstract conduct rules are transformed into particular resolutions of claims 
and issues resulting in judgments that announce or imply standards of 
conduct, which are concrete and contextualized to individual cases. 
Second, general and abstract rules of procedure are transformed into 
particular standards for the resolution of motions for judgments on the 
pleadings, summary judgment, and jury instructions. 
The pervasiveness of the particularization involved in Type II 
entanglement is a necessary feature of any system of adjudication. In the 
Introduction we explored why particularization is necessary. Abstract and 
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general rules must be applied to concrete and particular facts and 
procedural histories. And this process of application must respond to the 
three problems that we have identified: (1) the incomplete problem of 
imperfect knowledge of law and fact, (2) the problem of specification of 
legal norms, and (3) the problem of partiality. Type II entanglement is the 
inevitable byproduct of the particularization required to overcome the 
problems of imperfect knowledge, incomplete specification, and partiality. 
Without it, general and abstract rules would not be applied. Although I 
have expressed this idea in a novel framework, my core thesis has been 
expressed by others in a variety of ways. Geoffrey Hazard puts it this way: 
“Substantive law is shaped and articulated by procedural possibilities.”100 
The entanglement thesis is simply the idea that the entanglement of 
substance and procedure required by the application of abstract rules to 
concrete cases is a pervasive feature of adjudication. This thesis can be 
confirmed by consulting our thought experiment of acoustic separation 
between substance and procedure. In the world of acoustic separation, Type 
I entanglement disappears. The PSLRA could not achieve its goals in a 
world where those who issue securities are completely unaware of the 
operations of the adjudication process; an attempt to enact such a provision 
would violate the constitutional requirement that all conduct rules be 
promulgated in the Code of Conduct. But even in the world of acoustic 
separation, Type II entanglement would be pervasive. This is because the 
acoustic separation between substance and procedure cannot be complete in 
any possible world without “magical” connections between primary actors 
and the courts. For the system to work, facts must flow from the world of 
conduct into the world of adjudication and judgments must travel in the 
reverse direction. 
E. SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE RESTATED 
Justice Reed’s Erie concurrence was premised on a picture of the 
relationship between substance and procedure.101 Substance was one thing, 
and procedure another—although the line between the two might be 
hazy.102 The development of the Erie doctrine involves a series of attempts 
to operationalize this distinction—to render clear that which is hazy. The 
outcome-determination test (in both its original form and as reinterpreted in 
 
 100. Geoffrey Hazard, The Effect of the Class Action Device upon the Substantive Law, in CLASS 
ACTIONS: EXPERTS FROM A SYMPOSIUM BEFORE THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL 
CIRCUIT, 58 F.R.D. 307, 307 (1973). 
 101. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 91–92 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring). 
 102. See id. at 92. 
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Hanna) may have merit as a test for the resolution of Erie problems, but it 
is an utter failure for the purpose of distinguishing substance from 
procedure.103 A more promising approach for this task was suggested by 
Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Hanna; his concurrence was premised on 
the notion that substantive law regulates primary conduct and procedural 
law regulates the adjudicative process.104 But Justice Harlan’s suggestion 
runs into the problem of entanglement, which is exemplified by the 
PSLRA’s intentional use of procedural forms to achieve substantive 
goals.105 The thought experiment acoustically separating substance from 
procedure allows us to precisely characterize this entanglement by 
comparing actual legal rules to the form that they would take in the world 
of the thought experiment. The thought experiment allows us to distinguish 
the various modalities of entanglement between substance and procedure, 
resulting in a typology of substantive procedure and procedural substance. 
A closer examination of the types of entanglement yields the conclusion 
that one source of entanglement—the need to particularize general rules of 
substance and procedure—is ineliminable, even in the thought experiment 
of acoustic separation. 
The upshot of our investigation is not a deconstruction of the 
distinction between substance and procedure. Instead, the thought 
experiment yields a precise analytic tool for appreciating procedural forms 
and functions and allows us to appreciate the ineliminable and inherent 
entanglement of substance and procedure. For the purposes of a theory of 
procedural justice, the important conclusion is that procedures particularize 
abstract and general substantive rules. That is, the real work of procedure is 
to provide particular action-guiding legal norms. 
III. THE FOUNDATIONS OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
We have begun to lay the foundation for a theory of procedural justice 
by giving an account of the nature of procedure. This part of the Article 
completes the foundation by laying out the jurisprudential assumptions of 
the theory of procedural justice. The trick is to say enough about 
jurisprudential foundations to make the substance of the theory clear while 
avoiding unnecessary forays into the thorny and intractable problems of 
legal philosophy. This foundational work begins in Section A, “The 
Jurisprudential Framework for the Theory,” which briefly sketches a 
 
 103. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 
468–69 (1965). 
 104. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 475 (Harlan, J.,- concurring). 
 105. See, e.g., 15. U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)–(2) (2000). 
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plausible relationship between this Article and Ronald Dworkin’s theory of 
law as integrity. In Section B, “The Role of Public Reason,” I introduce an 
important qualification of Dworkin’s view: political morality requires legal 
justifications to rely on public reasons, implying that the theory of 
procedural justice introduced here must be grounded in arguments that are 
accessible to the public at large. Finally, in Section C, “Some Objections to 
a Theory of Procedural Justice,” I consider some of the most prominent 
objections that have been made to theoretical approaches to law in general 
and to a theory of civil procedure in particular. 
Some readers may be willing to go along with my project, and forgo 
the discussion of foundational questions that is found in this Part of the 
essay. If you prefer to do so, turn to Part IV, “Views of Procedural Justice.” 
A. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE THEORY 
My aim is to develop a theory of procedural justice and not a theory of 
general jurisprudence. Theories of general jurisprudence are enormously 
controversial, and there is reason to doubt that such controversies will ever 
be resolved. My aim, therefore, is to avoid the following question: what 
general normative theory should guide the law? Instead, I simply sketch 
one general theoretical framework, using that framework for convenience 
of exposition. The general approach that I will adopt is interpretive. The 
theory of procedural justice I offer here is intended to fit and justify the 
existing procedural landscape. This approach is, of course, familiar from 
the work of Dworkin.106 
Dworkin’s own elaboration of his theory utilizes a heuristic device, an 
imaginary judge named Hercules. In an early essay, “Hard Cases,” 
Dworkin posited that Hercules was confronted with a difficult case, in 
which the settled law did not provide a clear answer.107 In our context, we 
imagine that Hercules is faced with a case of first impression concerning an 
issue of procedural due process, the right to fair procedure contained in the 
 
 106. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF 
PRINCIPLE (1985); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978). Although I use Dworkin’s 
framework, the argument that I offer here is independent of “law as integrity,” the name Dworkin gives 
to his theory. My own views of general jurisprudence differ in important respects from Dworkin’s 
views. Whereas Dworkin may require only a loose degree of fit before proceeding to justification, my 
view is that the criterion of fit should do most of the work if the task at hand is that of a judge deciding 
a case. On the other hand, if the task is legislation, then justification properly steps to the front as the 
primary criterion. Although important, this disagreement is not crucial for the current project, which 
does not offer an interpretation of the Due Process Clause, but instead develops a theory of procedural 
justice. 
 107. See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 106, at 105–30. 
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Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. 
Constitution.108 To decide this hard case, Hercules must construct a theory 
of procedural due process. We might imagine that his decisionmaking 
proceeds in two steps. First, he identifies the theories that fit the 
constitutional text as well as the already decided cases: Hercules asks, 
“Which theories of procedural justice are consistent with the language of 
the Due Process Clause, its history, and the general contours of the 
Supreme Court’s procedural due process cases?” Second, from among 
these theories, he selects the theory that provides the best supporting reason 
for a due process doctrine as a matter of political morality. Hercules asks, 
“Of the theories of procedural justice that fit existing doctrine, which 
provides the best justification for that doctrine?”109 
One caveat should be noted at once: I have presented Hercules’ 
method as a linear two-step process, but this oversimplifies the theory for 
purposes of simplicity and clarity.110 Let us pause for a moment and 
examine the relationship between the two criteria, fit and justification, for 
evaluating a theory of procedural justice. Fit measures the adequacy of a 
theory by its ability to explain the shape of existing law. Thus, to meet the 
criterion of fit, a theory of procedural justice must cohere with the 
constitutional text, the judicial decisions, and the general shape of the civil 
dispute resolution system in the United States. An adequate theory of 
procedural fairness should account for basic features of civil procedure, 
such as the following: procedural due process doctrine, personal 
jurisdiction, the rules of pleading and joinder, the system of discovery, the 
rules of evidence, standards of appellate review, and the prior adjudication 
doctrines. 
We should observe, however, that there may be features of the system 
of civil procedure for which we should not seek an explanation. For 
example, the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts and some 
aspects of personal jurisdiction doctrine can only be explained by the fact 
that we have a system allocating power between the federal government 
and the states. There may be aspects of civil procedure that are mostly a 
 
 108. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
 109. By adopting the interpretive method as an expository device, I do not mean to endorse 
Dworkin’s approach to constitutional interpretation as against its rivals, such as textualism or 
originalism. 
 110. For Dworkin, the line between fit and justification is not hard and fast; rather, the line 
between fit and justification “is a useful analytical device that helps us give structure to any 
interpreter’s” working theory. See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 106, at 231. 
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matter of convention.111 Take the example of pleading. Not just any system 
of pleading would be fair, but there may be a broad range of pleading 
issues that can be settled by convention, for example, whether there are to 
be pleadings beyond the answer or reply,112 whether some issues are to be 
raised in the answer or by motions, and a variety of similar questions. The 
important thing is that the system of pleading should not unduly interfere 
with decisions on the merits as opposed to procedural technicalities.113 
In sum, the criterion of fit demands that our theory of procedural 
fairness be a theory that takes the current system of civil dispute resolution 
as its subject. The theory must fit existing doctrine where fairness is at 
stake, but need not fit features that are explained by other concerns, such as 
federalism or conventions, or arbitrary within certain limits. 
The second criterion is justification: what theory of procedural 
fairness offers the best justification—that is, the best argument of political 
morality—in support of our system of civil dispute resolution? This Article 
approaches the criterion of justification in two ways. First, we will assess 
proposed models of procedural justice using the familiar tools of moral and 
political argument. This first method sticks close to common sense, 
utilizing argumentative strategies that might be employed in a judicial 
opinion or brief. The second approach to the criterion of justification is 
more theory-laden or philosophical. An inquiry into procedural justice can 
step back from existing legal practice and ask the following question of 
political philosophy: what conception of procedural justice should be 
adopted in a just society?114 
The second dimension of the inquiry into justification is related to the 
first. Certainly our current practices and ideas about the reform of these 
practices will have much to tell us about the ideal case of a well-ordered 
society that is regulated by the best available conception of justice. But the 
two inquiries are not identical. It might be the case that core features of the 
 
 111. Here, I appeal to Aristotle’s distinction between conventional and natural justice. See 
ARISTOTLE, Ethica Nicomachea, in THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH, 1094a1, 
1130b31–1131a9 (W.D. Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press photo. reprint 1949) (1915). 
 112. This is not to say that procedural justice does not imply some limits on pleading rules. A 
system that required many, many levels of pleading, with technical requirements that operated as a trap 
for the unsophisticated, might run contrary to concerns for accuracy and efficiency. 
 113. See Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 308–20 (1938) 
(discussing the shift from code to notice pleading and its merits). 
 114. For the purposes of the second approach, I shall work within a roughly Rawlsian paradigm. 
See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 
(1993). For a summary of John Rawls’s theoretical framework as I understand it, see Lawrence B. 
Solum, Situating Political Liberalism, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 549 (1994). 
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current procedural system would not be included in the ideal case; for 
example, it might be argued that the best conception of procedural justice 
would not include the adversary system. 
I would like to make one concluding point about the jurisprudential 
framework within which this Article operates. Although this framework is 
broadly Dworkinian, it relies on only a subset of Dworkin’s ideas. Thus, I 
shall not rely on the right-answer thesis, Dworkin’s claim that every case 
has a unique, legally correct answer. Nor shall I rely on Dworkin’s claim 
that judges may only rely on considerations of fairness or principle, and 
thus, that reasons of policy or social utility have no proper role in judicial 
interpretation. For the purposes of this Article, I want neither to agree nor 
to disagree with Dworkin on these issues. Rather, my intention is simply to 
set these controversial features of Dworkin’s theory aside for the time 
being, on the ground that their resolution is not necessary for the task at 
hand. Moreover, although my argument is couched within the framework 
of Dworkin’s interpretivism—I shall claim that a certain conception of 
procedural justice is superior to its rivals on the criteria of fit and 
justification—this is not a necessary feature of my argument. The 
normative and descriptive arguments that I make here can be made clearly 
distinct, yielding an argument of political morality on the one hand and an 
argument of descriptive legal theory on the other. A final caveat concerning 
the relationship between this Article and Dworkin’s theory of law as 
integrity follows immediately in the next section. 
B. THE ROLE OF PUBLIC REASON 
A further question arises with respect to the dimension of justification: 
what sorts of reasons count as good justifications for the law? One answer 
to this question is that the laws should be justified by the best available 
moral theory, whether that theory is a deontological theory like Emmanuel 
Kant’s, a consequentialist theory like Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism, or a 
virtue-centered theory like Aristotle’s. In turn, when Hercules constructs a 
theory of procedural fairness, he ultimately may be required to resolve the 
great questions of moral theory and decide whether utilitarianism, 
Kantianism, virtue-ethics, or some other view offers the best general 
account of morality. 
The thesis that the deep premises of particular comprehensive moral 
doctrines are good legal reasons is problematic for two reasons. First, the 
question as to which moral theory is best is deeply controversial and, as a 
practical matter, no project in legal theory will get off the ground if the 
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deep questions of normative ethics must be resolved as a preliminary step. 
Essentially, if a legal theory rests on the deepest truths of moral theory, 
then it may be properly critiqued by cogent attacks on its underlying moral 
view. Because the history of moral philosophy suggests that the deep 
disagreements between those with theological and secular views or 
between utilitarians and Kantians are unlikely to be resolved, the reliance 
on deep moral reasons would render practical progress in legal theory an 
unreachable objective. 
Second, given that deep moral consensus is not a practical possibility, 
we must give public reasons if our justifications for the law are to inform or 
persuade our fellow citizens in general and the legal community in 
particular. This point involves more than simply a matter of instrumental 
efficacy. Respect for our fellow citizens requires that we make good and 
sufficient reasons available to them; the legitimacy of a democratic society 
requires this.115 In other words, it would be a denial of respect to give our 
fellow citizens only reasons that conflict with their most deeply held moral 
and religious beliefs, and a regime that provides such reasons cannot claim 
democratic legitimacy. Public reasons include common sense, the true and 
uncontroversial results of the sciences (broadly understood), and values 
embedded in our public legal and political culture that are available to our 
fellow citizens.116 Thus, when we assess a theory of procedural justice by 
the criterion of justification, we ought to ask whether the justifications are 
of the right sort; that is, we ought to ask if they are public reasons.117 
The ideal of public reason to which we shall appeal is similar to that 
offered by John Rawls. In summary, its features are as follows: 
(1) Content of Public Reason: Public reason is reason that relies 
on premises and modes of reason that are available to the public at 
large, including (a) the general features of all reason, such as rules 
of inference and evidence and (b) generally shared beliefs, 
common sense reasoning, and the noncontroversial methods of 
science.118 
 
 115. See JEREMY WALDRON, Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism, in LIBERAL RIGHTS 61, 61 
(1993); Christopher Bertram, Political Justification, Theoretical Complexity, and Democratic 
Community, 107 ETHICS 563, 565 (1997). 
 116. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 114, at 224–25. 
 117. See id.; Lawrence B. Solum, Constructing an Ideal of Public Reason, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
729 (1993); Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Justice, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1083, 1089–92 (1990) 
(discussing the requirement that judges rule on the basis of public reason); Lawrence B. Solum, 
Inclusive Public Reason, 75 PAC. PHIL. Q. 217 (1994); Lawrence B. Solum, Law and Public Reason, 
APA NEWSLETTERS, Spring 1996, at 54 (1996); Lawrence B. Solum, Novel Public Reasons, 29 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1459 (1996); Solum, supra note 114 (discussing Rawls’s theory of public reason). 
 118. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 114, at 224–25. 
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(2) Scope of Application: At a minimum, the ideal of public 
reason applies to deliberation and discussion concerning the basic 
structure of society and the “constitutional essentials.”119 
(3) Persons Obligated: The duty of civility specified by the ideal 
creates obligations for (a) both citizens and public officials when 
they engage in public political debate, (b) citizens when they vote, 
and (c) public officials when they engage in official action—so 
long as the debate, vote, or action concerns the subjects specified 
in (2).120 
(4) Structure of the Obligation: The ideal requires citizens and 
public officials to include public reasons in public political debate, 
but nonpublic reasons may be included, provided that public 
reasons are offered in due course.121 In special contexts, such as 
the decision of a legal dispute or the passage of a bill, public 
officials should exclude nonpublic reasons from official 
pronouncements such as judicial opinions or statements of 
legislative purpose.122 
(5) Nature of the Obligation: The duty of civility implied by the 
ideal is an obligation of political morality, and the ideal does not 
justify legal restrictions on public political discourse.123 
If Hercules complies with this ideal of public reason as a judge, he 
will be bound by the strict requirement that the ideal imposes on judges 
acting in their official capacity. That is, Hercules may offer only public 
reasons for his decisions. Thus, Hercules’ theory of procedural fairness 
may not rely on the deep and controversial premises of particular 
comprehensive views. He may not rely on the truth of a religious doctrine, 
Kantianism, utilitarianism, or any other particular comprehensive view. 
Hercules’s theory of procedural justice may, however, incorporate values 
and principles drawn from the public political culture. Importantly, the fact 
that a publicly available value or principle is part of or is supported by a 
variety of comprehensive doctrines does not render that value or principle 
nonpublic. Quite the contrary, public reasons will commonly find support 
in a variety of comprehensive doctrines, although the deep foundations for 
the public reason may vary from doctrine to doctrine. 
My theoretical framework differs from Dworkin’s theory to the extent 
that his view does not incorporate an ideal of public reason with content 
 
 119. Id. at 224, 227. 
 120. See id. at 217–18. 
 121. See id. at 217–18, 224–26. 
 122. See id. at 236, 252. 
 123. Id. at 217. 
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similar to that outlined above. Even if Hercules may voyage into the deep 
waters of ultimate value or ascend to the airy heights of abstract moral 
theory, this Article will remain on foot, relying for the most part on the 
familiar tools of legal theory and practical political argument. We shall 
endeavor to limit the conceptual ascent to those climbs that are necessary to 
counter rival views or to lay bare the bones of our shared intuitions about 
procedural fairness. 
C. SOME OBJECTIONS TO A THEORY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
This section considers three foundational objections to my project. 
The first foundational objection is rooted in legal pragmatism. It argues that 
highly abstract, large-scale theories, like a theory of procedural justice, 
ought to be eschewed in favor of mid-level or low-level principles. The 
second foundational objection is grounded in a radical critique of liberal 
legal theory. It states that no theory of procedural justice can succeed 
because existing doctrine is fundamentally incoherent and can only be 
explained as a function of political struggle. The third foundational 
objection is based on concerns raised in critical race theory and feminist 
jurisprudence. It states that a supposedly neutral theory of procedural 
justice must be incomplete unless it explicitly incorporates the perspectives 
of excluded groups. 
My aim is not to lay these objections to rest; each of them raises large 
questions that are outside the scope of this Article. Rather, my aim is to 
suggest that such foundational objections do not give us a priori reasons to 
turn aside from the project of developing a theory of procedural justice. 
Foundational questions can be raised properly if they are cogent after we 
are successful in developing a theory of procedural justice. At this point, let 
us consider each objection in turn. 
1. A Pragmatist Objection 
A legal pragmatist might make the following argument against the 
usefulness of developing a theory of procedural justice. We are not likely, 
the pragmatist begins, to reach agreement at the most general and abstract 
level about what procedural justice requires.124 Some will adhere to a 
utilitarian theory of procedural justice, others to a theory based on 
deontological (or rights-based) concerns. Because ultimate agreement on a 
general theory is not a realistic goal, we ought, for pragmatic reasons, to 
 
 124. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 161–63 (1996). 
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seek instead agreement on more particular and concrete principles. Rather 
than a theory of procedural justice, we ought to be developing mid-level 
principles.125 Utilitarians and deontologists may agree that our pleading 
system ought to provide adequate notice and avoid deciding disputes on the 
basis of technicalities, even though they disagree on the reasons for these 
principles. We ought to be seeking “incompletely theorized agreements,” to 
use Cass Sunstein’s felicitous phrase.126 
This objection must be taken seriously. In the case of procedural 
justice, the objection has an especially strong appeal because most 
discussions about procedure (and certainly most thinking by judges, 
lawyers, and legal scholars) have avoided the most general and abstract 
issues of procedural justice. Rather, the focus has been on relatively 
concrete and particular problems. For example, a great deal of attention has 
been devoted to working out the precise implications of the rules of 
procedure in relatively narrow contexts. At the next level of conceptual 
ascent, there has been a great deal of focus on the middle level of 
abstraction and developing an adequate account of personal jurisdiction or 
of the Erie doctrine. The practice of proceduralists provides a good reason 
to believe doctrinal detail and mid-level principles provide a better target 
for theorists than general and abstract principles of procedural justice. 
The practice of legal scholars is reflected in judicial opinion. The 
Supreme Court has stated, “We must bear in mind that no single model of 
procedural fairness, let alone a particular form of procedure, is dictated by 
the Due Process Clause. ‘The very nature of due process negates any 
concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable 
situation.’”127 It is well to bear this statement in mind. The search for 
principles of procedural justice should not be confused with a much less 
promising enterprise, the quest for a universal set of procedures applicable 
in every factual and legal context. The likelihood that this latter exercise 
would be futile does not mean that the former task—the identification of 
general principles of procedural justice—is without promise. 
 
 125. A mid-level principle might, for example, address questions such as the following: Should 
finders of fact be lay persons or judges? Should there be a right of representation by counsel? And 
should there be an extensive right to pretrial discovery? Mid-level principles address questions that are 
relatively more particular and concrete than the questions addressed by the relatively general and 
abstract principles developed here. See infra Part VI. 
 126. SUNSTEIN, supra note 124, at 35 (defining this phrase as a situation in which people “accept 
the principle [but] need not agree on what it entails in particular cases”). 
 127. Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 483 (1982) (quoting Mitchell v. W.T. Grant 
Co., 416 U.S. 600, 610 (1974)). 
SOLU12.DOC 11/30/2004 9:41 AM 
234 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:181 
At this point, my claim is simply that there is no way to settle, a priori, 
whether a theory of procedural justice will be fruitful or not. Such theories 
must stand on their merits—the reasons advanced in their favor, the 
answers to the objections raised, and their utility as tools for analysis. In 
other words, we ought to have a pragmatic attitude about the usefulness of 
abstraction and generality in legal thinking. Though pragmatic 
considerations sometimes counsel against highly abstract, large-scale 
theories, they do not always so counsel. The only way for a pragmatist to 
judge the value of a theory of procedural justice is to put it to work and see 
if it pays. William James famously asked whether a theory has “cash 
value.”128 If a theory of procedural justice can cut legal ice, then we have 
good reason to use it. 
A bit more can be said about the pragmatist objection, however, 
especially in light of the role of public reason, as sketched in Part III.B. 
There are strategies and resources available to a theory of procedural 
justice for coping with the problem of disagreement. It is unrealistic to 
hope that utilitarians and deontologists will agree across the board about 
anything, procedural justice included. But a theory of procedural justice 
need not be expressed in a way that takes sides in the great debates of 
moral theory or religious belief. Rather, we may express the theory in terms 
of a set of principles, which might be affirmed for a variety of reasons 
including legal reasons (such as fit with existing doctrine) and reasons of 
moral theory (such as those provided by utilitarianism, virtue ethics, or 
some version of deontology). In Rawlsian terms, we might seek an 
“overlapping consensus” between those who affirm the principles for a 
variety of reasons.129 As Sunstein puts it, we can seek an “incompletely 
theorized agreement.”130 When we put the case for the theory, we shall 
avoid reliance on particular comprehensive doctrines (for example, on 
utilitarianism, Kantianism, virtue ethics, or particular religious views) and 
instead rely on public reasons, or those reasons that are widely available to 
the public at large.131 
 
 128. As James puts it, “Pragmatism . . . asks its usual question. ‘Grant an idea or belief to be true,’ 
it says, ‘what concrete difference will its being true make in anyone’s actual life? How will the truth be 
realized? What experiences will be different from those which would obtain if the belief were false? 
What, in short, is the truth’s cash-value in experiential terms?’” WILLIAM JAMES, Pragmatism, in 
WRITINGS 1902–1910, at 479, 573 (Bruce Kukclick ed., 1987). 
 129. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 114, at 15. 
 130. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 124, at 35. 
 131. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 114, at 223–24. 
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2. A Radical Objection 
Consider a more radical objection to the project of developing a theory 
of procedural justice. The very idea of a theory that “fits” existing law 
assumes that there is some minimum degree of coherence in current 
procedure doctrine, but that assumption is open to question. It might be 
argued that existing doctrine is strongly incoherent. The most extreme form 
of this claim would be the strong indeterminacy thesis. As applied to civil 
disputes, the thesis states that there is no outcome of any procedural 
question that we can reasonably see as legally incorrect. More concretely, a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion can be properly granted or denied with respect to any 
conceivable complaint. Any court can properly assert or reject personal 
jurisdiction over any conceivable defendant. Indeed, any procedural motion 
can be properly granted or denied in any conceivable case. This form of the 
objection seems too strong to be plausible. In procedure, as elsewhere, 
there are easy cases. Some complaints clearly state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted.132 Others clearly do not.133 If there are easy cases in 
procedure, then the strong indeterminacy thesis is false in the procedural 
domain.134 
But the strong indeterminacy thesis is not required for a radical 
critique of my project to succeed. For a theory of procedural justice to fit 
existing doctrine, it will not suffice for the doctrine merely to avoid total 
incoherence; rather, existing doctrine must meet a minimum threshold level 
of coherence if the project is to succeed. This is not to say that the project 
requires perfect coherence. Any plausible version of interpretivist legal 
theory must admit that there are mistakes in doctrine. Some cases or rules 
will not fit the best available theory of procedural justice. With respect to 
them, the theory will maintain that the decision should be overruled or the 
rule amended.135 But if it turns out that the underlying principles of fairness 
that best explain the law of personal jurisdiction are fundamentally 
inconsistent with those that explain the opportunity to be heard, and that yet 
a third set of inconsistent principles best explain pleading and joinder, then 
 
 132. The forms that accompany the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide paradigm cases of 
complaints that should not be dismissed on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6). 
 133. A complaint with no allegations at all would seem to be an easy case for granting a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion. 
 134. See Lawrence B. Solum, Indeterminacy and Equity, in RADICAL CRITIQUES OF THE LAW 44, 
47–48 (Stephen M. Griffin & Robert C.L. Moffat eds., 1997) [hereinafter Solum, Indeterminacy and 
Equity] (giving an example and explanation of an “easy case” in which only one outcome is possible); 
Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 
471–72 (1987) [hereinafter Solum, Indeterminacy Crisis]. 
 135. See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 106, at 118–23. 
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the interpretivist project will face severe obstacles. Interpretivism assumes 
that the law is a seamless web, but what if it is not? 
A theory of procedural justice will lack validation on the criterion of 
fit if there is moderately strong incoherence in existing doctrine. But once 
again, this objection does not provide an a priori reason to reject the project 
of developing a theory of procedural justice. If a theory can be developed 
and shown to fit existing doctrine, then the charge of incoherence will have 
been false. Unless one believes that there are good a priori reasons for 
believing that the law can never be coherent, then once again the issue 
should be postponed until after we have a particular theory of procedural 
justice in view. 
3. A Perspectivalist Objection 
Consider yet another foundational objection to the project of 
developing a theory of procedural justice. Perspectivalists will argue that 
such a theory is fundamentally misguided because it fails to acknowledge 
the perspectives of those who have been excluded from the making and 
shaping of modern procedure doctrine, especially women and people of 
color.136 Surely there is some truth to this objection. The method for theory 
construction that I have proposed is biased or tilted because it takes 
existing doctrine as fixed and as the data for which the theory must 
account. Thus, the interpretive approach incorporates the possibility that 
existing procedure institutionalizes systematic unfairness.137 
But the perspectivalist objection does not justify abstention from the 
project of theory building. First, articulating the notion of procedural 
 
 136. See Roy L. Brooks, Critical Race Theory: A Proposed Structure and Application to Federal 
Pleading, 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 85 (1994). Cf. Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 
B.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1992) (“Unfortunately, the myth of due process repeatedly has been corrupted to 
enhance the position of the powerful. Consequently, due process is a myth not only because it is a set of 
stories that transmit values, but also because it is a fantasy for many who claim its protection.”). See 
generally Lawrence B. Solum, Virtues and Voices, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 111 (1990) (discussing the 
exclusion of the voices of persons of color, women, the poor, and homosexuals from political 
discourse). 
 137. The theory of procedural justice articulated in this Article can be seen as a response to the 
perspectivalist critique in an important respect. By emphasizing rights of participation, procedural 
justice can at least ensure that the voices of excluded groups are heard when the rights of individual 
members of such groups are at stake. Cf. Gerald Torres, Environmental Burdens and Democratic 
Justice, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 431, 453–55 (1994) (suggesting that improved community participation 
procedures would make administrative agencies more responsive to poor and minority communities); 
Eric K. Yamamoto, Efficiency’s Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for Minorities, 25 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 341, 350–54, 420–21 (1990) (exploring efficiency reforms of current court 
procedures that tend to reduce minority access to the courts and decrease advocacy of minority rights). 
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fairness implicit in existing practice has substantial value even if the 
perspectivalist objection is correct: reconstructing the implicit ideal 
provides definition to a debate that would otherwise be murky. Second, the 
truth of the perspectivalist critique cannot be assumed in advance. After a 
theory of procedural justice has been articulated, perspectivalist critics can 
put forth their arguments, which can then be judged on the merits. 
We have completed our sketch of a justification for the enterprise of 
developing a theory of procedural justice. I recognize that this sketch will 
be unsatisfying to many and that the issues that are raised by the objections 
to my project cannot be resolved in the brief scope of this  
Article. My goal is more modest. I hope that I have laid my cards on the 
table, so that the reader can evaluate the project with a sense of its 
foundational assumptions and with some notion of the objections that 
might be raised. At this point, we turn to the idea of procedural justice 
itself. 
IV.  VIEWS OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
This part surveys and critiques the notions of procedural justice that 
are implicit in judicial opinion and legal scholarship. Section A sets out a 
general framework for thinking about procedural fairness and delineating 
the subject matter that the theory will cover. Current thinking about 
procedural fairness has been informed by three ideas laid out and critiqued 
in Section B. First, the “accuracy model” assumes that the aim of civil 
dispute resolution is correct application of the law to the facts. Second, the 
“balancing model” assumes that the aim of civil procedure is to strike a fair 
balance between the costs and benefits of adjudication. Last, the 
“participation model” assumes that the very idea of a correct outcome must 
be understood as a function of a process that guarantees fair and equal 
participation. Section C suggests the ways in which the three models can be 
integrated into a unified theory of procedural justice. 
A. THE IDEA OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
In this section, I set out some very basic preliminary points about the 
idea of procedural justice. In Section 1, I define the topic, relating 
procedural justice to the notions of corrective and distributive justice, and 
then lay out three possible views of procedural justice—perfect, imperfect, 
and pure. In Section 2, I distinguish the subject matter of the theory, setting 
out those issues that I bracket or reserve for another occasion. 
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1. The Conceptual Framework 
The notion of justice can be analyzed in many ways, but one good 
place to start is with Aristotle. Aristotle divides the topic of justice into two 
main parts, which we shall call “distributive justice” and “corrective 
justice.” Distributive justice concerns the division of shares in social 
benefits and burdens; thus, many questions of tax policy are questions of 
distributive justice. Corrective justice involves the rectification of injustice, 
and thus includes a variety of topics from criminal law, torts, and contracts, 
among many others.138 Supplementing Aristotle’s account, let us say that 
“procedural justice” is concerned with the means by which social groups 
(including governments, private institutions, and families) apply the 
requirements of corrective and distributive justice to particular cases. In the 
context of a modern nation-state, procedural justice is concerned with the 
adjudicative methods by which legal norms are applied to particular cases 
and the legislative processes by which social benefits and burdens are 
divided. In this Article, we am concerned with the procedures of corrective 
justice, and in particular, with the procedures of corrective civil justice—
that is, civil procedure. A conception of procedural justice specifies the 
conditions under which the application of the norms of corrective justice to 
particular cases is fair. 
The idea of procedural justice may be made easier by using a simple 
example. Consider the familiar procedure for dividing a cake: the person 
who slices the cake picks last.139 What makes this a fair procedure? One 
answer is that the criterion for what constitutes a fair outcome, equal slices 
for all, requires that the slicer pick last. The slicer-picks-last rule is fair 
because it guarantees accuracy in cutting equal slices. Or does it? A more 
reliable way to ensure perfectly equal slices would be to use a compass and 
principles of plane geometry. But this strikes us as an undue amount of fuss 
to go through when slicing a cake. Perhaps the reason we believe that the 
slicer-picks-last rule is fair is that it strikes a balance between the 
importance of the outcome and the cost of getting there; it gets us close to 
equal shares most of the time at a reasonable price. Thus, the slicer-picks-
last rule might be considered fair because it does a good job of balancing. 
Or is there something even more to the idea that the slicer-picks-last rule is 
fair? Maybe we believe that the slicer gets a fair share because the slicer 
was the one who did the cutting; the slicer’s participation in the cutting 
validates the outcome, even if the slicer ends up with a smaller slice (or 
 
 138. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 111, at 1131b25–1132b20. 
 139. See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 114, at 85.   
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among the calorie conscious, a bigger slice).140 The slicer-picks-last rule 
could be fair because of process independent of outcome. 
These questions about the fairness of procedures for slicing a cake can 
be generalized by setting out a framework for analyzing the idea of 
procedural justice. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls distinguishes between 
three general kinds of procedural justice: (1) “perfect” procedural justice, 
(2) “imperfect” procedural justice, and (3) “pure” procedural justice. 
Consider perfect procedural justice first. There are, he writes, 
[t]wo characteristic features of perfect procedural justice. First, there is 
an independent criterion of what is a fair division, a criterion defined 
separately from and prior to the procedure which is to be followed. And 
second, it is possible to devise a procedure that is sure to give that 
desired outcome.141 
Rawls argues that the rule for slicing cakes is an example of perfect 
procedural justice. The person who slices picks last, thereby ensuring the 
equal division of shares. “Equal shares for each” is the independent 
criterion of a fair division; the slicer-picks-last rule is the procedure that 
reliably produces that outcome. 
In the case of imperfect procedural justice, the first characteristic, an 
independent criterion for fairness of outcome, is present, but the second, a 
procedure that guarantees that outcome, is not. Rawls contends that 
[i]mperfect procedural justice is exemplified by a criminal trial. The 
desired outcome is that the defendant should be declared guilty if and 
only if he has committed the offense with which he is charged. The trial 
procedure is framed to search for and to establish the truth in this regard. 
But it seems impossible to design the legal rules so that they always lead 
to the correct result. The theory of trials examines which procedures and 
 
 140. See id. Strictly speaking, this argument only works for a two-person cake slicing game. The 
strategy can be generalized to a n person game. For example, if there are n potential cake consumers 
(call them C1, C2, C3, and so forth to Cn) the procedure would be as follows: C1 cuts a slice that C1 
considers to be 1/n of the cake. If C2 believes the slice is 1/n or less, she passes. If C2 believes the slice 
is more than 1/n, she trims the slice to equal what she believes is 1/n. This procedure is repeated until Cn 
either trims or passes. The last person to touch the slice gets it. This procedure is then iterated, so that in 
the second and subsequent rounds, each consumer cuts a slice that he or she believes is 1/n of the 
original, until all of the slices have been distributed. Using this procedure, the consumers receive slices 
that they believe are all 1/n of the original cake, with one possible exception. Cn may not believe that the 
last slice is 1/n of the original cake because Cn might rationally believe that she was in error when she 
failed to trim some or all of the prior slices. We might still believe, however, that Cn has received a fair 
share of the cake because Cn had an opportunity to trim each of these slices and chose not to do so. See 
JOHN ALLEN PAULOS, A MATHEMATICIAN READS THE NEWSPAPER 8 n.* (1995) (describing the 
procedure in a four-person cake-slicing game). I owe thanks to David Leonard for calling my attention 
to the n- person version of the familiar rule. 
 141. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 114, at 85. 
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rules of evidence, and the like, are best calculated to achieve this purpose 
consistent with the other ends of the law. Different arrangements for 
hearing cases may reasonably be expected in different circumstances to 
yield the right results, not always but at least most of the time.142 
Thus, imperfect procedural justice incorporates the notion of an 
independent criterion for accuracy but adds the notion of “other ends of the 
law,” or considerations of cost that may be balanced against accuracy. 
Rawls’s final kind of justice is “pure procedural justice”: 
[P]ure procedural justice obtains when there is no independent criterion 
for the right result: instead there is a correct or fair procedure such that 
the outcome is likewise correct or fair, whatever it is, provided that the 
procedure has been properly followed. This situation is illustrated by 
gambling. If a number of persons engage in a series of fair bets, the 
distribution of cash after the last bet is fair, or at least not unfair, 
whatever this distribution is.143 
Pure procedural justice rejects an underlying assumption of both perfect 
and imperfect procedural justice—the assumption that there is an 
independent criterion for what constitutes the correct outcome. Though 
there are not criteria for the correct outcome, there is an ideal (or actual) set 
of procedures. 
We shall take Rawls’s analysis as the beginning point for our inquiry 
into procedural justice. That is, as we begin to unpack our notions of 
procedural justice, we shall ask whether we are implicitly using the idea of 
perfect, imperfect, or pure procedural justice, or some other notion. 
2. The Limits of the Enterprise 
This Article develops a theory of procedural justice, and before we 
proceed any further, I should say a few words about the limits of this 
enterprise. First, we shall limit our consideration to civil justice, explicitly 
excluding consideration of criminal procedure. This limitation may be 
arbitrary, but it is, I think, necessary if the enterprise is to get off the 
ground at all. Civil procedure is a large enough topic, indeed, perhaps too 
large a topic. Moreover, the criminal system is different in a number of 
respects, including the burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
special protections for criminal defendants provided (or formerly provided) 
 
 142. Id. at 85–86. 
 143. Id. at 86. Rawls notes that his gambling example requires further assumptions, including that 
the bets are fair in the sense that the expected payoff of each bet is zero, that the bets are made 
voluntarily, that no one cheats, that the players entered the game under fair conditions, and so forth. Id. 
SOLU12.DOC 11/30/2004 9:41 AM 
2004] PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 241 
by the privilege against self-incrimination in the Fifth Amendment, and the 
protections provided by the search and seizure provision of the Fourth 
Amendment.144 A complete theory of procedural justice would address 
these differences between the civil and criminal systems, but this essay 
does not attempt to develop such a complete theory.145 
There is a second limit on the enterprise of building a theory of 
procedural justice. Procedural fairness may be the most central principle of 
civil procedure, but it is not the only principle. Federal civil procedure in 
the United States, which we shall most frequently use as an example, is 
shaped by concerns for federalism that are not matters of procedural 
justice. For this reason, the theory that I offer does not fully account for a 
variety of doctrines in which federalism (or some other principle or policy) 
plays a shaping role. These topics include federal subject matter 
jurisdiction, the federalism component of the due process limits on personal 
jurisdiction, and much of the Erie doctrine. 
In addition, there is a third limit on the theory that is developed here. 
The theory focuses on adjudication as the application of general rules to 
particular cases. Our investigation will focus on the civil action at the trial 
level. This focus elides an important aspect of the system of civil 
adjudication—the role of appellate courts in developing and modifying 
general and abstract rules themselves. This role is thematized by the way 
that the U.S. Supreme Court uses particular cases as a vehicle for 
announcing general rules of constitutional law. In cases like Miranda v. 
Arizona146 and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,147 the Supreme Court acts 
in a legislative capacity, creating a constitutional code that supplements the 
actual text of the Constitution. A similar role is played by state courts in 
 
 144. The civil-criminal distinction is the topic of a large literature. See Mary M. Cheh, 
Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and 
Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325 (1991) (discussing some 
distinctions between civil and criminal law in a broader analysis of the increasing use of civil remedies 
to punish criminal conduct); John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and 
Civil Law Models—And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1878, 1887–90 (1992) 
(discussing the increasing overlap of civil and criminal law and the potential policy problems associated 
with this development); Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Getting Beyond the Civil/Criminal Distinction: A New 
Approach to the Regulation of Indirect Contempts, 79 VA. L. REV. 1025 (1993) (critiquing the 
distinction between criminal and civil law in the context of indirect contempts); Kenneth Mann, 
Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795 
(1992) (discussing punitive civil sanctions and the procedures used to impose those sanctions). 
 145. At various points in the Article, I will offer remarks that point toward an account of the 
distinctiveness of criminal procedure. See infra Part IV.B.2(b). 
 146. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 147. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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cases governed by the common law. In cases like Li v. Yellow Cab Co.148 
or MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,149 state courts of last resort create and 
modify general rules of contracts, property, and torts—once again playing a 
role that is analogous to that played by legislatures. 
Because my focus will be on the application of general rules to 
particular cases, for the most part we will simply set aside the special 
problems and issues raised by judicial lawmaking in civil litigation. The 
theory offered here is not a theory of the common lawmaking process or of 
constitutional adjudication. Moreover, my focus on rule application puts to 
the side important questions regarding public law litigation that others may 
believe should be at the center of a theory of procedural justice.150 This 
does not mean that the theory of procedural justice cannot and should not 
be extended to these contexts; rather, these issues are simply put aside in 
order to allow us to focus on the core case of civil adjudication—the case 
in which the general rules are fixed and application is the focus of the 
adjudicative process.151 
B. THREE MODELS OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
In this section, we examine three simple conceptions or models152 of 
procedural justice that are, at least partially, implicit in current legal 
practice.153 Each model will be measured against the criteria of fit and 
 
 148. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975). 
 149. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1150 (N.Y. 1916). 
 150. In this regard consider, Owen Fiss’s concession that his theory may not apply to the 
adjudication of “purely private disputes.” Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The 
Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 30 (1979). 
 151. In addition to the limits discussed, the scope of this Article is limited in a variety of other 
ways. For example, the discussion focuses on procedural justice in the public sphere and does not 
consider the issue of procedural fairness in private associations. See generally Pinsker v. Pac. Coast 
Soc’y of Orthodontists, 526 P.2d 253, 260 (1974) (en banc) (holding that public policy requires certain 
private associations “to refrain from arbitrary action” with respect to the admission, disciplining, or 
expulsion of members and that “the association’s action must be both substantively rational and 
procedurally fair”). 
 152. I use “concept” and “conception” to refer to the general idea of procedural justice as opposed 
to particular theories of procedural justice. See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 106, 
at 103–04; W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, in 56 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTLELIAN 
SOCIETY 167, 167 (1956). 
 153. I use three models, labeled “accuracy,” “balancing,” and “process” to discuss the major 
families of ideas about procedural fairness. Similar distinctions have sometimes been mapped with 
different terminology. For example, Laurence Tribe distinguishes between the “instrumental” and 
“intrinsic” values of due process. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 666 (2d ed. 1988) (distinguishing between the “instrumental” and “intrinsic” values of due 
process). See also Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World of 
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justification. For each model we will question whether it accounts for the 
shape of current doctrine and whether it provides a normatively attractive 
grounding for that doctrine. 
We can begin with the utopian hypothesis that the current doctrine is 
structured by an implicit conception of perfect procedural justice—or the 
accuracy model. This hypothesis is shown to be inadequate on grounds of 
fit. Although a concern for truth-seeking and accuracy does characterize 
some procedure doctrines, there are a variety of doctrines that cannot be 
explained on the model of perfect procedural justice. Examples include res 
judicata and other rules that protect the finality of judicial decisions. 
Moreover, the accuracy model suffers from a crucial ambiguity: does it 
pursue accuracy in particular cases or accuracy in the system as a whole? 
The shortcomings of the accuracy model lead to a second hypothesis: 
current doctrine is best explained as structured by a conception of imperfect 
procedural justice—the balancing model. Two variations of this hypothesis 
are explored. The first variation is utilitarian or consequentialist. Procedure 
doctrine might be seen as structured by the balancing of accuracy and cost. 
The second variation is rights based: it assumes that procedural justice 
requires attention to the fair distribution of the costs imposed by the system 
of procedure. These two variations can be combined in a variety of ways to 
produce other, more complex versions of the balancing model. 
We then consider a third hypothesis that a conception of pure 
procedural justice best fits and justifies existing doctrine. We shall call this 
the participation model. The key notion is that it is the process itself and 
not outcome that defines procedural justice. If process is the key, what kind 
of process is intrinsically fair? This question can be answered in at least 
two different ways. The first answer uses actual acceptability to the parties 
as the criterion for fair process. The second variation uses the notion of 
acceptability under ideal conditions. Both variations of the participation 
model suffer from serious flaws, namely, the exclusion of all 
considerations of accuracy and cost as the criteria for procedural fairness. 
That is, it purchases conceptual purity at the price of plausibility. 
 
Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REV. 561, 598 (1993) (distinguishing between outcome-oriented and 
process-oriented participation theories). 
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1. The Accuracy Model 
The first model focuses exclusively on accuracy, or the correct 
application of the law to the facts.154 My exposition of this model begins 
with its utopian form—the ideal of perfect procedural justice. 
a. The Utopian Ideal of Perfect Procedural Justice 
Consider the possibility that current doctrine is informed by the 
utopian ideal of perfect procedural justice.155 Substantive law provides an 
independent criterion for the correct outcome. Robert Bone has called this 
the “rights-based” view.156 The procedural system is designed to ensure 
that in each case the substantively correct outcome actually issues. Let us 
call the conception that procedural justice is measured solely by the 
correctness of outcomes the accuracy model. 
On the surface, it seems obvious that the system strives for correct 
outcomes. Consider the basic structure of the civil litigation system. Courts 
frequently articulate the telos of the civil litigation system as a “search for 
truth.”157 One federal court opined that “the ultimate aim of the judicial 
system is to ascertain the real truth.”158 Thus, liberal pleading rules are 
designed to guard against erroneous resolutions on technical grounds.159 
Extensive discovery aims to provide the parties with all the relevant 
 
 154. See Patrick Johnston, Civil Justice Reform: Juggling Between Politics and Perfection, 62 
FORDHAM L. REV. 833, 882 n.1 (1994) (“I will use the term ‘procedural justice’ broadly to suggest an 
assessment of the quality or success of procedural law in providing dispute-resolution participants what 
we think they are due.”). 
 155. See D.J. GALLIGAN, DISCRETIONARY POWERS: A LEGAL STUDY OF OFFICIAL DISCRETION 
57–61 (1986). See also Susan Kneebone, Natural Justice and Non-Citizens: A Matter of Integrity?, 26 
MELB. U. L. REV. 355, 374 (2002) (characterizing D.J. Galligan as maintaining that “the main purpose 
of the doctrine of procedural fairness is to make the best (that is, the most accurate) decisions in terms 
of substantive outcomes”). 
 156. Bone defines rights-based views thus: 
A rights-based theory assumes that the purpose of adjudication is to determine each party’s 
legal rights accurately. Because rights trump social utility, a deprivation of a right cannot be 
justified by direct appeal to the aggregate social benefits the offending activity makes 
possible. Thus, if an erroneous result counts as a deprivation of substantive right, procedures 
that increased error cannot be justified simply by citing the aggregate benefits to all resulting 
from reduced litigation and delay costs. 
Bone, supra note 153, at 598. 
 157. See, e.g., Carroll v. Jaques Admiralty Law Firm, 110 F.3d 290, 294 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating 
that “[t]he search for truth . . . is at the heart of the litigation process”); Millen v. Mayo Found., 170 
F.R.D. 462, 464 (D. Minn. 1996) (“Justice is the search for truth in an effort to resolve conflict.” 
(internal quotation omitted)). 
 158. See, e.g., Headley v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 141 F.R.D. 362, 366 n.21 (D. Mass. 1991). 
 159. See, e.g., Mahler v. Drake, 43 F.R.D. 1, 3 & n.8 (D.S.C. 1967) (stating the Federal Rules may 
be construed liberally “in the search for truth as the ultimate justice”). 
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evidence for their case.160 Accuracy in fact-finding and in the application of 
law to fact is provided by elaborate trial procedures,161 including cross 
examination,162 neutral judges163 and juries,164 rules of evidence,165 and 
representation by counsel.166 A multilevel appellate system provides for the 
correction of errors made at the trial level.167 Even statutes of limitations 
have been explained as a mechanism for enhanced accuracy.168 At least one 
commentator has suggested that the current system of procedural rule-
making is utopian in aspiration and fails to take costs into account.169 That 
the system is not actually perfect does not mean that perfect procedural 
justice is not its aspiration; perfect procedural justice can be the animating 
 
 160. See, e.g., Burke v. N.Y. City Police Dep’t., 115 F.R.D. 220, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating 
that “the overriding policy is one of disclosure of relevant information in the interest of promoting the 
search for truth in a federal question case”); Myers v. St. Francis Hosp., 220 A.2d 693, 697 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1966) (“The discovery rules are to be construed liberally, for the search for truth in aid of 
justice is paramount. Concealment and surprise are not to be tolerated in a modern judicial system.”). 
 161. See, e.g., Latiolais v. Whitley, 93 F.3d 205, 207 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that “fundamental 
fairness requires that plaintiffs have the opportunity to present their cases so that the trier of fact can 
make a meaningful search for the truth.”); D’Auria ex rel. Mendoza v. Allstate Ins. Co., 673 So. 2d 147, 
147 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (per curiam) (stating that “trials . . . function as forums for the search of 
truth.”). 
 162. See, e.g., In re Grant, 936 P.2d 1360, 1364 (Kan. 1997) (Six, J., dissenting) (“As lawyers and 
judges, we acknowledge cross-examination as an aid in the search for truth.”). 
 163. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Santiago, 591 A.2d 1095, 1113 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (stating that 
judges must undertake a “search for truth”). 
 164. See, e.g., Ray v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 696 A.2d 399, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating that the 
purpose of jury instructions is to aid the jury in its “search for truth”). 
 165. See, e.g., Walstad v. State, 818 P.2d 695, 699 n.6 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (“The general 
purpose of the Rules of Evidence is to facilitate the search for truth.”). 
 166. See, e.g., State v. Morales, 657 A.2d 585, 599 (Conn. 1995) (Borden, J., concurring) (stating 
that the right to counsel aids in the “search for truth”); PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 52 (1967) (“Limiting the right to counsel 
‘gravely endangers the judicial search for truth.’”). But see United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 258 
(1967) (White, J., dissenting) (stating that “as part of our modified adversary system and as part of the 
duty imposed on the most honorable defense counsel, we countenance or require conduct which in 
many instances has little, if any, relation to the search for truth”). 
 167. See, e.g., Shiflett v. Virginia, 447 F.2d 50, 60 (4th Cir. 1971) (en banc) (Winter, J., 
dissenting) (stating that “at least one appeal is a necessary and desirable step in the search for truth”); 
United States v. Brown, 50 F.R.D. 110, 112 (D.D.C.) (stating that “appeals, like trials, are a search for 
truth”), rev’d on other grounds, 428 F.2d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
 168. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (stating that statutes of limitations 
“protect defendants and the courts from having to deal with cases in which the search for truth may be 
seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading 
memories, disappearance of documents, or otherwise”). For a thorough analysis of the various 
justifications for statutes of limitations, see generally Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, The 
Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of Limitation, 28 PAC. L.J. 453 (1997). 
 169. See Laurens Walker, Avoiding Surprise from Federal Civil Rule Making: The Role of 
Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 569, 575–76, 582 (1994). 
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principle of procedure doctrine, even though a residue of inaccuracy exists, 
despite the system’s best efforts. 
But this hypothesis will not withstand serious scrutiny because the 
procedural system is replete with rules that explicitly aim at the insulation 
of error from corrective action. One obvious example is appellate review. 
The clearly erroneous and abuse of discretion standards insulate trial judge 
decisions that are in error from appellate review. Another example is the 
law of prior adjudication. The doctrines of claim and issue preclusion 
prevent relitigation of particular legal theories and whole causes of action, 
even when the prior litigation resulted in an inaccurate decision. This idea 
has been expressed by the courts on numerous occasions. For example, 
[i]t has been said that res judicata makes black white and crooked 
straight. In some cases its application produces a demonstrably incorrect 
result. The principle that litigation must come to an end, however, is a 
very important one, and the fact that some decisions will be incorrect in a 
way that can later be demonstrated is a necessary price.170 
The point is that the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion cannot be 
explained on the ground that they aim at accuracy of results. Although the 
current law of prior adjudication may sometimes protect a correct 
determination from subsequent reconsideration that can result in error, a 
prior adjudication doctrine that truly aimed at accuracy would have a much 
different shape than existing doctrine: it might allow relitigation after a 
showing of clear and convincing evidence that the prior decision was 
incorrect, for example. 
Thus, the conception of perfect procedural justice fails to meet the 
criterion of fit.171 It cannot account for basic features of procedure doctrine. 
 
 170. Velasquez v. Franz, 589 A.2d 143, 165 (N.J. 1991) (Stein, J., dissenting). The most 
prominent expression of the idea is from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Jeter v. Hewitt: 
Under the system of that State, the maintenance of public order, the repose of society, and the 
quiet of families, require that what has been definitely determined by competent tribunals 
shall be accepted as irrefragable legal truth. So deeply is this principle implanted in her 
jurisprudence, that commentators upon it have said, the res judicata renders white that which 
is black, and straight that which is crooked. Facit excurvo rectum, ex albo nigrum. No other 
evidence can afford strength to the presumption of truth it creates, and no argument can 
detract from its legal efficacy. 
Jeter v. Hewitt, 63 U.S. 352, 363–66 (1859). See Taxing Dist. of Brownsville v. Loague, 129 U.S. 493, 
505 (1889). 
 171. In the text, I do not consider the possibility that the features of existing doctrine that do not 
fit the accuracy model should be viewed as “mistakes,” which are subject to eventual correction through 
common law adjudication. See DWORKIN, supra note 106. The best way to approach this possibility is 
to compare the accuracy model with other available models, including the balancing model and the 
principles of procedural justice that I introduce in Part VI.A. When the alternatives are on the table the 
question will be, which theory best fits and justifies procedure doctrine as a whole. At this point, I offer 
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This utopian conception fails on the criterion of justification as well. Given 
that civil procedure imposes real costs on litigants and society at large, it is 
difficult to argue that the smallest marginal gain in accuracy is worth the 
largest investment of resources. Justice has a price, and there is a point at 
which that price is not worth paying.172 Moreover, we have every reason to 
believe that accuracy is subject to the law of diminishing returns. If we 
were to make perfect accuracy our highest commitment, we would find that 
as we got closer and closer to our goal, the cost of reducing the marginal 
rate of error would become higher and higher. We would reach a point 
where society would be required to invest enormous resources for an 
infinitesimal gain in accuracy. 
In sum, the accuracy model suffers from defects in both fit and 
justification. Doctrines like prior adjudication suggest that the existing 
system of procedure does not aim at accuracy alone, and the law of 
diminishing returns suggests that a system aiming at accuracy alone cannot 
be justified as striking a reasonable balance between competing claims on 
social resources. 
b. Systemic Accuracy Versus Case Accuracy 
There is another difficulty with the accuracy model: the notion of 
accuracy is itself ambiguous or underdeterminate.173 To begin the 
investigation of this point, note that the accuracy of a procedure can be 
viewed from two perspectives. From the ex post perspective, we can ask 
whether the result in a particular case was correct; call this “case accuracy.” 
From the ex ante perspective, we can ask whether a given procedure will 
produce more or less accurate results for all future cases; call this “systemic 
accuracy.” Do these two kinds of accuracy track each other, that is, do 
 
the more modest claim that a theory of procedure that calls for wholesale revision of prior adjudication 
doctrine is, at least, subject to a prima facie objection that it suffers from a substantial problem of fit. 
 172. Bone articulates the problem thus: 
 Our current system tolerates procedural error even when expensive procedures might reduce 
it, and we do not believe that a moral wrong or a rights violation has occurred every time 
some procedure marginally increases the error risk. Furthermore, if a substantive right 
implied a right to a perfectly accurate outcome, parties would be entitled to demand that the 
community invest resources in procedure at a level that maximized accuracy regardless of 
cost. Any system that recognized such a right could easily find itself morally committed to a 
disastrous level of financing for adjudication. 
See Bone, supra note 153, at 599. 
 173. On the notion of underdeterminacy, see generally Lawrence B. Solum, Indeterminacy Crisis, 
supra note 134; Solum, Indeterminacy and Equity, supra note 134. 
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procedures that maximize case accuracy also maximize systemic 
accuracy?174 
This is a difficult question, and the answer, as one might expect, is it 
depends. There are some contexts in which the procedure that would result 
in case accuracy ex post in the particular case would result in systemic, ex 
ante inaccuracy. A clear example of the potential conflict between systemic 
and case accuracy is provided by the effects that statutes of limitations have 
on the accuracy of civil proceedings. On the one hand, statutes of 
limitations are defended on the ground that they are accuracy enhancing. 
For example, in United States v. Kubrick,175 the U.S. Supreme Court 
argued that statutes of limitations “protect defendants and the courts from 
having to deal with cases in which the search for truth may be seriously 
impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of 
witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents, or otherwise.”176 
The use of the modal operator “may” is revealing. Statutes of limitations 
create incentives to bring claims within the limitations period, and the 
likely effect of this incentive is that early filing preserves the evidentiary 
record and thus increases the likelihood of accurate adjudication. But in 
any particular case in which the statute runs before the claim is filed, the 
result is that the claim is lost, even if it is meritorious and even if the 
evidentiary record is sufficiently preserved to ensure a high likelihood of 
accurate adjudication. In other words, statutes of limitations purchase 
systemic accuracy at the price of case accuracy.177 
 
 174. It might be argued that the procedure that maximizes case accuracy will always maximize 
system accuracy. Begin with the procedural rule that maximizes systemic accuracy, and then consider 
the application of that rule to a particular case in which it is believed that a different rule would 
maximize case accuracy. There must be some feature of the particular case that accounts for the 
difference. But the rule that maximizes systemic accuracy can always be modified to create an 
exception for that kind of case. Because systemic accuracy is simply the sum of case accuracy for all 
future cases, a rule that incorporates the exception will produce greater systemic accuracy than would a 
rule without the exception. Therefore, systemic accuracy requires the exception, and the supposed 
divergence between systemic accuracy and case accuracy disappears. This argument is a version of a 
familiar argument, first made by David Lyons, for the extensional equivalence of act and rule 
utilitarianism. See DAVID LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM (1965). Whatever the merits 
of Lyons’s argument are as applied to utilitarian moral theory, it does not establish the extensional 
equivalence of case accuracy and systemic accuracy because it does not take into account the incentive 
effects that legal rules (as opposed to the ideal rules of rule utilitarianism) have on future behavior. 
 175. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979). 
 176. Id. at 117. 
 177. The substance of this point is recognized by Tyler Ochoa and Andrew Wistrich. See Ochoa & 
Wistrich, supra note 168, at 477–79. See also Charles C. Callahan, Statutes of Limitations—
Background, 16 OHIO ST. L.J. 130, 134 (1955). 
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Another example is provided by the legal rules that deal with a party’s 
destruction of evidence. In Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills 
Distributors, Inc.,178 then-Judge Breyer explained the two different 
purposes that underlie the spoliation inference, a judge-made rule of 
evidence that permits a finder of fact to draw an inference against a 
spoliator, or a person who destroys evidence: 
The adverse inference is based on two rationales, one evidentiary 
and one not. The evidentiary rationale is nothing more than the common 
sense observation that a party who has notice that a document is relevant 
to litigation and who proceeds to destroy the document is more likely to 
have been threatened by the document than is a party in the same 
position who does not destroy the document. The fact of destruction 
satisfies the minimum requirement of relevance: it has some tendency, 
however small, to make the existence of a fact at issue more probable 
than it would otherwise be. Precisely how the document might have 
aided the party’s adversary, and what evidentiary shortfalls its 
destruction may be taken to redeem, will depend on the particular facts 
of each case, but the general evidentiary rationale for the inference is 
clear. 
The other rationale for the inference has to do with its prophylactic 
and punitive effects. Allowing the trier of fact to draw the inference 
presumably deters parties from destroying relevant evidence before it 
can be introduced at trial. The inference also serves as a penalty, placing 
the risk of an erroneous judgment on the party that wrongfully created 
the risk.179 
What Breyer calls the “evidentiary rationale” expresses an aim at accuracy 
in the individual case. Although the destruction of evidence may create 
uncertainty, the system can respond to that uncertainty by drawing those 
inferences that seem most likely under the circumstances. The “punitive” 
rationale is focused on systemic accuracy: by deterring future acts of 
 
 178. Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distribs., Inc., 692 F.2d 214 (1st Cir. 1982). 
 179. Id. at 218 (internal citations omitted). The First Circuit also describes the spoliation inference 
this way: 
When a document relevant to an issue in a case is destroyed, the trier of fact sometimes may 
infer that the party who obliterated it did so out of a realization that the contents were 
unfavorable. Before such an inference may be drawn, there must be a sufficient foundational 
showing that the party who destroyed the document had notice both of the potential claim and 
of the document’s potential relevance. Even then, the adverse inference is permissive, not 
mandatory. If, for example, the factfinder believes that the documents were destroyed 
accidentally or for an innocent reason, then the fact-finder is free to reject the inference. 
Blinzler v. Marriott Int’l., Inc., 81 F.3d 1148, 1158–59 (1st Cir. 1996). See also Allen Pen Co. v. 
Springfield Photo Mount Co., 653 F.2d 17, 23–24 (1st Cir. 1981) (holding that without some evidence 
that documents have been destroyed “in bad faith” or “from the consciousness of a weak case,” it is 
“ordinarily” improper to draw an adverse inference about the contents of the documents). 
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destruction of evidence, the system aims to improve the long-run accuracy 
of the system as a whole. But the goals of case accuracy and systemic 
accuracy may conflict in any particular case. When evidence is negligently 
destroyed, for example, the careless failure to preserve it may not support 
an inference that the destroyed material was unfavorable to the party who 
destroyed it. Hence, accuracy in the individual case would be undermined 
by imposing a penalty for this destruction. From the systemic point of 
view, however, imposing a penalty on the negligent destruction of evidence 
might create incentives to be more careful in handling such evidence, 
improving the long-run accuracy of the system as a whole. 
For which sort of accuracy should procedural justice aim? This type of 
question arises frequently in both the law and moral theory. In the law, we 
frequently draw a distinction between case-by-case balancing, in which 
factors are balanced to decide a particular case, and systemic balancing, in 
which the factors are balanced to create a general rule, which is then 
applied to decide particular cases.180 In moral theory, we distinguish 
between two forms of utilitarianism: act utilitarianism, which holds that an 
action is right if and only if that action will maximize utility as compared to 
the possible alternative actions, and rule utilitarianism, which holds that an 
action is right if and only if that action is in accord with a general rule that 
would maximize utility if the rule were generally obeyed.181 The general 
distinction between rules or systems, on the one hand, and acts or 
individual cases, on the other, is operating in the distinction that we have 
drawn between case accuracy and systemic accuracy. 
In formulating a conception of procedural justice in general and 
articulating the accuracy model of procedural fairness in particular, the 
tension between case accuracy and systemic accuracy poses a problem that 
must be resolved. If we aim at case accuracy, we achieve procedural justice 
in the case before us, but we may sacrifice accuracy in future proceedings. 
If we aim at systemic accuracy, we achieve a system that produces more 
accurate outcomes in the aggregate, but particular cases require a ruling 
against the party that is otherwise entitled to prevail. Wholesale procedural 
justice is purchased at the price of retail procedural injustice. 
How can this dilemma be resolved? One way out would be to appeal 
to a general moral theory for guidance. For example, we might appeal to a 
 
 180. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE 
L.J. 943, 948 (1987) (using the terms “definitional” and “ad hoc” balancing to refer to the distinction 
between systemic rule balancing and case-by-case balancing). 
 181. See Dan W. Brock, Utilitarianism, in THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 824, 
824 (Robert Audi ed., 1995). 
SOLU12.DOC 11/30/2004 9:41 AM 
2004] PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 251 
deontological view, like Kant’s, for the proposition that one should never 
render an unjust decision at the expense of an innocent litigant in order to 
achieve systemic benefits. Instead, we might choose to pursue case 
accuracy because it respects an important political right—the right to an 
accurate determination of one’s legal rights. Or, we might appeal to a 
consequentialist view, like utilitarianism, and opt for systemic accuracy on 
the ground that rules designed to produce systemic accuracy will produce 
the greatest good for the greatest number.182 But, as I have already 
argued,183 the appeal to general moral theories to arbitrate between 
conceptions of procedural justice is inconsistent with the ideal of public 
reason. Our resolution of the tension between systemic and case accuracy 
will neither command widespread assent nor offer reasons that can be 
accepted as legitimate by the citizenry at large if it depends on the truth of a 
particular comprehensive moral doctrine. 
The next question is whether we can choose between aiming at case 
accuracy or systemic accuracy without relying on a comprehensive moral 
theory. Consider the following principle of political morality: each 
individual has a presumptive right to adjudication of the individual’s 
entitlements based on an assessment of the merits of his or her case. This 
principle of background morality expresses a presumptive right and not an 
unqualified legal entitlement. This principle of political morality does not 
need to rest on any particular moral or religious doctrine: the notion that the 
law should treat each of us as an individual finds strong support in the 
tradition of individual rights and liberties of our political culture. 
This background right of political morality is not unqualified. For 
example, the system may establish general procedural roles that aim at 
systemic accuracy, so long as these rules satisfy the requirements of the 
rule of law, that is, so long as they are public and it is possible to comply 
with them through the exercise of reasonable care. So, I may be penalized 
for destroying evidence if the rule against it is announced in advance and if 
the rule allows me the defense that I have made reasonable good faith 
 
 182. The passage in the text elides the important distinction between act and rule utilitarianism. 
The way that rule utilitarianism supports systemic accuracy over case accuracy is clear: to the extent 
that accuracy is a good consequence, rule utilitarianism counsels in favor of the general rule that will 
promote the greatest accuracy in the long run. An act utilitarian analysis is more complicated. One 
might argue that case accuracy is to be preferred on act utilitarian grounds, because the act utilitarian 
analysis focuses on the consequences of each individual act, in this case the decision of a particular 
case. In the context of a system of procedural rules, however, the act may be the promulgation of the 
rules, and hence the consequences to be summed would include the benefits of accuracy of all future 
cases affected by the rule. 
 183. See supra Part III.B. 
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efforts at compliance. In the case of a statute of limitations, it is fair to cut 
off my legal claim if I was given reasonable notice of the limitations period 
and the period was sufficient to enable me to bring my claim. 
In light of this, consider the following three-part hypothesis 
concerning the relationship between case accuracy and systemic accuracy: 
(1) where systemic accuracy and case accuracy are congruent, the system 
of procedure aims at both; (2) where systemic accuracy would impair case 
accuracy, the system usually aims at case accuracy; and (3) systemic 
accuracy may be preferred over case accuracy if systemic accuracy can be 
obtained through general and public rules, so long as it is possible for those 
affected to comply with the rules by reasonable good faith efforts. 
Assuming, then, that we can offer a satisfactory account of the 
relationship between systemic accuracy and case accuracy, the accuracy 
model stands. It is modified, though, so that accuracy is a plausible 
candidate as a component of an ideal of procedural justice, but it is not a 
candidate for a complete account of procedural justice. The thesis that the 
system aims at accuracy alone does not fit important aspects of the existing 
system of civil dispute resolution and does not offer a normatively 
attractive justification of that system. If taken alone, the accuracy model 
fails. 
2. The Balancing Model 
The next hypothesis is that the current shape of procedure doctrine is 
best explained and justified by a conception of imperfect procedural justice. 
We assume that the substantive law provides an independent criterion for 
what constitutes a just or fair outcome. Acknowledging that perfection is 
impossible and that diminishing marginal returns imply that approaching 
perfection will become too costly at some point, the system aims at a 
balance between accuracy and its cost. Let us call this notion of imperfect 
procedural justice the balancing model. It is the nature of the compromise 
between accuracy and cost that provides content to an ideal of imperfect 
procedural justice. Under what conditions will accuracy be sacrificed? How 
should the costs of procedural justice be distributed? 
One answer to these questions is utilitarian. We could simply weigh 
the costs of procedure against the benefits and adopt the system of 
procedure that will maximize utility. Another approach would emphasize 
rights-based constraints on both the nature of the costs that may be imposed 
and the distribution of these costs. Each of these two approaches is 
examined in turn. 
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a. Consequentialist Balancing: The Mathews v. Eldridge184 
Balancing Test 
The consequentialist version of imperfect procedural justice finds 
substantial support in the decisions of the Supreme Court that interpret the 
Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. The most striking example is 
provided by the balancing test announced in Mathews v. Eldridge:185 
[O]ur prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates 
of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, 
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens 
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.186 
This approach is not confined to due process doctrine. It informs courts’ 
decisions in a number of doctrinal areas.187 Consider, for example, the 
following excerpt from a discussion of standards of appellate review: 
“Duplication of the trial judge’s efforts in the court of appeals would very 
likely contribute only negligibly to the accuracy of fact determination at a 
huge cost in diversion of judicial resources.”188 The Court made an explicit 
appeal to a balancing of the benefits of accuracy with its costs. 
Beginning with this emphasis on balancing, we could construct a 
utilitarian conception of imperfect procedural justice. This effort is 
complicated, however, because there are many forms of utilitarianism. For 
our purposes, we might consider ideal rule utilitarianism, in which an act is 
right if and only if it conforms with the system of rules, which, if 
universally followed, would produce the best consequences.189 Let us make 
 
 184. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 185. For scholarly commentary on Mathews v. Eldridge, see Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme 
Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors 
in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976). 
 186. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35. 
 187. See, e.g., Yorktown Med. Lab. v. Perales, 948 F.2d 84, 90 (2d Cir. 1991) (applying the 
Mathews balancing test to a due process challenge to a state’s use of sampling in an audit of a 
laboratory’s Medicaid payment claims); Bell v. Farmer’s Ins. Exch., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 544, 575 (Ct. App. 
2004) (applying the Mathews balancing test to determine whether the use of statistical sampling 
techniques to assess class damages comports with due process); In re Travarius O., 799 N.E.2d 510, 
515 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (analyzing “the possible deprivation of a parent’s due process rights in 
termination and adoption proceedings by balancing the factors enunciated . . . in Mathews”). 
 188. Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 574–75 (1985). 
 189. See generally LYONS, supra note 174 (discussing various forms of utilitarianism); J.J.C. 
SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST (1973) (same). 
SOLU12.DOC 11/30/2004 9:41 AM 
254 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:181 
a further simplifying assumption: that all of the relevant costs can be 
expressed as prices. The resultant approach would be roughly similar to 
some law and economics approaches. 
Consider, for example, Richard Posner’s economic analysis of 
procedure. He writes, “The objective of a procedural system, viewed 
economically, is to minimize the sum of two types of costs. The first is the 
cost of erroneous judicial decisions.”190 The second type of cost is “the cost 
of operating the procedural system.”191 Operating costs are borne by the 
public in the form of subsidies to the judicial system and by the parties in 
the form of court fees, attorneys’ fees, and litigation costs. 
Can a utilitarian conception of imperfect procedural justice fit and 
justify the general contours of existing procedure? Consider first the 
dimension of fit. On one hand, the utilitarian conception seems to fit 
contemporary procedural due process doctrine remarkably well. Mathews 
v. Eldridge and its progeny are all but explicit in their utilitarianism. On the 
other hand, a broader survey of the legal landscape reveals a number of 
problems. 
The first problem of fit concerns the relationship between procedural 
and substantive justice. The theoretical framework that we are operating 
within postulates that the law is a seamless web.192 Our account of 
procedural justice must fit within a larger theory that fits and justifies the 
law as a whole. The point is much mooted, but there are grave doubts about 
the viability of utilitarian theory to account for the shape of existing legal 
doctrine. Indeed, from Bentham on, utilitarians have been critiqued at least 
as much as they have been used to explain legal theory. Large domains of 
law seem best explained by rights-based accounts, including rights to 
privacy as well as freedom of speech and religion. 
The second problem of fit concerns the system’s reluctance to take 
utility into account in a variety of situations. Mathews embodies a line of 
cases in which the plaintiff seeks to extend traditional adversary procedures 
to administrative action; in that context, a utilitarian approach 
predominates. The same approach does not seem to be followed when we 
turn our attention to the traditional pleading, discovery, and trial system. It 
is true that some rules can be explained on utilitarian grounds—prior 
 
 190. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 549 (4th ed. 1992). See generally Louis 
Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication, supra note 3 (analyzing the economic costs associated 
with legal reforms to increase accuracy in adjudication). 
 191. POSNER, supra note 190, at 549. 
 192. See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 106, at 239–40, 264, 354, 379–91. 
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adjudication doctrine and standards of appellate review may be examples. 
But what is the utilitarian case for the elaborate machinery of discovery, 
trial by jury, the rules of evidence, and so forth? And why do these 
procedures come, for the most part, as an indivisible package? Why not 
Mathews in reverse, a doctrine that would eliminate procedures when it 
could be shown that their costs exceeded their benefits? These rhetorical 
questions are merely suggestive, and much utilitarian work has been done 
on the rules of evidence, the jury trial, and so forth. In this regard, it is 
important to remember that the expensive machinery of the traditional trial 
is used in only a tiny percentage of actual disputes, with negotiated 
settlement as the mode for resolving the vast majority. But even conceding 
these points, the problems of fit seem overwhelming. 
Despite the very broad statement of the holding in Mathews, the 
Supreme Court has not applied the balancing test in practice, even in cases 
in which the issue is whether a hearing is required. A clear example is the 
Court’s decision in Richards v. Jefferson County.193 There the Alabama 
Supreme Court gave claim-preclusive effect to a prior judgment that the 
parties to be bound did not have an opportunity to participate. Rather than 
balancing, the Court relied on a categorical rule: 
The doctrine of res judicata rests at bottom upon the ground that the 
party to be affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has 
litigated or had an opportunity to litigate the same matter in a former 
action in a court of competent jurisdiction. The opportunity to be heard is 
an essential requisite of due process of law in judicial proceedings. And 
as a State may not, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, enforce 
a judgment against a party named in the proceedings without a hearing or 
an opportunity to be heard, so it cannot, without disregarding the 
requirement of due process, give a conclusive effect to a prior judgment 
against one who is neither a party nor in privity with a party therein.194 
Indeed, the Court in Richards explicitly rejected the weighing of 
consequences: 
Respondents contend that, even if petitioners did not receive the kind of 
opportunity to make their case in court that due process would ordinarily 
ensure, the character of their action renders the usual constitutional 
protections inapplicable. They contend that invalidation of the 
occupation tax would have disastrous consequences on the 
county . . . .195 
 
 193. Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793 (1996). 
 194. Id. at 797 n.4 (citations and emphasis omitted). 
 195. Id. at 802–03. 
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The Court did not even accept the invitation to engage in a balancing of 
interests: 
Of course, we are aware that governmental and private entities have 
substantial interests in the prompt and determinative resolution of 
challenges to important legislation. We do not agree with the Alabama 
Supreme Court, however, that, given the amount of money at stake, 
respondents were entitled to rely on the assumption that the [prior] action 
“authoritatively establish[ed]” the constitutionality of the tax. A state 
court’s freedom to rely on prior precedent in rejecting a litigant’s claims 
does not afford it similar freedom to bind a litigant to a prior judgment to 
which he was not a party. That general rule clearly applies when a 
taxpayer seeks a hearing to prevent the State from subjecting him to a 
levy in violation of the Federal Constitution.196 
The important point is that the Court in Richards did not engage in 
Matthews v. Eldridge balancing; rather, it relied on a general rule that 
guarantees an opportunity to be heard, and thus, a right of participation. 
Putting aside the dimension of fit, does the utilitarian version of the 
balancing model provide the best justification for the structure of existing 
procedure doctrine? This is a large question, to put it mildly. Certainly, 
utilitarian reasoning has played a role in thinking about the law.197 
Moreover, it seems overwhelmingly plausible to believe that consequences 
do count in legal justification. Even the most ardent adherents of rights-
based approaches are unlikely to maintain that accuracy or participation 
must be purchased at any cost, and the magnitude of the costs imposed is 
itself relevant to questions of fairness. Thus, a utilitarian account captures 
at least part of the story. 
But does the utilitarian version of the balancing model tell the whole 
story? Does utilitarianism provide the right kind of justification for the 
existing system of procedure? Consider the following argument for a 
negative answer to these questions. Recall the observation, made above, 
that ours is a pluralist society, in which there are a variety of competing 
comprehensive moral and religious doctrines. Although some features of 
utilitarianism, such as the insistence that consequences do count, are the 
subject of wide agreement, other features, especially the beliefs that only 
consequences count and that all values can be reduced to a single metric, 
are highly controversial. For this reason, utilitarian moral theory does not 
provide an appropriate justification for our system of procedure. The right 
 
 196. Id. at 804–05 (citation omitted). 
 197. For a very explicit appeal to utilitarian norms, see Louis Kaplow, A Fundamental Objection 
to Tax Equity Norms: A Call for Utilitarianism, 48 NAT’L TAX J. 497 (1995). 
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sort of justification must draw on public reasons, and in particular, on 
widely shared values that are implicit in our public political culture. The 
utilitarian notion that consequences count does provide a public reason, but 
the utilitarian premise that all rights ultimately depend on maximizing 
some nonmoral good is not an appropriate justification. 
b. Deontological Constraints on Balancing: Consideration of Cost 
and Recognition of Procedural Rights 
Consider, then, an alternative to the consequentialist model of 
imperfect procedural justice. Is it possible to formulate a model of 
imperfect procedural justice that uses deontological notions, such as 
fairness and rights, to give a systemic account for the ways in which a 
system of procedure should aim for less-than-complete accuracy and for 
the distribution of costs imposed by such a system? This conception of 
procedural justice would need to incorporate accounts of the fair 
distribution of procedural burdens and the correction of procedural 
injustice. 
Begin with the most obvious burden imposed by imperfect procedural 
justice: the risk of error. Does fairness have anything to say about the 
distribution of this risk? In the civil context, the baseline notion seems to be 
that the risks of error should be distributed equally. Neither plaintiffs nor 
defendants should enjoy an advantage in any particular category of cases. 
The clearest expression of this notion is found in the formulation of the 
burden of proof for most issues in civil litigation. The preponderance of the 
evidence standard seems designed to spread the risk of error evenly across 
potential litigants.198 Why? Consider the alternatives. Suppose that in 
ordinary civil cases, the plaintiff were required to prevail beyond a 
reasonable doubt or by clear and convincing evidence. Such burdens would 
allocate the risk of error unevenly, resulting in a higher loss rate for 
plaintiffs with meritorious claims than for defendants entitled to prevail on 
the merits. 
 
 198. Consider the possibility that the overall risk of error can be minimized by a procedure that 
distributes the risk asymmetrically. For example, imagine that the baseline rate of error in a particular 
context is 0.2 (and hence the accuracy rate is 0.8) with the risk distributed equally between potential 
plaintiffs and defendants (each bearing a 0.1 risk of an erroneous decision that goes against them and a 
0.1 risk of an erroneous decision in their favor). Suppose further that a procedural change would reduce 
the overall risk to 0.15 (and hence the accuracy rate is 0.85), but that all of this risk would be borne by 
plaintiffs. If accuracy alone were considered, then the procedural change would be preferred  
(0.85 > 0.8), but if equal distribution of the risk of error is independently valuable, then the change 
might be ruled out on the ground that a 0.15 risk of erroneous decisions that disadvantage plaintiffs 
accompanied by a 0.0 risk of erroneous decisions that disadvantage defendants is less fair than the 
symmetrical risk that was associated with the baseline error rate. 
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The risk of error is influenced by many factors. Suppose that the 
criteria of fit and justification are best satisfied by a fairness-based 
conception of imperfect procedural justice, requiring an equal distribution 
of risks among plaintiffs and defendants from the ex ante perspective. This 
hypothesis would be confirmed if it could be shown that existing doctrine 
avoids asymmetrical distributions of the risk of error, except in those cases 
in which there are countervailing considerations of fairness or cost.199 This 
claim needs to be qualified: some asymmetry may be unavoidable. The 
criterion of fit does not require that the doctrine fit the goal specified by the 
criterion of fairness in the conception of procedural fairness; if the current 
practice approximates the maximum degree of satisfaction of the criterion 
that is practically possible, then the conceptions can be said to fit current 
practice. 
There is at least one way in which existing doctrine does not seem to 
spread the risk of error equally among the various classes of litigants. In an 
adversary system, the quality of representation may affect the risk of 
erroneous deprivation of substantive rights. Given that the quality of 
representation depends on the ability to pay, current civil procedure 
doctrine would seem to provide a systemic distribution of the risk of error 
in favor of those who have the greatest share of social resources. Equal 
distribution of the risk of error would seem to require the equalization of 
legal resources,200 but current doctrine provides very little in the way of 
such equalization, especially in cases without a clear market value. This 
evidence does not suffice to settle the matter. It might turn out that 
inequality of legal resources is required by other considerations of fairness 
like fundamental economic liberties. These important issues are outside the 
scope of this Article. 
A fairness- or rights-based conception of imperfect procedural justice 
will have implications for the distribution of other costs that are imposed 
by the system of procedure. For example, liberal discovery may operate to 
increase accuracy, but it also imposes burdens on both litigants and third 
parties. A rights-based approach would attend to the question whether 
discovery would violate the preexisting moral or legal rights of the parties, 
such as the right to privacy. Rather than balancing the costs of privacy 
 
 199. Asymmetrical risks of error might also be justified where they benefit the party that bears the 
higher risk of error. Thus, in a variation of the example provided above, supra note 198, a change from 
a symmetrical risk of 0.1 for plaintiffs and 0.1 for defendants (total = 0.2) to an asymmetrical risk of 
0.05 for plaintiffs and 0.0 for defendants (total = 0.05) is acceptable. This is because the risk of error 
disadvantaging plaintiffs is reduced (0.05 < 0.1) even though it becomes unequal (0.0 ≠ 0.05). 
 200. See Alan Wertheimer, The Equalization of Legal Resources, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 303, 304–06 
(1988). 
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invasions against the benefits in terms of increased accuracy, a rights-based 
conception might look to whether the privacy right has been waived, and if 
not, whether that right is more fundamental (or ranked higher in a lexical 
ordering) than the interests of the parties in accurate adjudication. 
The adequacy of a fairness-based conception of imperfect procedural 
justice is more difficult to assess than is the adequacy of a utilitarian 
conception. Utilitarian accounts are relatively simple in structure, and 
although the assessment of consequences may be difficult in practice, it 
may well be possible to devise test cases that will reveal the lack of fit 
between the utilitarian account and existing doctrine. This simplicity is 
lacking in the case of fairness-based conceptions. A great deal of 
argumentative work needs to be done in order to produce even the sketch of 
a fairness-based conception of imperfect procedural justice; until that work 
is done, it simply is not possible to determine whether existing doctrine fits 
the conception. There is another complication here raised by the 
relationship between the criteria of fit and justification. If fit alone were the 
criterion, a rights-based conception could turn out to be empty and 
impossible to falsify. One could always gerrymander a conception of 
procedural rights so that it has exactly those rights embodied by existing 
doctrine. The criterion of justification demands that the conception of 
procedural justice provide a coherent justification for the shape of existing 
doctrine. Thus, the criterion of justification rules out arbitrary, post hoc 
procedural rights conceptions that are tailored to the shape of existing law. 
In Part VI, we will examine an articulated theory of procedural justice—
albeit one that does not fit within the confines of the balancing model. 
3. The Participation Model 
Let us now consider a third and final family of conceptions of 
procedural justice. The participation model holds that procedural fairness 
requires that those affected by a decision have the option to participate in 
the process by which the decision is made.201 The idea that procedural 
fairness requires participation is a familiar one. In Marshall v. Jerrico, 
Inc.,202 Justice Marshall wrote that there are “two central concerns of 
procedural due process, the prevention of unjustified or mistaken 
 
 201. See, e.g., Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. 
REV. 1413, 1489 (1991) (“Procedural fairness, however, is not subsumed completely by substantive 
justice. Procedural fairness means that a legitimate decisionmaking process promotes independent 
values of participation, deliberation, and consensus.”); Frank I. Michelman, Formal and Associational 
Aims in Procedural Due Process, in DUE PROCESS 126 (J. Rolan Pennock et al. eds., 1977). 
 202. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980). 
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deprivations and the promotion of participation and dialogue by affected 
individuals in the decision-making process.”203 
The participation model is not well defined because it rests on 
uncertain and varying foundations. For this reason, we will investigate four 
interpretations of the model. The four interpretations are unified by the idea 
of pure procedural justice, that is, the idea that the fairness of a procedure is 
a function, not of some independent criteria, but instead of the procedure’s 
intrinsic features. This means that the outcome of the procedure is fair, 
whatever it is, provided that the requirements of the procedure have been 
satisfied. My discussion of the first interpretation, the “gaming 
interpretation,” briefly explores the notion that litigation should be 
considered a fair game or contest in which the winners are entitled to 
prevail if they have played by the rules and are entitled under the rules to 
win. My discussion of the second, the “dignity interpretation,” emphasizes 
dignity and autonomy as a function of the actual participation of litigants in 
procedures that affect them. My discussion of the third, the “satisfaction 
interpretation,” argues that participatory process is justified by the greater 
level of satisfaction it provides to litigants. My discussion of the fourth, the 
“discourse theory interpretation,” suggests an ideal communication 
situation as the criterion of a just or correct outcome and then argues that 
civil procedure doctrine aims at approximating this ideal. 
a. The Gaming Interpretation 
At the outset, we should dispose of the least plausible interpretation of 
the participation model, the gaming interpretation. This interpretation 
expresses two related, but somewhat inconsistent, ideas about procedural 
fairness: one is captured by the analogy between litigation and a game of 
chance, and the other is expressed by the metaphor of the level playing 
field. Each of these ideas is explored in turn. 
The first idea is that civil litigation is like a game of chance. Gambling 
contests are examples of pure procedural justice, so long as the rules are 
announced in advance and enforced, because gamblers and athletes agree to 
the procedure. No procedural unfairness can attach to one’s having bet 
heavily on three aces if one loses to four twos. On this model, the side that 
wins a game of civil litigation deserves its victory, so long as all of the 
rules were followed. 
This theory has been advanced by many, most notably by Bentham,204 
and criticized by others. The theory should properly be viewed as a straw 
 
 203. Id. at 242. 
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man or a reductio of the participation model. Jerome Frank provides a 
loose statement of the criticism on the gaming theory: 
Wigmore (following up a suggestion made by Bentham) suggested that 
“the common law, originating in a community of sports and games, was 
permeated by the instinct of sportsmanship” which led to a “sporting 
theory of justice,” a theory of “legalized gambling.” This theory, 
although it had some desirable effects, “has contributed,” said Wigmore, 
“to lower the system of administering justice and in particular of 
ascertaining truth in litigation, to the level of a mere game of skill or 
chance” . . . in which lawyers use evidence “as one plays a trump card, 
or draws to three aces, or holds back a good horse till the home- 
stretch . . . .”205 
The difficulty with the gaming interpretation of the participation model is 
that litigants do not choose to file or defend lawsuits in the same way that 
gamblers choose to join a poker game. If one’s legal rights have been 
violated and the violator refuses voluntary alternative dispute resolution, 
then litigation is the only alternative. Even if it were fair to analogize the 
filing of a civil action to entering a sporting event, the requisite voluntary 
choice is missing in the case of civil defendants who can be compelled to 
play against their will at the risk of a binding default judgment being 
entered against them. 
If I choose to play a game of poker and lose $10,000, that outcome 
can be said to be fair, so long as everyone who played abided by the rules. 
Poker players choose to play the game that is constituted by the rules of 
poker, and it would be very odd indeed if an experienced player who lost at 
poker were to complain that he or she had been cheated on the grounds that 
poker itself is unfair. But if I am forced to play a game of civil litigation 
and lose $10,000, then there is a further question: were the procedural rules 
fair? This question suggests another version of the gaming theory, captured 
by the metaphor of a “level playing field,” frequently used in judicial 
opinions.206 
 
 204. Jeremy Bentham used the analogy to criticize the idea of pure procedural justice as “a maxim 
which one would suppose to have found its way from the gaming-table to the bench.” 7 JEREMY 
BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 171 (Russell & Russell Inc. 1962) (1843). 
 205. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTHS AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 91 (3d ed. 
1973). See also Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 102 (1977) (Fortas, J., concurring) (arguing that a trial 
is “not a sporting event”); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest 
for Truth?, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279; William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting 
Event or Quest for Truth? A Progress Report, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1990). 
 206. United States v. O’Keefe, 128 F.3d 885, 897 (5th Cir. 1997) (discussing a “level playing field 
between the prosecution and the defense”); United States v. Hsu, 982 F. Supp. 1022, 1025–26 (E.D. Pa. 
1997); Saunders v. City of Philadelphia, No. 97-3251, 1997 WL 400034, at *6 (E.D. Pa. July 11, 1997) 
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What is meant by a level playing field? A sporting contest is unfair if 
the field is tilted, giving one side an unfair advantage. But the notion of 
unfair advantage must be cashed out. In a sporting contest, a level playing 
field is required so that the skill of the athletes will determine the outcome. 
But we do not believe that the skill of the lawyers should determine the 
outcome of civil litigation, although we acknowledge that, in fact, legal 
skill may play a role. As a normative matter, an ideal of procedural justice 
that is fair to lawyer-contestants is completely unattractive.207 
The gaming interpretation of the participation model is a nonstarter as 
a theory of procedural justice precisely because it does not recognize the 
cogency of the very question it is supposed to address. Although the 
gaming interpretation cannot be considered a serious candidate, it does 
enable us to see what is at stake in our investigation of the participation 
model. We need an interpretation of what makes a process fair that can 
address the fact that civil litigation is not a freely chosen activity. 
b. The Dignity Interpretation 
The second interpretation of the participation model connects the 
independent value of process with the dignity of those who are affected by 
legal proceedings.208 One way of articulating this central notion is that 
everyone is entitled to their day in court. This right to participation is 
justified by a background right of political morality, that is, the right of 
 
(stating “the public interest, we find, is best served where all parties have a level playing field, as set 
forth in the apposite rules of civil and criminal procedure”); Bilbo ex rel. Basnaw v. Shelter Ins. Co., 
698 So. 2d 691, 693 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (“The effect of the amendment [making summary judgment 
more freely available] is to level the playing field between the parties in two ways: first, the supporting 
evidence submitted by the parties should be scrutinized equally, and second, the overriding presumption 
in favor of trial on the merits is removed.”). 
 207. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957) (“The Federal Rules reject the approach that 
pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept 
the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.”). 
 208. The dignity argument is associated with its eloquent exposition by Jerry Mashaw. See JERRY 
L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 158–253 (1985). See also Owen M. Fiss, 
The Allure of Individualism, 78 IOWA L. REV. 965, 978 (1993) (stating that “participation has a value in 
its own right, manifesting a public commitment to the dignity and worth of the individual”); Jerry L. 
Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885 (1981); 
Toni M. Massaro, The Dignity Value of Face-to-Face Confrontations, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 863 (1988); 
Richard B. Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to 
Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 193 (1978) (“It is this value of individuality—of 
respect for personal integrity and identity—that forms the core of inherent dignity. To ignore or deny its 
existence, or discard its importance in the procedural due process equation, is to invite a regime hostile 
to the role of the individual . . . .”); Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 
GEO. L.J. 1357, 1391–93 (1991) (asserting that participation enhances respect for the dignity of litigants 
and reasoned and accurate decisionmaking). For a critique of the dignity theory, see Rutherford, supra 
note 136, at 42–47. 
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persons (or citizens) to be treated with dignity and respect. A procedure 
that ensures parties an opportunity to participate in the process of making 
decisions that affect them might be counted as a just procedure for this 
reason, independently of the correctness of the outcome that results from 
the procedure. 
Robert Bone describes a closely related notion as follows: “The ‘day 
in court’ ideal in American adjudication is linked to a process-oriented 
view of adjudicative participation that values participation for its own sake, 
not just for its impact on outcome quality. Participation is important 
because it gives individuals a chance to make their own litigation 
choices.”209 A variety of values are invoked in connection with the day-in-
court ideal, including equality, individuality, and autonomy, but the most 
frequently invoked value is dignity. We shall call the interpretation of the 
participation model that is grounded in the notion that participation is 
essential for dignity the dignity interpretation. 
The best account of the dignitary value of participatory process has 
been developed by Jerry Mashaw. 210 Mashaw states the intuitive idea as 
follows: 
At an intuitive level, a dignitary approach is appealing. We all feel that 
process matters to us irrespective of result. This intuition may be a 
delusion. We may be so accustomed to rationalizing demands for 
improvement in our personal prospects, in the purportedly neutral terms 
of process fairness, that we can no longer distinguish between outcome-
oriented motives and process-oriented arguments . . . . 
 . . . Yet there seems to be something to the intuition that process itself 
matters. We do distinguish between losing and being treated unfairly. 
And, however fuzzy our articulation of the process characteristics that 
yield a sense of unfairness, it is commonplace for us to describe process 
affronts as somehow related to disrespect for our individuality, to our not 
being taken seriously as persons.211 
Mashaw argues that his dignitary theory of procedural due process provides 
both a necessary and sufficient account of the Due Process Clauses.212 
 
 209. Bone, supra note 153, at 619. See Robert G. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative 
Forms: Reconceiving the History of Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213 (1990) 
[hereinafter Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms]; Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in 
Court” Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193 (1992) [hereinafter Bone, Day in 
Court]. 
 210. See JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE (1983); MASHAW, supra note 208; 
Mashaw, supra note 185. 
 211. MASHAW, supra note 208, at 162–63. 
 212. Id. at 169. 
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There is something to the notion that a right to participation in 
decisionmaking processes is valuable because it respects the dignity and 
autonomy of those who are affected by the outcome of those processes. 
Certainly, it is not wrong to say that including those who are affected in the 
decisionmaking process is respectful of their autonomy and status as equal 
citizens (or persons). It is plausible to see dignity as playing at least a 
supporting role in an account of procedural fairness. 
But at this point the question is whether the dignity interpretation of 
the participation model offers an independent model or theory of 
procedural justice. It is clear that it does not. First, participation alone is not 
sufficient to make for a just or fair procedure. All the participation in the 
world will not save a sham trial from a charge of injustice. At the very 
least, the role of accuracy in our understanding of procedural justice would 
need to be taken into account. Second, it is not clear that the value of 
dignity provides reasons that are sufficiently weighty to counter the other 
values that bear on procedural justice. By itself, the value of dignity is 
closely related to the values that are served by proper etiquette or good 
manners. Indignity or disrespect are not the sort of grave injuries that trump 
other values tout court, but the dignity interpretation of the participation 
model would require dignity to have precisely that kind of force or weight. 
It does not suffice to say that dignity is a matter of right because the 
concerns implicated by the accuracy model (that is, the underlying 
substantive rights vindicated by a system of procedure) are also matters of 
right. And if we were to ask whether the substantive rights served by 
accuracy trump the right to be treated with dignity, it is difficult to make 
the case that dignity ranks so high that it always trumps the other rights 
implicated in procedural fairness. As a general theory of procedural justice, 
the dignity interpretation is a nonstarter. 
c. The Satisfaction Interpretation 
The dignity interpretation is rooted in a rights-based or fairness-
centered conception of political morality, but the third interpretation of the 
participation model looks to a more utilitarian measure of the value of 
process. The satisfaction interpretation of the participation model uses 
participant satisfaction as the criteria for the evaluation of process. A 
process that provides participants an opportunity to tell their stories and 
make litigation decisions may be most satisfactory to participants, even if 
the process is less accurate or more costly than alternatives that afford less 
opportunity for participation. Social psychologists have attempted to 
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measure participant satisfaction levels and other perceptions of various 
procedures.213 
For the purposes of discussion, let us assume that social psychologists 
were able to demonstrate that participation is satisfying to litigants and that 
this satisfaction is not substantially dependent on the accuracy and cost of 
the process. Would this social fact provide a good and sufficient reason for 
the participation model? Stating the issue somewhat differently, would the 
 
 213. Social psychology has produced a large literature on procedural justice. See, e.g., E. ALLAN 
LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988); JOHN THIBAUT & 
LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975); TOM R. TYLER, WHY 
PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990) [hereinafter TYLER, OBEY THE LAW]; Edith Barrett-Howard & Tom R. 
Tyler, Procedural Justice as a Criterion in Allocation Decisions, 50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
296, 300 (1986); Joel Brockner & Phyllis Siegel, Understanding the Interaction Between Procedural and 
Distributive Justice, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS OF THEORY AND RESEARCH 390 (Roderick 
M. Kramer et al. eds., 1996); James L. Gibson, Understandings of Justice: Institutional Legitimacy, 
Procedural Justice, and Political Tolerance, 23 LAW & SOC. REV. 469 (1989); Pauline Houlden, Stephen 
LaTour, Laurens Walker & John Thibaut, Preference for Modes of Dispute Resolution as a Function of 
Process and Decision Control, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 13 (1978); Stephen LaTour, 
Determinants of Participant and Observer Satisfaction with Adversary and Inquisitorial Modes of 
Adjudication, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1531 (1978); Stephen LaTour, Pauline Houlden, 
Laurens Walker, & John Thibaut, Procedure: Transnational Perspectives and Preferences, 86 YALE L. J. 
258 (1976); E. Allan Lind & Robin I. Lissak, Apparent Impropriety and Procedural Fairness 
Judgments, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL. SOC. PSYCHOL. 19 (1985); E. Allan Lind, Robert J. MacCoun, Patricia 
A. Ebener, William L.F. Felstiner, Deborah R. Hensler, Judith Resnik & Tom R. Tyler, In the Eye of the 
Beholder: Tort Litigants’ Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 953, 967, 968 tbl. 2 (1990); E. Allan Lind & P. Christopher Earley, Procedural Justice and 
Culture, 27 INT’L J. PSYCHOL. 227, 227–40 (1992); E. Allan Lind, Ruth Kanfer, & P. Christopher Garley, 
Voice, Control, and Procedural Justice: Instrumental and Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness 
Judgments, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952 (1990); Norman G. Poythress, Procedural 
Preferences, Perceptions of Fairness, and Compliance with Outcomes, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 361 
(1994); Austin Sarat, Authority, Anxiety, and Procedural Justice: Moving from Scientific Detachment to 
Critical Engagement, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 647 (1993) (reviewing TYLER, OBEY THE LAW, supra); Blair 
H. Sheppard, Justice is No Simple Matter: Case for Elaborating Our Model of Procedural Fairness, 49 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 953, 956–57 (1985); John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of 
Procedure, 66 CAL. L. REV. 541 (1978); Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the 
Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion 
Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703 (1993); Tom R. Tyler, Jonathan D. Casper & Bonnie Fisher, Maintaining 
Allegiance Toward Political Authorities: The Role of Prior Attitudes and the Use of Fair Procedure, 33 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 629, 640–41 (1989) (reporting data from interviews with criminal defendants and 
concluding that perceptions of procedural fairness affected attitudes towards judicial authority and 
government more so than did outcomes and favorable sentences); Tom R. Tyler & Kenneth Rasinski, 
Procedural Justice, Institutional Legitimacy, and the Acceptance of Unpopular U.S. Supreme Court 
Decisions: A Reply to Gibson, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 621 (1991); Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological 
Consequences of Judicial Procedures: Implications for Civil Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REV. 433 
(1992); Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Disputant Concerns in Mediation, 3 NEGOTIATION J. 367 (1987); 
Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal 
Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103, 106 (1988); Laurens Walker, E. Allan Lind & John Thibaut, 
The Relation Between Procedural and Distributive Justice, 65 VA. L. REV. 1401 (1979). 
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fact that participatory process produces high levels of satisfaction support a 
pure procedural justice theory of civil litigation? 
Once again, the answer to these questions is obviously no. To see this 
point clearly, let us assume, for the moment, a utilitarian framework for 
evaluating these questions. We assume that participatory process has 
independent satisfaction value, S. But there are other values to be weighed 
in a utilitarian calculus. The benefits of accurate adjudication, A, and other 
external costs, C, and benefits, B, of the various alternatives must be 
summed. On utilitarian grounds, we should prefer the alternative with the 
highest utility score. For each alternative, i, the utility, is calculated as 
follows: Ui = Si + Ai + Bi - Ci. But this is the balancing model, not the 
participation model. In order for the satisfaction interpretation of the 
participation model to succeed on utilitarian grounds, we would need to 
show that litigant satisfaction is the only consequence that counts (that is, 
that Ui = Si), but there is no basis for making such a showing. Even if it 
could be demonstrated that litigants prefer participatory process, even when 
they are made aware of the accuracy effects and other social costs and 
benefits, the satisfaction interpretation still would not be sufficient because 
civil proceedings have effects on persons who are not litigants. For 
example, accurate adjudication may produce general deterrence, legal 
proceedings may be subsidized by public expenditures, and so forth. Thus, 
litigant satisfaction cannot be the sole determinant of the utility of the 
procedural system. 
This simple utilitarian objection to the satisfaction interpretation is 
reinforced when fairness concerns are brought to bear on our evaluation. 
Accuracy serves to ensure that litigants prevail when they are entitled to do 
so, and inaccurate outcomes deny litigants their rights. Even if some 
litigants are more satisfied with a process that results in an erroneous 
outcome that disadvantages them (but allows them to participate), this does 
not justify denying other litigants outcomes to which they have a right. This 
point could be overcome if it could be shown that all (or almost all) 
litigants would consent to an erroneous judgment against them in exchange 
for more participation, but it seems most unlikely that such a showing 
could be made. 
It is important to remember that these arguments against the 
satisfaction interpretation of the participation model make a very narrow 
point—that satisfaction with the process is not the whole story about 
procedural fairness. This narrow point does not force the conclusion that 
litigant satisfaction is unimportant or that it should not be considered in the 
evaluation and comparison of specific procedures. The proper conclusion 
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to draw is that the satisfaction interpretation of the participation model fails 
as a stand-alone theory of procedural justice. 
d. The Discourse Theory Interpretation 
Consider then, a fourth interpretation of the participation model. This 
interpretation argues for a deep, constitutive connection between 
participatory process and correct outcomes. Because this interpretation is 
most fully expressed in the discourse theory offered by Jürgen Habermas, 
we shall call it the discourse theory interpretation. 
Existing procedures do more than simply provide for participation. 
Trials, for example, are conducted according to elaborate rules that ensure 
that both sides have an equal opportunity to present their cases. Decisions 
are made by neutral third parties. These features suggest that the procedural 
system might be conceived as the model of the ideal communication 
situation articulated by Habermas. He has advanced what might be called a 
discourse theory of truth.214 On the discourse theory, we parse a truth claim 
as a claim that the proposition asserted as true would be agreed on under 
conditions of rational discourse, including the condition that all participants 
have an equal opportunity to engage in, advance, or refute arguments, 
question claims, and so forth.215 The key notion is that “ultimately there 
can be no separation of the criteria for truth from the criteria for the 
 
 214. See THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE CRITICAL THEORY OF JÜRGEN HABERMAS 291–310 (1978). 
See also JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS (William Rehg trans., 1996); JÜRGEN 
HABERMAS, 1 THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF 
SOCIETY (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984) [hereinafter REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF 
SOCIETY]; JÜRGEN HABERMAS, 2 THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: LIFEWORLD AND 
SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1987) [hereinafter 
LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM]. For an important recent secondary account of Habermas’s theory, see A. 
Michael Froomkin, Habermas@discourse.net: Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 751 (2003). For a basic exposition of Habermas’s theory, see Lawrence Byard Solum, Freedom of 
Communicative Action: A Theory of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 54 
(1989). Another important secondary source is Michel Rosenfeld, Can Rights, Democracy, and Justice 
Be Reconciled Through Discourse Theory? Reflections on Habermas’s Proceduralist Paradigm of Law, 
17 CARDOZO L. REV. 791 (1996). 
Thomas McCarthy’s commentary is the best and most accurate introduction and guide to 
Habermas’ thought. See MCCARTHY, supra. Lucid summaries of Habermas’s more recent work are 
found in ARIE BRAND, THE FORCE OF REASON: AN INTRODUCTION TO HABERMAS’ THEORY OF 
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (1990); DAVID M. RASMUSSEN, READING HABERMAS (1990); STEVEN K. 
WHITE, THE RECENT WORK OF JÜRGEN HABERMAS: REASON, JUSTICE, AND MODERNITY (1988). For a 
word on the problem of understanding Habermas’s language, see MICHAEL PUSEY, JÜRGEN HABERMAS 
11 (1986). For a study plan for approaching the corpus of his work in a systematic fashion, see id. at 
124–25. For a brief introduction, see Richard J. Bernstein, Introduction to HABERMAS AND MODERNITY 
1 (Richard J. Bernstein ed., 1985). 
 215. See MCCARTHY, supra note 214, at 306. 
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argumentative settlement of truth claims.”216 As applied to the context of a 
civil action, the idea is that there is no criterion for a legally correct 
outcome other than the criterion for the settlement of a civil dispute 
through fair procedures.217 
How does the ideal communication conception of pure procedural 
justice fare, when measured against the criteria of fit and justification? 
Initially, consider the question of fit. Certainly, there is much that can be 
said for the notion that the litigation system aims at the approximation of 
ideal discourse conditions. For example, rules about the equality of 
communicative opportunity are built into a variety of procedures including 
discovery, trial, hearings, and so forth. There does seem to be a basic 
notion that in order for a procedure to be fair, each side must have an equal 
opportunity to present its case, question, rebut, and so forth.218 
Other features of the ideal communication situation are modeled in 
existing procedure doctrine. For example, as articulated by Habermas, the 
ideal communication situation requires that the validity of norms be subject 
to challenge. One might see the appellate system and the practice of 
judicial review for constitutionality as providing an institutionalization of 
this requirement. 
If we assume for now that the discourse theory interpretation of the 
participation model satisfies the criterion of fit, the next question is whether 
it satisfies the criterion of justification. Does the discourse theory offer the 
best justification for the general shape of the existing system of civil 
procedure? This question is complicated by the breadth of discourse theory, 
which contains within itself a general account of what constitutes an 
adequate justification. Consider then, a very brief summary of the central 
features of Habermas’s theory. 
Habermas’s theory of communicative action borrows from speech act 
theory. Persons use language to act—to coordinate behavior through 
rational agreement. Promises, assertions, and orders are all examples of 
communicative actions. When one engages in a speech act, one implicitly 
raises validity claims to comprehensibility, truth, sincerity, and right. When 
I ask you to close the window, I am explicitly making a claim (1) to truth, 
that there is a window and that it can be closed; (2) to sincerity, that my 
request is sincere (not a joke or irony or sarcasm); and (3) to right, that it is 
 
 216. Id. at 303. 
 217. Cf. Solum & Marzen, supra note 95, at 1164–65. 
 218. The idea of equality of litigation opportunity is very similar to the notion of a level playing 
field. See supra notes 206–207 and accompanying text. 
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appropriate for me to make such a request of you. Engaging in the request 
pragmatically commits me to redeem any of these validity claims should 
you challenge the claim. Redemption occurs in rational discourse: we seek 
to reach an agreement or consensus on the challenged validity claim. Our 
search is rational in the sense that we seek agreement based on the force of 
the better argument, and we rule out coercion or deception as the basis for 
agreement. 
Habermas’s theory can be understood as an attempt to develop a 
communicative conception of rationality. Such a communicative 
conception contrasts with a subjective (or Cartesian) view. According to 
the subjective conception, rationality is understood as a property of an 
individual’s isolated deliberation. The communicative conception views 
rationality intersubjectively as a property of agreements among persons. 
Thus, the operative notion of agreement is the idea of a rational consensus, 
distinguished from the brute fact of bare agreement. 
Habermas argues that a rational consensus is one that results purely 
from the force of the better arguments and not from constraints on 
communication. The absence of such constraints can be elucidated in terms 
of the formal structure of the communicative situation. A communicative 
situation is structured without constraint only if it is open to all with the 
ability to communicate, it provides equal opportunity to engage in 
communication, and the participants are motivated solely by a cooperative 
search for truth or right. These conditions are met in the ideal 
communication situation, which Habermas formerly labeled the “ideal 
speech situation.”219 
The ideal communication situation can be defined more precisely by 
identifying three rules that formalize its conditions: 
(1) Rule of Participation. Each person who is capable of engaging 
in communication and action is allowed to participate. 
(2) Rule of Equality of Communicative Opportunity. Each 
participant is given equal opportunity to communicate with 
respect to the following: 
a. Each participant is allowed to call into question any proposal; 
b. Each participant is allowed to introduce any proposal into the 
discourse; and 
 
 219. See REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY, supra note 214, at 25; MCCARTHY, 
supra note 214, at 306. 
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c. Each participant is allowed to express attitudes, sincere beliefs, 
wishes, and needs. 
(3) Rule against Compulsion. No participant may be hindered by 
compulsion—whether arising from inside the discourse or outside 
of it—from making use of the rights secured under (1) and (2).220 
As Thomas McCarthy put it, the ideal communication situation “can 
serve as a guide for the institutionalization of discourse and as a critical 
standard against which every actually achieved consensus can be 
measured.”221 To return to the Dworkinian criterion of justification, 
discourse theory maintains that an adequate justification is one that would 
be the subject of rational agreement under the conditions of the ideal 
communication situation. This is the point expressed by the following 
passage, which is laden with the theoretical vocabulary of Habermas’s 
theory: “Just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected 
persons could agree as participants in rational discourses.”222 
Thus, the formal model of the ideal communication situation might 
provide a route to justification of the participation model. The argument 
could begin with the rule of participation. The rule of participation 
formalizes the notion that an agreement cannot count as rationally 
motivated if it can be demonstrated that it was only reached because 
someone who would have disagreed was excluded from the process of 
deliberation. In the context of litigation, the rule of participation would 
justify familiar principles of procedural due process, for example, the right 
to notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
The second step in the argument for the participation model from 
discourse theory would focus on the rule of equality of communicative 
opportunity. The upshot of this rule is that an agreement does not count as a 
rational consensus if it is reached under conditions where one participant or 
group of participants is not allowed to engage in the same quantity or 
quality of speech acts. Participants must have the same opportunities to 
initiate and perpetuate communication. In the context of procedural rules, 
 
 220. This formulation is based on one suggested by Robert Alexy and adopted by Habermas. See 
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 89 (Christian Lenhardt & 
Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans., 1990); Robert Alexy, Eine Theorie des Praktischen Diskurses, in 
NORMENBEGRÜNDUNG UND NORMENDURCHSETZUNG 22, 40–41 (Willi Oelmüller ed., 1978); Robert 
Alexy, A THEORY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION 119–24, 193 (Ruth Adler & Neil MacCormick trans., 
1989). The names given to the three rules are mine. 
 221. MCCARTHY, supra note 214, at 309. 
 222. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 214, at 107. See also William Rehg, 
Against Subordination: Morality, Discourse, and Decision in the Legal Theory of Jürgen Habermas, 17 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1147, 1150–51 (1996) (discussing Habermas’s formulation). 
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the rule of equality of communicative opportunity is reflected in a wide 
variety of rules that provide equal opportunity for litigants to engage in 
discovery, the presentation of witnesses, cross examination, and so forth. 
Where local rules limit the number of interrogatories, the rule is not that the 
plaintiff shall have thirty and the defendant ten. If the amount of time 
allowed the plaintiff to present his case is limited to one day, the defendant 
is likely to be allowed a roughly equal amount of time.223 
Habermas himself has made the connection between discourse theory 
and rules of procedure: 
Rules of court procedure institutionalize judicial decision making in such 
a way that the judgment and its justification can be considered the 
outcome of an argumentation game governed by a special program. Once 
again, legal procedures intertwine with processes of argumentation, and 
in such a way that the court procedures instituting legal discourses must 
not interfere with the logic or argument internal to such discourses. 
Procedural law does not regulate normative-legal discourse as such but 
secures, in the temporal, social, and substantive dimensions, the 
institutional framework that clears the way for processes of 
communication governed by the logic of application discourses.224 
Habermas then works through a number of specific examples drawn from 
German criminal and civil procedure.225 
In sum, a case can be made that an ideal communication conception of 
pure procedural justice fits the existing contours of procedure doctrine. 
Indeed, some commentary on procedure is at least suggestive of a 
Habermasian view. John MacArthur Maguire and Robert Vincent, writing 
in 1935, made the following pronouncement: “Courtroom truth is what a 
jury or the judge finds after full and fair presentation of evidence.”226 
There are, however, a number of problems with the idea that process 
fairness is the sole criterion for courtroom truth. One problem arises from 
the structure of most of modern evidence doctrine. The rules of evidence 
seem to assume that there really is a fact of the matter; thus, the 
admissibility and exclusion of evidence should aim at maximizing the 
likelihood that trials will result in fact-finding that is accurate according to 
 
 223. If inequalities are allowed, it will be because they are justified by a more basic equality. For 
example, when each side has been provided adequate time to present its case, more time for one side 
would be redundant. 
 224. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 214, at 234–35. 
 225. Id. at 235–37. 
 226. John MacArthur Maguire & Robert C. Vincent, Admissions Implied from Spoliation or 
Related Conduct, 45 YALE L.J. 226, 238 (1935). 
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the independent criteria of what really happened. The basic structure of 
evidence law, which is built around ideas of relevance and prejudice, is not 
structured around the notion that equal opportunity to present evidence 
guarantees the emergence of truth. 
At a commonsense level, the ideal communication conception of fair 
process founders on a very practical objection. Although an agreement that 
is reached under nonideal conditions, in which one side was not given an 
opportunity to present its side, may be suspect, it does not follow that the 
agreement reached under ideal conditions is any guarantee of truth. The 
reason is simple: inputs count. Even the fairest trial, conducted under 
conditions that closely approximate those of the ideal communication 
situation, can yield an unjust outcome if crucial information was not 
considered.227 Maguire and Vincent’s formulation built this notion into the 
idea of courtroom truth: “Courtroom truth,” they said, “is what a jury or the 
judge finds after full and fair presentation of evidence.”228 The notion that 
full presentation of evidence is required for courtroom truth reflects the 
notion that inputs count. As the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts put the point, 
Truth in the real world . . . may well differ from the “truth” announced 
by the jury’s verdict. Although the ultimate aim of the judicial system is 
to ascertain the real truth, trial is nevertheless, in the scheme of things, an 
imperfect method, and the “truth” memorialized by the jury’s verdict 
may not necessarily mirror actual truth.229 
There is no guarantee of perfect accuracy, but the system aims for 
accuracy and not simply an equal opportunity to engage in the presentation 
of evidence, the questioning of witnesses, and so forth. 
At this point, we can take stock of the participation model. we began 
with what is virtually a reductio of the process view, the gaming 
interpretation. Because litigation is not a voluntary contest between 
litigants or lawyers, adherence to rules announced in advance is not 
sufficient for procedural fairness. The second interpretation, which 
emphasizes the dignity interest of litigants, at least gets off the ground, but 
the dignity-enhancing process is not sufficient for fairness in the face of 
skewed outcomes. The third interpretation, the satisfaction interpretation, 
 
 227. For Habermas’s view of the relationship between discourse theory and ideas about truth, see 
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, POSTMETAPHYSICAL THINKING: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 135–39 (William Mark 
Hohengarten trans., 1992). See generally RICHARD L. KIRKHAM, THEORIES OF TRUTH (1995) (offering 
an introductory account of contemporary philosophical thinking about truth). 
 228. Maguire & Vincent, supra note 226, at 238 (emphasis added). 
 229. Headley v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 141 F.R.D. 362, 366 n.21 (D. Mass. 1991). 
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suffers from a similar defect; the subjective satisfactions of participation 
cannot confer legitimacy on a system with systematically distorted results. 
The final attempt to rescue a pure process view attempts to remedy this 
defect by positing a constitutive relationship between accuracy and fair 
process, but this view is inconsistent with the widely shared and firmly held 
convictions of common sense. 
C. FROM THE THREE MODELS TO A THEORY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
What can we garner from our consideration of the three simple models 
of procedural fairness? Some conclusions are uncontroversial. We have 
very good reasons to believe that accuracy counts, even if the accuracy 
model does not tell the whole story about procedural justice. We also have 
good reasons to believe that any plausible account of procedural justice 
must account for the costs of procedure, although we may need to do 
further work to determine how the consequentialist and deontological 
interpretations of cost should be incorporated. These lessons will be 
reflected in the principles of procedural justice,230 requiring that accuracy 
be maximized subject to several provisos, including one aimed at striking a 
fair balance between accuracy and the costs of adjudication 
The question that remains is whether the participation model makes 
any contribution to our understanding of procedural justice that is not 
already captured in the other two models. Our analysis of the participation 
model has, so far, been limited to whether it provides the whole story, and 
we have concluded that it does not. The question addressed in this part of 
the Article is whether process tells an essential and irreducible part of the 
story. Even if fair process is not the sole criterion for procedural fairness, it 
does not follow that the value of participation and equality of litigation 
opportunity is measured solely by the contribution made to accuracy and 
litigant satisfaction. Hence, we must next examine the value of 
participation. 
V. THE VALUE OF PARTICIPATION 
What is the value of allowing litigants to participate in civil 
adjudications that may bind them? Most obviously, a procedure that 
provides for participation is likely to be more accurate than one that does 
not. In addition, litigants may feel more satisfied by adjudication that 
affords them the opportunity to tell their story in a meaningful way. But the 
 
 230. See infra Part VI.A. 
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focus of this part of the Article is not on accuracy or satisfaction. Instead, 
our focus will be on the connection between participation and legitimacy. 
A good way to begin this inquiry is to recall what we have called the 
hard question of procedural justice: How can we regard ourselves as 
obligated by legitimate authority to comply with a judgment that we 
believe (or even know) to be in error with respect to the substantive merits? 
The answer to this question cannot be accuracy—the hard question arises 
only when litigants have a warranted belief that the outcome was not 
accurate.231 Nor can the answer to this question be a subjective sense of 
satisfaction. Satisfaction that is merely subjective cannot confer normative 
legitimacy—although it may provide the legitimacy that is required for the 
important social goods of voluntary compliance and social stability. The 
full answer to the hard question of procedural justice must include a 
normative theory of procedural legitimacy. The participatory legitimacy 
thesis—the central claim of this part of the Article—provides such a 
normative theory. Procedures that purport to bind without affording 
meaningful rights of participation are fundamentally illegitimate. 
The central claim of this part is set forth in Section A, which 
investigates the claim that participation has a value that cannot be reduced 
to accuracy, because a core right of participation is essential for the 
legitimacy of adjudication. Next, Section B examines a framework for 
pinpointing the stakes in the debate over the value of process and 
participation. Then, Section C surveys three justifications that have been 
offered for the proposition that participation has a value that cannot be 
 
 231. It might be argued that legitimacy can be conferred on an erroneous outcome by a process 
that is accurate in the aggregate. Randy Barnett has advanced such a theory in the context of 
constitutional legitimacy. See RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 9–86 (2004). Although Barnett’s theory suggests the view critiqued in this 
footnote, there is a crucial difference. Barnett’s theory answers what makes a constitution legitimate. He 
does not answer what we might call the hard question of constitutional legitimacy: how can I regard a 
constitutional outcome as just when I am injured by the outcome and it is fundamentally unjust? 
Does systemic accuracy confer legitimacy on inaccurate outcomes? Consider a dissatisfied 
litigant who answers this question in the negative: the litigant argues that if accuracy is the measure of 
legitimacy, then the erroneous outcome that injures the litigant is clearly illegitimate. The natural 
counter is to argue that the litigant would have consented in advance to this procedure because it gives 
the best chance of systemic accuracy. There are two responses to this argument. First, the litigant might 
argue that overall systemic accuracy does not guarantee maximum accuracy in particular case types. If 
the litigant’s case is a type for which the general, transsubstantive rules of procedure are less accurate 
than alternative rules, the litigant could argue that he or she would not have consented. Second, and 
independently, the litigant may argue that if hypothetical consent is the criterion, then he or she would 
not consent on the basis of accuracy alone. In particular, he or she might have demanded both 
reasonable rights of participation and a reasonable balance between procedural costs and benefits before 
giving hypothetical consent. 
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reduced to accuracy or cost. Finally, Section D reviews a number of 
arguments that have been raised against the idea that process counts quite 
apart from considerations of accuracy and cost. 
A. THE PARTICIPATION THAT IS ESSENTIAL FOR LEGITIMACY 
This section lays out the case that a right of participation is essential 
for the legitimacy of a final and binding civil proceeding. The aim of this 
section is to narrow our focus with two claims. First, the value of process 
that cannot be reduced to accuracy or cost is connected with participation. 
Second, the normative foundation of the irreducible value of participation 
must be found in the notion of legitimacy. 
1. A Statement of the Participatory Legitimacy Thesis 
Participation is essential for the normative legitimacy of adjudication 
processes232—that is the core idea, but the full statement of the 
participatory legitimacy thesis is more complex: 
Because a right of participation must be afforded to those to be 
bound by judicial proceedings in order for those proceedings to 
serve as a legitimate source of authority, the value of participation 
cannot be reduced to a function of the effect of participation on 
outcomes; nor can the value of participation be reduced to a 
subjective preference or feeling of satisfaction. 
The full statement suggests several important distinctions. First, 
legitimacy does not require actual participation. Only an option or right is 
required because participation may be voluntarily forsworn. Second, so far 
as legitimacy is concerned, it is the option to participate at a meaningful 
stage that is crucial. Temporary decisions that are not binding may be 
unjust for other reasons, but they do not violate the fundamental 
requirement of legitimacy. Third, the participatory legitimacy thesis makes 
a claim about the relationship between participatory legitimacy and 
outcomes. The value of participation cannot be reduced to the effect of 
participation on outcomes. With these distinctions in place, we can turn to 
the obvious question: what does it mean to say that the legitimacy of civil 
 
 232. Cf. Bone, supra note 156, at 625 (“A strong participation right can be justified only by a 
normative theory of process value that grounds the value of participation in the conditions of 
adjudicative legitimacy, such as respect for a party’s dignity or autonomy.”). 
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dispute resolution depends on affording those who are to be bound a right 
of participation?233 
2. The Analogy to Legislation 
We can approach the participatory legitimacy thesis by first examining 
an analogous case, the case of legitimacy in the exercise of legislative 
power. For the exercise of legislative power to be legitimate, the legislation 
must be the outcome of a process that satisfies norms of democratic 
participation234 (and perhaps other norms as well). These norms include the 
requirement that citizens have either the right to vote directly on legislative 
proposals or to vote for representatives to whom the citizens have delegated 
legislative authority.235 The norms of democratic participation also include 
the requirement that citizens have a right to freedom of expression 
regarding legislative matters and the election of government officials.236 If 
these norms are not satisfied, the outcome of the legislative process is not 
regarded as legitimate. 
The connection between participation and legislative legitimacy is a 
strong one. First, legislation that is imposed by an unelected authority is 
illegitimate even if the particular laws that are passed are good ones, as 
 
 233. The connection between legitimacy and participation has recently been explored by 
Christopher Peters. See Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 312 
(1997). Many commentators have noted the connection between the legitimacy of adjudication and 
participation. See, e.g., EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 5 (1949) 
(“Reasoning by example in the law is a key to many things. It indicates in part the hold which the law 
process has over the litigants. They have participated in the lawmaking. They are bound by something they 
helped to make.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Metaprocedure, 98 YALE L.J. 945, 952 (1989) (book 
review) (“One other value [of due process] might be to assure an individual participation in decisions 
affecting him or her, thereby enhancing the legitimacy of the ultimate decision.”); John B. Oakley, The 
Screening of Appeals: The Ninth Circuit’s Experience in the Eighties and Innovations for the Nineties, 
1991 BYU L. REV. 859, 874 (noting the connection between legitimacy and participation in the context 
of the Ninth Circuit’s summary disposition procedures). Cf. Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of 
Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 202–03 
(1983) (noting the connection between participation and legitimacy in the context of criminal 
procedure). 
 234. See, e.g., Kenneth Ward, The Allure and Danger of Community Values: A Criticism of 
Liberal Republican Constitutional Theory, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 171, 188–89 (1996) (discussing 
the connection between participation and democratic legitimacy in republican theory). 
 235. See Robert A. Katz, Comment, The Jurisprudence of Legitimacy: Applying the Constitution 
to U.S. Territories, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 779, 792 (1992) (“Democratic government derives its legitimacy 
from the formal consent and ongoing participation of the governed, who are considered the ultimate 
source of political authority.”). 
 236. See Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 
877, 882–84 (1963) (discussing the relationship between democratic legitimacy and the right of 
participation). See also John A. Powell, Worlds Apart: Reconciling Freedom of Speech and Equality, 85 
KY. L.J. 9, 45 (1997) (commenting on Thomas Emerson’s position). 
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measured by appropriate standards of political morality. Second, 
undemocratic legislation is illegitimate even if the undemocratic process 
(benevolent dictatorship) reliably produces excellent laws. Third, 
undemocratic legislation is illegitimate even if the legislation would have 
been approved by citizens had they been afforded an opportunity to do so. 
Rights of democratic participation are essential to the legitimacy of 
legislative processes. 
It might be thought that the legislative process demonstrates that 
participation is unimportant because there is no individual right to a hearing 
before a legislature passes a statute or an agency makes a rule, even if the 
statute or rule will have a substantial effect on one’s interest. But this 
argument is off the mark, at least if the target is the proposition that 
participation in the process never matters to procedural fairness. For 
example, the right to an equal vote matters aside from outcomes. Edmund 
Burke’s virtual representation theory237 is, in our political culture, a 
paradigmatic case of bad political theory. The slogan “No taxation without 
representation” is an expression of a fundamental political value of great 
importance. A right of participation in the form of an equal vote in the 
election of representatives is thought to be a prerequisite for the fairness or 
justice of the legislative process. The case of legislation illustrates the 
general proposition that a right of participation may be essential to 
legitimacy, quite apart from its effects on outcomes. 
3. The Importance of Legitimacy 
Why is legitimacy important? Citizens are not obligated to regard 
illegitimate laws as authoritative. Consequently, they have no content-
independent obligation of political morality to obey such laws except the 
obligation imposed by the correspondence of the laws with the independent 
requirements of political morality.238 Given human nature and pluralism in 
matters of politics, religion, and morality, there will inevitably be 
disagreement about the justice or goodness of particular laws. The 
consequence of such disagreement under circumstances of illegitimacy is 
that citizens can frequently regard themselves as morally obligated or 
authorized to disobey particular laws. This does not necessarily entail 
general social disorder. The state may be able to coerce obedience to 
illegitimate laws—although depending on social circumstances, such 
 
 237. See HANNAH FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 174–76 (1967) (“Virtual 
representation exists where the substantive content and effect occur without election.”). 
 238. Thus, one may have an obligation to obey an illegitimate law against murder because the 
content of the law is itself required by political morality. 
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coercion may require the repressive use of state power. But even if 
normative legitimacy is not required for social stability, it is nonetheless a 
very great social good. A society in which citizens can reasonably regard 
themselves as having a content-independent obligation to obey the law is 
better than a society in which the law begins with a presumption of 
illegitimacy. 
As it is with legislation, so it goes with adjudication. The exercise of 
adjudicative power to bind an individual must be legitimate for the 
adjudication to be authoritative and, hence, to create content-independent 
obligations of political morality, to obey judicial decrees, and to respect the 
finality of judgments. This conclusion is strongly supported by our 
investigation of the nature of procedure in Part II. The upshot of that 
investigation was the entanglement thesis, including the idea that procedure 
transforms general and abstract conduct rules into particular and concrete 
action-guiding legal norms. The requirement of legitimacy for substantive 
law reflects the action-guiding role of conduct rules. The entanglement 
thesis establishes that procedure performs a similar function—guiding 
action in particular and concrete factual contexts. More plainly, 
adjudication is lawmaking. The particularization that procedure provides is 
required for the law to do its work of guiding action, because of the three 
problems identified at the outset of my discussion: (1) the problem of 
imperfect knowledge of law and fact, (2) the problem of incomplete 
specification of legal norms, and (3) the problem of partiality. Not only 
does procedure guide primary conduct, procedure must guide conduct for 
substance to guide action. 
Moreover, in the case of adjudication, as in the case of legislation, we 
regard legitimacy as a political good. The goodness of legitimacy flows 
from an intuitively appealing principle of political morality: each citizen 
who is to be bound by an official proceeding for the resolution of a civil 
dispute should be able to regard the procedure as a legitimate source of 
binding authority creating a content independent obligation of political 
morality for the parties to the dispute.239 The notion that the procedures for 
the adjudication of civil disputes should be legitimate is not controversial. 
We hold to this notion for important reasons of principle and policy. As a 
pragmatic matter, it is important that citizens be able to regard procedures 
as legitimate so that we may secure their voluntary cooperation with the 
 
 239. Note the modal qualification: citizens should be able to regard adjudication as legitimate. 
There may be citizens who will not believe that adjudication is legitimate, even when all of the 
objective conditions for legitimacy have been met. This may result, for example, from the clouding of 
judgment that results from self-interest. 
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system of civil justice.240 Great social evils would attend a system that 
resorted to sanctions and incentives to secure the compliance of citizens 
who regarded the system as illegitimate and did not regard the system as a 
source of binding authority or moral obligation.241 This argument of policy 
is complemented by one of principle: as a matter of political morality it 
would be unjust to coerce compliance with the judgments of a civil justice 
system that could not be regarded by reasonable citizens as legitimate. 
As in the case of legislation, the legitimacy of adjudication depends on 
affording those who are to be bound a right to participate, either directly or 
through adequate representation.242 As in the case of legislation, 
adjudication is not legitimate if the norms of participation are violated (a) 
even if the outcome of the particular adjudication would be considered 
right by independent norms of political morality, (b) even if the procedure 
was generally reliable, and (c) even if the outcome would have been the 
same had the required participation actually occurred. 
Why is a right to participation required if citizens are to regard civil 
procedures as legitimate? To see the answer to this question clearly, we 
 
 240. This point is strongly associated with the work of Tom Tyler: 
[P]eople defer to rules primarily because of their judgments about how those rules are made, 
rather than their evaluations of their content. Judgments about the fairness of decision-making 
authorities have been found to be more central to a rule’s legitimacy, and to people’s 
willingness to accept it, than are judgments of decision favorability. In other words, people 
are willing to defer to laws and legal authorities on procedural justice grounds. 
Tom R. Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws: A Psychological Perspective, 29 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 219, 231 (1997). For more work by Tyler and others on the connection between 
participation and perceptions of legitimacy, see supra note 213. See also Tracey L. Meares, Norms, 
Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 391, 403 (2000) (“[T]he use of procedures regarded 
as fair by all parties facilitates the maintenance of positive relations among group members . . . even in 
the face of the conflict of interest that exists in any group whose members have different preference 
structures and different beliefs . . . .”); Raymond Paternoster, Robert Brame, Ronet Bachman & 
Lawrence W. Sherman, Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect of Procedural Justice on Spouse 
Assault, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 163, 165 (1997) (“[B]eing treated fairly by authorities, even while 
being sanctioned by them, influences both a person’s view of the legitimacy of group authority and 
ultimately that person’s obedience to group norms.”). 
 241. Of course, psychological legitimacy would suffice for this purpose. So, for example, we 
might be able to achieve psychological legitimacy through the use of manipulation, coercion, or 
deception. But if we reject the use of these techniques on grounds of political morality, the alternative is 
that we offer a sound justification for the normative legitimacy of adjudication. 
 242. Martin Redish observes this about aggregative procedures in mass tort litigation: 
The unease about the suggestion must be attributed to different concerns—the belief that the 
legitimacy of a democratic system and the dignity of those who make up society require the 
actual participation of the citizenry in the governing process. It is arguable that a similar 
dignitary legitimacy analysis dictates that a defendant have the opportunity to litigate each 
plaintiff’s damages, even if one were to assume that the end result of such a process would be 
roughly equivalent to the result of a sampling procedure. 
Martin H. Redish, Procedural Due Process and Aggregation Devices in Mass Tort Litigation, 63 DEF. 
COUNS. J. 18, 24 (1996). 
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must return to the hard question of procedural legitimacy. When we seek to 
identify the conditions for the legitimacy of adjudication, we should 
assume the point of view of a citizen who is to be bound by a judgment that 
he or she has good reason to believe is in error and is adverse to the 
citizen’s interests or wishes. For this person, the question is “Can I 
reasonably regard a procedure that did not afford me a right to participation 
(to observe and be heard) as a legitimate source of final, binding authority, 
which creates an obligation of political morality for me to comply with the 
outcome of the procedure?” If the answer to this question is no, then we 
should affirm the participatory legitimacy thesis. 
Let us take up the point of view of this citizen. From this perspective, 
it is clear that being barred from participation undermines the legitimacy of 
civil adjudication. If I did not participate in a procedure that purports to 
bind me with finality, I may always object that the procedure was defective 
because an element of my case was not even considered by the tribunal 
through no fault of mine. For example, I may complain that salient facts 
were not presented or that a relevant legal principle was overlooked. I 
might argue that the tribunal did not hear my claim, that the law applied 
was invalid on constitutional grounds, or that the tribunal failed to evaluate 
my contention that my case was an exceptional one in which equity 
required an adjustment of the legal rule. The right of participation is the 
right to observe, to make arguments, to present evidence, and to be 
informed of the reasons for a decision. Without these participation rights, I 
cannot be assured that the proceeding considered my view of the law and 
facts. 
On the other hand, if I have been given the right to participate in the 
proceeding and have chosen not to make a potentially salient argument (by 
presenting evidence, making legal arguments, challenging the validity of 
the law, or arguing for an equitable exception), then I may not reasonably 
complain that the proceeding was illegitimate because my arguments were 
not considered by the tribunal. By participating or waiving the right to 
participate, I become an “author”243 of the proceeding; the choice of what 
arguments will be advanced on my behalf becomes my choice. As 
Christopher Peters has observed, 
judicial decisions are to a very great extent products not of the unilateral 
decree of a judge or panel of judges, but rather of a process of 
participation and debate among the parties to the case that greatly 
restricts the decisional options available to the court. In this sense, 
 
 243. An author, but not the author. Judges, juries, and other litigants are also authors of a civil 
action and its outcomes. 
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judicial decisions resemble the decisions made by a democratic 
legislature after debate and a fair hearing at which all relevant views 
have been aired.244 
One point deserves special mention before we proceed. A citizen who 
could be finally bound may wish to raise points that either cannot, or likely 
will not, have any effect on the outcome of the proceeding. An important 
example of this involves what we might call “principled dissent from legal 
norms.” Even if I have no viable legal argument against a legal norm that 
binds me, I may have an interest in making (or even attempting to make) 
arguments that the norm is illegitimate. In the United States, such 
arguments may don constitutional garb because many arguments of 
political morality can be dressed in the clothes of equal protection, due 
process, or freedom of speech.245 But such arguments need not be legal, 
and, even if legal, they may be raised as a matter of principle and not 
because they have a realistic possibility of success.246 Some citizens may 
regard themselves as morally obligated to express their principled dissent 
from legally valid norms.247 
This discussion allows us to clarify three aspects of the participatory 
legitimacy thesis. First, a right or option to participate is required for final 
and binding adjudication to be legitimate—the claim is qualified by the 
terms “right or option,” “final,” and “binding.” Second, the legitimacy that 
participation confers on adjudication cannot be reduced to accuracy 
enhancing effects, subjective preferences, feelings of satisfaction, or even 
perceptions of legitimacy. Third, we have not yet specified the institutional 
form of the minimal right of participation that is the subject of the 
participatory legitimacy thesis. 
4. Three Thought Experiments 
So far, the case for the participatory legitimacy thesis has rested on 
abstract consideration of political philosophy. The abstract can be 
supplemented by a few concrete thought experiments designed to elicit first 
 
 244. Peters, supra note 233, at 347. 
 245. In addition to the constitutional arguments in the text, more unconventional arguments may 
be made on the basis of the Ninth Amendment or the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
 246. At this point, critics might argue that such arguments are aimed at success in the court of 
public opinion or in the courts of the relatively distant future. This may be the case, but it need not be 
so. A citizen might regard himself or herself as obligated to register dissent, even if the citizen believes 
that he or she has no likelihood of success. 
 247. This point would assume a greater significance in a system that permitted jury nullification. 
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our intuitions and then our considered judgments about the relationship 
between procedure and legitimacy. 
Before we go any further, I want to make two concessions about these 
thought experiments. The first concession is that my thought experiments 
may not succeed in pumping from the reader the same intuitions that they 
pump from me,248 but I would ask readers to bear in mind that reasonable 
people do share my intuitions. The second concession is that bare intuitions 
are not sufficient to make my case. Let me stipulate that the term 
“intuition” describes our initial, unreflective reaction to a thought 
experiment. Further, such intuitions, if confirmed by reflection and 
deliberation, can be said to constitute “considered judgments.” The purpose 
of these thought experiments is to provide a combination of intuition and 
supporting grounds that will yield good and sufficient reasons for us to 
reach considered judgments about procedural fairness. 
a. Exclusion from a Meeting 
Imagine that you are a faculty member excluded (without good cause) 
from a faculty meeting on a topic that concerns you, or a judge excluded 
from a meeting of your judicial council, or a lawyer excluded from a firm 
meeting, or a law review editor excluded from a meeting of the editorial 
board. Suppose further that you are fully satisfied with the outcome of the 
meeting and that the meeting did not impose excessive costs or otherwise 
violate any rights except your right to participate. Indeed, as a matter of 
subjective preferences, we can imagine that you had quite a nice time 
during the period of your exclusion, a much better time than you would 
have had in a dreary meeting. Is your exclusion from the meeting unfair or 
unjust, even though you agree with the outcome and the balance of costs 
and benefits favored your exclusion? My considered judgment is that your 
exclusion renders the meeting illegitimate with the consequence that you 
are not required to regard its outcome as authoritative. Of course, if you 
agree with the outcome, you may choose to abide by it nonetheless. 
b. Star Chamber 
Suppose we had a reliable procedure for producing accurate criminal 
verdicts that excluded the defendant and defense counsel from the secret 
proceedings. The exclusion is complete, and the defendant may not 
participate in any way, even through the submission of written arguments 
to the court (let us call the tribunal providing this perfectly accurate 
 
 248. On the role of thought experiments as intuition pumps, see DANIEL C. DENNETT, ELBOW 
ROOM 12 (1984). 
SOLU12.DOC 11/30/2004 9:41 AM 
2004] PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 283 
procedure “Star Chamber”).249 Would a defendant convicted through such 
a process have any ground for complaint? The objection cannot be that the 
process was unreliable. By hypothesis, Star Chamber is demonstrably 
reliable, and if convicted, the hypothetical defendant will know that he or 
she is, in fact, guilty. Nonetheless, many will share the intuition that secret 
proceedings from which the defendant is excluded are unfair despite their 
hypothesized accuracy. On further reflection it seems likely that this 
intuition may well turn into a considered judgment. 
The features of Star Chamber that seem objectionable are its secrecy 
(most especially the exclusion of the defendant) and the inability of the 
defendant to have a say, to raise objections, to ask questions, and so forth. 
Suppose that we vary the hypothetical to isolate these features. Would Star 
Chamber be objectionable if the defendant had the right to observe the 
proceeding but not participate in any other way, either directly or through 
an agent or representative? By hypothesis, nothing the defendant would say 
could make the proceeding more accurate, although we may hypothesize 
that the defendant’s participation might increase the likelihood of an 
erroneous decision. My considered judgment is that this procedure is still 
unfair to the defendant; indeed, in some ways, the requirement that he or 
she remain silent is more horrifying than the requirement that the defendant 
remain outside the room. What about having a say without access? It is 
difficult to imagine a case in which the defendant is still excluded, but does 
have the right to have a say. Having a meaningful say requires knowledge 
of the proceeding, at least to the extent necessary to identify what concerns 
are relevant to the decisionmakers’ deliberation. The hypothetical variation 
of Star Chamber in which the defendant is allowed to submit a written or 
videotaped statement, but not to know anything about the rest of the 
proceedings, strikes me as unfair, although it is a slight (or perhaps 
substantial) improvement over the case in which the defendant is both 
excluded and silenced. 
c. Guardian ad Litem 
Imagine now that you are being sued in an ordinary civil case. You are 
disputing a debt with a creditor; you are a competent adult; you have no 
disability that would render you unable to make your own decisions 
regarding the lawsuit. Nonetheless, the court denies your request to 
participate directly and instead appoints a guardian ad litem to act as your 
surrogate in the litigation. Your guardian is competent and makes good 
decisions. There is no reason to believe that the proceeding will be any less 
 
 249. See Riebli, supra note 1, at 810–11. 
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accurate because of the guardian’s decisions on your behalf. Moreover, as 
far as your preferences are concerned, this is not a bad deal. You do not 
derive utility from the litigation process, and quite enjoy spending your 
time in other ways. Now suppose that you lose, and furthermore, that you 
know a mistake has been made. My intuition is that under these 
circumstances, you would have good reason to deny the legitimacy of this 
proceeding. Your participation was feasible, and there was no compelling 
reason of cost or competency to deny you the right to participate. 
The point of these three thought experiments is to suggest that our 
intuitions about particular and concrete cases cohere with the general and 
abstract considerations of political theory. Given this reflective 
equilibrium, we have good and sufficient reason to accept the participatory 
legitimacy thesis. 
B. FRAMING THE ISSUE: REDUCTION OR DEPENDENCE 
Discussion of the value of participation has generated unnecessary 
confusion because of a failure to distinguish two possible relationships 
between the value of process and participation on the one hand and the 
value of accuracy (or other costs and benefits that might be balanced) on 
the other. We shall call these two relationships “reduction” and 
“dependence.” Before we proceed any deeper into the controversy over the 
value of process in general and the participatory legitimacy thesis, this 
distinction must be clarified. 
1. Reductionist Programs 
One possible relationship between the value of process and other 
values, such as the value of accuracy, is captured by the idea of a 
reductionist program. For example, it might be argued that all of the value 
of participation in civil proceedings can be cashed out in terms of the 
contribution that participation makes to accuracy. The thesis that the value 
of participation can be reduced to the value of accuracy suggests that we 
value participation because, under normal circumstances, participation 
enhances accuracy. Phrased in terms of the three models, this reductionist 
strategy suggests that the idea of fairness identified by the participation 
model can be reduced to the fairness specified by the accuracy model. 
Another reductionist program suggests that the value of participation 
can be explained in terms of the satisfaction that participation provides to 
litigants. This reductionist program treats the value of participation as 
simply another social cost or benefit that can be weighed against other such 
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costs, including the social cost of inaccurate adjudication and participatory 
procedure. A more complex reductionist program would combine both the 
accuracy strategy and the cost strategy. The value of participation—this 
complex reductionist program would claim—can be reduced to the 
accuracy effects of participation plus any utility that would be derived from 
the satisfaction of subjective preferences for participation. 
2. Arguments for Dependence 
Reductionist strategies should be distinguished from another kind of 
claim about the relationship between the value of process and participation 
on the one hand and accuracy or cost on the other hand. It might be claimed 
that the value of participation is not independent of the effects on 
participation. Dependence does not entail reducibility, although reducibility 
does entail dependence. This point is vitally important, but it has not been 
obvious in debates over the value of participation. 
Consider the implications of this distinction for the relationship 
between the participatory legitimacy thesis and reductionist programs. The 
thesis that a right of participation is essential for the legitimacy of final, 
binding adjudication does not rest on the claim that the value of 
participation is independent of effects on outcomes or accuracy. But the 
participatory legitimacy thesis is inconsistent with the proposition that the 
value of participation can be reduced to accuracy. 
Why dependence? Final binding adjudication is not legitimate unless a 
minimum right of participation is afforded to those with a substantial 
interest in the controversy. If this claim is true, does it follow that the value 
of participation is independent of the effects of participation on outcome? 
The answer to this question is no. This conclusion can be established 
through the following thought experiment: suppose you are offered a right 
to participate in a proceeding, but the proceeding is structured so that your 
input cannot have an effect on the outcome. Would this right of 
participation be sufficient to legitimate the proceeding? No. It is not just 
having a say that counts. Meaningful participation must be part of the 
process and not a wheel that turns but moves nothing else.250 Meaningful 
participation requires that your input to the proceeding be considered, that 
what you say plays a role in the deliberative process of the decisionmaker. 
In this sense, the value of participation is dependent on possible effects on 
outcomes, and, hence, is in some sense dependent on possible impacts on 
 
 250. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 271 (3d ed. 1999) (stating that “a 
wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism”). 
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accuracy. Thus, there is good and sufficient reason to believe that the 
legitimacy of a procedure is not independent of its effect on outcomes. Put 
another way, the legitimacy of a procedure depends, at least in part, on its 
accuracy. 
Does this form of dependence implicate the further conclusion that the 
participatory legitimacy thesis can be reduced to a claim about the 
relationship between participation and accuracy? The answer to this 
question is clearly no. The reduction of legitimacy to accuracy would 
require the truth of one of the following two propositions: (1) if legitimacy 
and accuracy are not a matter of degree, then it would have to be the case 
that accuracy is both a necessary and sufficient condition for legitimacy; or 
(2) if legitimacy and accuracy are a matter of degree (scalar), then it would 
have to be the case that the degree of legitimacy of a procedure is an 
increasing function of the accuracy rate of the procedure. Neither of the 
two propositions follows logically from the fact that legitimacy depends on 
accuracy.251 
So far, we have dealt only with the dependence of legitimacy on the 
possibility that outcomes will be affected by participation. What about the 
claim that the value of participation can be reduced to a feeling of 
satisfaction or some other psychological effect of participation? This point 
may have some force as applied to the dignity theory of the value of 
participation,252 but as applied to the participatory legitimacy thesis this 
objection is far off the mark. The participatory legitimacy thesis is a claim 
about the normative legitimacy of adjudicatory procedures and not 
primarily a claim about the psychological acceptability of such procedures. 
If psychological legitimacy were the only value at issue, then one might 
argue that its value could be reduced to specific costs and benefits, such as 
the psychological benefit to litigants of being satisfied with the resolution 
of their disputes or the social benefit of perceived legitimacy in promoting 
voluntary compliance with the law. 
C. DIGNITY, EQUALITY, AND AUTONOMY 
The value of participation derives from the idea of legitimacy. Our 
focus on legitimacy contrasts with much of the prior literature, which has 
suggested three rival explanations—based on dignity, equality, and 
autonomy—for the irreducible value of legitimacy. Each of these three 
 
 251. That is, the fact that x depends on y does not mean either that x is the case if and only if y or 
that x is an increasing function of y. 
 252. See infra Part V.D.1. 
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rival explanations has a contribution to make, especially when considered 
in relationship to legitimacy. Considered in isolation, however, dignity, 
equality, and autonomy do not provide an adequate explanation of the 
value of participation. 
We have already addressed dignity in the context of the participation 
model of procedural fairness.253 At that point, we asked whether the 
participatory process, in respecting the dignity of litigants, could be used as 
a model that would, by itself, explain and justify the civil procedure 
landscape. Our answer was no. Does dignity offer a sufficient explanation 
of the intuitions elicited by our thought experiments, which implied that 
participation has irreducible (but not necessarily independent) value? The 
answer to this question is also no. When participation is an entitlement 
(whether produced by law or by less formal social norms), denying 
someone the right to participate is an insult to that person’s dignity. If I am 
entitled to attend the meeting and you exclude me, then you have violated 
my entitlement, and in so doing you have insulted me. On the other hand, if 
I have no right to attend the meeting and you exclude me, dignity requires 
that I gracefully accept the exclusion and feel no insult to my dignity. The 
point is that dignity does not create the right to participate—it is a 
reflection of that right. 
A second rival to legitimacy as the ground of a right to participation is 
the notion of equality.254 Procedural justice has been defined as “the right 
to treatment as an equal. That is the right, not to an equal distribution of 
some good or opportunity, but to equal concern and respect in the political 
decisions about how these goods and opportunities are to be distributed.”255 
But equality alone cannot do the work of explaining a right to participation. 
Once rights of participation are defined, equality comes into the picture. If 
 
 253. See supra Part IV.B.3.b. 
 254. See Massaro, supra note 208, at 902 (“Procedure therefore not only should promote 
rationality through unbiased and accurate decisionmaking, but also should show respect for persons by 
allowing equal, active participation in decisions affecting their interest.”); Martin H. Redish & 
Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 
YALE L.J. 455, 484 (1986) (“One value that might conceivably be fostered by procedural due process is 
the goal of equality.”); Rehg, supra note 222, at 1147 (“[I]nasmuch as a procedure expresses a 
recognition of one’s equal status as a citizen regardless of how insightful one’s judgment on a given 
issue, participation in the procedure can reinforce group solidarity, at least to some degree.”); 
Rutherford, supra note 136, at 74 (“The right to participate is meaningful only if a person can 
participate on an equal footing.”). Although various scholars have seen connections between equality 
and the value of participation as a component of procedural justice, William Rubenstein’s investigation 
of the role of equality in procedure omits this topic. See William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of 
Equality in Civil Procedure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1865 (2002). 
 255. Jeffrey Rachlinski, Perceptions of Fairness in Environmental Regulation, in STRATEGIES 
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT 339, 347 (Barton H. Thompson Jr. ed., 1995). 
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others are afforded a right of participation, but I am arbitrarily denied this 
right, I have been treated unequally and have a right to complain—this is 
equality before the law, an important sense of the abstract idea of equality. 
Equality also plays a role in theories of distributive justice. It might be 
argued that an equal right to participate in litigation is a component part of 
distributional equality. But once again, equality comes to the scene after we 
have settled the prior question of whether there is a right to participate in 
litigation. If no such right exists, then the norm of distributional equality is 
consistent with giving the right to none—as it would also be with giving 
the right to all. Equality simply does not do the necessary work. 
The third rival to legitimacy is based on the notion of autonomy.256 As 
Robert Bone has written, “According to [the Kantian process-based] 
theory, certain elements of civil process, such as individual participation 
and rational decision making, are implicit in what it means to respect 
human dignity and autonomy.”257 But if considered in isolation, the value 
of autonomy simply will not do the necessary work. On the one hand, the 
concept of autonomy is too general to provide a particular right to 
participation in the adjudicative process. On the other hand, legal process 
necessarily involves limitations on autonomy rights. The sphere of civil 
litigation is not the private sphere where individual autonomy holds sway. 
To the contrary, civil litigation is the public sphere where individual 
autonomy is necessarily qualified by the need for coordination of 
individual action. 
But when the idea of autonomy is considered in relationship to 
legitimacy, a role for autonomy (as well as dignity and equality) becomes 
apparent. Legitimacy itself is important because we respect the dignity of 
citizens as equal and autonomous. If we rejected the idea that citizens are 
autonomous and equal, then the value of legitimacy would not apply to 
 
 256. The association between procedural fairness and autonomy is a common theme in the 
literature. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Eric J. Beste, Personal Jurisdiction and the Global Resolution 
of Mass Tort Litigation: Defining the Constitutional Boundaries, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 917, 954 
(1995) (“[P]articipation of the parties is considered a key element of due process because of our belief 
in individual autonomy.”); Jason Richards, Richards v. Jefferson County: The Supreme Court Stems the 
Crimson Tide of Res Judicata, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 691, 716 (1998) (“‘Central to litigant 
autonomy is participation. For the due process right to be meaningfully individual, a litigant must have 
the opportunity to tell his story, to try his case.’” (quoting Jack L. Johnson, Comment, Due or Voodoo 
Process: Virtual Representation as a Justification for Preclusion of a Nonparty Claim, 68 TUL. L. REV. 
1303, 1323 (1994))); Elijah Yip & Eric K. Yamamoto, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Jurisprudence of 
Process and Procedure, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 647, 670 (1998) (“[P]rocedural fairness may be viewed in 
three component parts: litigant autonomy, dignity, and participation.”). 
 257. Bone, supra note 6, at 509. See also Bone, supra note 156, at 619–20 (assuming that “the 
intrinsic value of participation is historically tied to respect for individual autonomy”). 
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them. Dignity, equality, and autonomy are fundamental political values. 
The idea that they connect in some way to the value of participation is 
sound. The error is to believe that any one of these values directly provides 
the value of participation—legitimacy plays that role. 
D. ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS 
At this point, we have stated the participatory legitimacy thesis and 
clarified the relationship it bears to attempts to reduce the value of process 
to effects on outcomes. We can now proceed with an analysis of some of 
the arguments that have been made against the claim that participation has 
irreducible value. 
1. Reductionism One: The Reduction to Subjective Preference 
One powerful critique of the value of participation has been offered by 
David Rosenberg.258 Rosenberg’s argument, which is specific to the mass-
tort context, is complex and subtle, but we can understand the core of his 
objection by attending to the following points. First, Rosenberg argues that 
in the mass-tort context, the primary purposes of the law are deterrence and 
compensation. Deterrence does not require individual participation and 
may be better served without it.259 At bottom, deterrence rests on accuracy 
and not on any independent process values. Second, Rosenberg contends 
that the value of participation is a “subjective taste for particularized 
process,”260 which litigants should be and are willing to trade for lower 
product prices.261 These arguments rely on further premises, for which 
Rosenberg provides a variety of arguments. Importantly, Rosenberg argues 
that collectivization will result in more accurate outcomes by transferring 
resources from redundant case-by-case adjudication to collectivized 
proceedings.262 Rosenberg also argues that collectivization is less costly 
than individual participation; collectivization and insurance will result in a 
higher ex ante welfare level for those who are injured.263 
Accepting Rosenberg’s factual premises and conclusions, his 
argument boils down to the following. Considering the policy goals of 
 
 258. See Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 213, 237–48, 255–57. 
 259. Id. at 213, 237–48. 
 260. Id. at 255, 256 n.110. 
 261. Id. at 213. 
 262. Id. at 237. Rosenberg argues that the determination of causation and liability issues involves 
high costs, that plaintiffs’ lawyers will underinvest in litigating these issues, and that as a result defense 
lawyers will have a systematic advantage. Id. 
 263. See id. at 245–48. 
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deterrence and compensation, collectivization should be preferred over a 
right to participation because collectivization is both more accurate and less 
costly than the alternatives. Thus, both the accuracy and balancing models 
favor collectivization over an individualized right to participation. 
Moreover, because the value of participation can be reduced to the 
“subjective taste for particularized” process, it follows that the value of 
participation can be fully achieved by allowing those who desire to opt out 
of collectivization to pay the full cost of a particularized proceeding.264 
“Plaintiffs are never made better off by being vested with a property 
right—which, absent the entitlement, they would not and could not pay 
for—to an inefficient day in court, to personal control over their claims, 
and to other anti-collectivist procedures.”265 
Has Rosenberg made a convincing case against the irreducible value 
of process in general or the participatory legitimacy thesis in particular? 
Despite the powerful arguments advanced, the answer is an obvious no. 
Rosenberg’s argument is question-begging because it assumes the very 
conclusion for which he is attempting to argue. The assumption that there is 
no right of political morality to individualized participation is smuggled 
into Rosenberg’s argument in four moves. First, he assumes that the 
purposes or functions of adjudication can be reduced to the purposes or 
functions of the substantive law being applied. For example, he assumes 
that the function of tort adjudication is reducible to the function of 
substantive tort law. Second, Rosenberg assumes the validity of the 
balancing model by stating that the functions or purposes of tort 
compensation are deterrence and compensation. Third, he assumes that the 
value of participation can be reduced to a subjective preference, which can 
be balanced against the costs and benefits of accurate adjudication and the 
costs of individual participation. Fourth, he then shifts the burden, asking 
why individuals should “desire the particularizing process for its own 
sake—that is, unrelated to any instrumental reasons, such as providing 
cost-effective improvements in accounting or replacement value of 
compensation awards.”266 
None of these arguments are decisive, however, if the participatory 
legitimacy thesis provides support for a background right of political 
morality to a minimum level of participation. It is as if Rosenberg has 
argued against a right to the freedom of speech by arguing that the purpose 
of the political system is to maximize utility, that the value of self-
 
 264. Id. at 256 n.110. 
 265. Id. at 256–57. 
 266. Id. at 256. 
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expression is reducible to a subjective preference to make noise, that 
democratic processes can maximize utility by collectivized lobbying, and 
that, therefore, there is no possible explanation for the noninstrumental 
value of an individualized right to free speech. Yes, if all these premises 
were true, that conclusion would follow—but look at how much has been 
packed into these premises. 
To the extent that Rosenberg has a positive argument against the 
irreducible value of process and participation, it rests on the assumption 
that the value of particularized procedures can be reduced to the subjective 
preferences of consumers for such procedures. If this were true, then 
Rosenberg would have made a convincing case for the balancing model 
and against an independent role for a background right to a minimum level 
of participation. If his case for reducing the value of participation to 
subjective preference rests on the assumption that some version of 
utilitarian moral theory is true, then his argument should be rejected on the 
ground that it does not provide an appropriate public reason. Most citizens 
are not utilitarians, and the public at large would reasonably reject the 
premise that all values are subjective preferences whose intensity can and 
should be measured by willingness to pay. 
To the extent that Rosenberg does not rely on subjective-preference 
utilitarianism, his argument boils down to a question: what is the 
noninstrumental value of participation? Rosenberg is certainly entitled to 
ask the question, but posing the question does not demonstrate that there is 
no answer. 
2. Reductionism Two: The Reduction to Accuracy Objection 
Louis Kaplow has raised another objection to the irreducible value of 
process.267 As we shall see, Kaplow’s objection is closely related to 
Rosenberg’s. We shall call Kaplow’s argument the “reduction to accuracy 
objection,” and at the outset it is important to recall the distinction between 
reduction and dependence. It is not completely clear whether Kaplow 
intends to make the claim that the value of participation can be reduced to 
the effects of participation on accuracy or whether he is only arguing for 
the nonindependence claim. We shall return to the significance of this 
distinction at the end of my consideration of his argument. 
Kaplow begins by asking whether “process value” is subsumed by the 
value of accuracy, raising the question in the following form: 
 
 267. Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication, supra note 3, at 389. 
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One suspects that claimants who object to not being heard are those 
who are, for example, denied benefits. If only losers complain, however, 
one should be suspicious that the complaint is motivated by a concern 
for the result, and thus an objection to a lack of process may implicitly 
be an instrumental argument. An entirely plausible reason to object to 
not being heard is that one may believe (perhaps feel certain) that the 
decision was adverse precisely because the decision-maker was deprived 
of information one had to offer. Thus, the decision may have been 
inaccurate. Alternatively, one may suspect that the decision-maker 
would be more favorable when the claimant appears personally, 
independent of any additional information made available, suggesting a 
favorable shift in the implicit burden of proof.268 
In a footnote, Kaplow observes that “one does not often hear stories of 
individuals who win complaining that they did not get their day in 
court.”269 Although he may be wrong about this—the evidence suggests 
that there is a very strong preference for participation270—the real problem 
with his argument is that it elides the hard question of procedural 
legitimacy. The most important task for a theory of procedural justice is to 
offer those who suffer from inaccurate and binding decisions a reason to 
regard themselves as legitimately bound. 
Kaplow argues that the hypothesis that process value is independent of 
accuracy can be tested: 
To test this, one must consider a hypothetical situation—one 
probably too far removed from the typical disappointed applicant’s mind 
for him to take seriously—in which the applicant is heard but it is certain 
that the decision would be unaffected by the hearing. Would individuals 
value appearing if they knew in advance that they would be ignored or 
that they would be “heard” but that hearing them could have no effect 
whatever on the decision?271 
Kaplow’s hypothetical produces an intuition that process does not matter 
apart from outcome.272 But does the hypothetical frame the issue correctly? 
Certainly a hearing in which one knows in advance that one will be ignored 
is not a hearing in which one has a meaningful opportunity to participate. A 
meaningful right to be heard requires that the adjudicator not turn a deaf 
 
 268. Id. at 390–91 (footnotes omitted). 
 269. Id. at 390 n.249. 
 270. See supra note 213 (collecting social psychology literature on a preference for participation). 
 271. Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication, supra note 3, at 391 (footnotes omitted and 
emphasis added). 
 272. A set of hypotheticals that produce opposing intuitions is offered in Part V.A.4. 
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ear.273 Likewise, if the adjudicator listens but the participation “could have 
no effect,” then there is no meaningful right of participation. The modal 
operator “could” is crucial to Kaplow’s argument because it builds the 
hypothetical in such a way that it is impossible for the input to change the 
outcome,274 and it suggests that the input is not really part of the process at 
all.275 
Kaplow then goes on to explicate his thought experiment, but in a way 
that shifts our focus from whether there are any intrinsic process values to 
the quite different question of whether the subjective preference for process 
is sufficiently weighty to justify its costs: 
From one perspective, this is simply an empirical question that 
could be tested directly. There is indirect evidence relevant to how much 
people value [personal] appearances for their own sake. One type of 
evidence noted previously is the high rate of settlement in most civil 
litigation. Another is the form of dispute resolution typically specified by 
contract, and these often are of a simple sort. Of particular relevance for 
Mathews v. Eldridge, individuals’ private disability contracts presumably 
do not provide for personal appearances in formal hearings. Moreover, in 
such instances, individuals who agree to summary procedures forgo not 
only the benefits of greater personal involvement per se but also any 
positive effect such involvement may have on the accuracy of outcomes. 
Finally, it is important to recall . . . that individuals’ incentives to 
promote their interests in claims proceedings, by personal appearance or 
otherwise, tend to be socially excessive. Thus, even if individuals, at the 
 
 273. There is an important distinction between turning a deaf ear and listening when there is little 
likelihood that one’s mind will be changed, but this distinction is lost if one measures the difference by 
the probability that listening will result in a different decision. One can have an open mind, and yet 
believe that it is most unlikely that one’s mind will be changed. 
 274. See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 250, at 271. 
 275. Kaplow’s hypothetical can be more precisely formulated in possible worlds semantics, which 
cash out the notion of possibility in terms of relationships between the actual world and possible worlds. 
It may be important to pin down the precise sense of “could” that Kaplow means to invoke. We can do 
this by introducing the notion of accessibility relations between the actual world and other possible 
worlds. Something “could” happen in the logical sense if it does happen in at least one logically 
accessible possible world, and all possible worlds are logically accessible—a logically impossible world 
does not exist. Something “could” happen in the physical sense if it does happen in at least one 
nomologically-accessible possible world, that is, in at least one world that obeys the general laws of 
science. Historical accessibility is the relationship between the actual world and worlds that share the 
history of the actual world up to the present moment. One interpretation of Kaplow’s remark is that he 
is asking whether someone would value a right of participation in proceeding P at time T1 if that person 
knew of no nomologically, historically accessible possible world in which he or she could participate 
and prevail in P. See generally DIVERS, supra note 68 (discussing the issues raised by the philosophical 
idea of possible worlds); KRIPKE, supra note 70 (same); LEIBNIZ, supra note 69 (same); LEWIS, supra 
note 71 (same). 
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time disputes arose, did value further participation and were willing to 
pay for it, satisfying such preferences may be socially undesirable.276 
None of the evidence that Kaplow adduces is sufficient to establish the 
conclusion that process has no irreducible value or that there is no 
background right of political morality to adequate equal participation. 
Consider each argument in turn. First, “the high rate of settlement in 
most civil litigation” may be evidence against a subjective preference for 
participation, but it is simply irrelevant to whether the right to such 
participation is justified on grounds of political morality: no one has argued 
for a duty to participate or a requirement that every case go to trial. 
Moreover, Kaplow’s understanding of what is meant by participation is 
implausibly narrow. Kaplow asserts that “in a settlement, both sides forfeit 
the opportunity to appear personally and participate, implying that 
settlement destroys value for both parties if participation is indeed valuable 
to them.”277 But in the usual or typical case, one does have an opportunity 
to participate in settlement negotiations, either in person or through an 
agent. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a settlement process that completely 
eliminates party participation—perhaps a mediator could make a settlement 
proposal without consulting with the parties and each party would then 
have to accept or reject the settlement without comment. It is true that 
settlement involves a different form of participation than does an adversary 
hearing, but this hardly suffices to establish that there is no irreducible 
value to participation at all.278 
Second, even if it were true that “individuals’ private disability 
contracts presumably do not provide for personal appearances in formal 
hearings,” such contracts are entered into voluntarily. Instances of the 
waiver of a right do not provide evidence that the right itself lacks a 
foundation in political morality. Moreover, one does have a right to an 
individualized hearing when one purchases private disability insurance;279 
 
 276. See Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication, supra note 3, at 391–93 (footnotes 
omitted). 
 277. Id. at 392 n.254. 
 278. To avoid misunderstanding, we should note the difference between the adjudicatory and 
legislative contexts with respect to settlement. It is true that in a sense one waives the right to 
participation in a formal process in the course of settlement, whereas normally one cannot waive the 
right to vote in bargaining (among interest groups or among legislators). But this difference between the 
two contexts does not establish that there is no irreducible value to participation, because, as is pointed 
out in the text, the waiver of the right to formal process does not waive the right to participate in 
determination of the outcome of adjudication. 
 279. Kaplow is likely correct in assuming that there is no right to a formal hearing before one’s 
claim is denied, but this is not decisive. The notion that there is an irreducible value to process and 
participation does not entail that this value is sufficient to justify a hearing before benefits are denied. 
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that right is provided by the substantive law of contract and insurance, 
creating a cause of action for the wrongful denial of benefits. The case in 
which such a right is not present would be one in which the insurance 
company required its insured to consent to entry of judgment against the 
insured in case of a dispute over the policy—a procedure that would be 
analogous to the cognovit note. There is no evidence that insurance 
contracts contain such provisions, and it is not clear that such contracts 
would comport with due process. 
Third, the assertion that “individuals’ incentives to promote their 
interests in claims proceedings, by personal appearance or otherwise, tend 
to be socially excessive” assumes a utilitarian framework for the resolution 
of the question. If we assume utilitarianism first, we will be able to make a 
convincing case for a utilitarian version of the balancing model, but this 
argument would simply beg the question of whether the balancing model 
provides the best account of procedural justice. The balancing model is, in 
a sense, already built into a utilitarian framework. 
Kaplow expresses his argument somewhat differently when he poses 
the following hypothetical: “[O]ne could have two systems, known to 
produce identical outcomes, but in only one is the applicant heard. By 
charging differential fees, one could measure the value individuals 
associate with the procedure.”280 But this hypothetical assumes that the 
irreducible value of procedure must be measurable by willingness to pay—
in other words, this argument is the subjective preference argument that has 
already been considered above. Moreover, the assumption that the two 
systems are “known to produce identical outcomes” is simply a variation of 
the hypothetical in which it is assumed that participation cannot affect the 
outcome.281 
This leads to my final observation about Kaplow’s argument. The 
modally restricted hypotheticals, in which participation cannot affect 
outcomes, may support the contention that the value of participation is not 
independent of effects on outcomes, but such hypotheticals do not support 
a reduction of the value of participation on effects on outcomes. If we bear 
in mind the distinction introduced above, in Part V.B. It becomes apparent 
that Kaplow’s arguments, whatever its merits as directed against a claim of 
independent value for participation, does not engage the participatory 
legitimacy thesis, which claims irreducible but not independent value. 
 
 280. Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication, supra note 3, at 391 n.253. 
 281. See supra text accompanying note 271. 
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3. Reductionism Three: The Reduction of Participation to Other Values 
Most arguments against the independent value of participation do not 
directly address the relationship between participation and legitimacy. 
Kaplow provides, however, a brief discussion of this relationship.282 
Kaplow’s argument proceeds by the method of separation of cases. Kaplow 
argues that there are four possible variations of the argument that 
participation is required for legitimacy: (1) participation provides 
legitimacy because it enhances accuracy;283 (2) participation creates the 
appearance of legitimacy because it creates a perception of accuracy;284 (3) 
participation provides legitimacy because it respects the dignity of 
litigants;285 and (4) participation provides legitimacy because it prevents 
the abuse of power.286 
Of course, the validity of Kaplow’s argument depends on whether he 
has correctly identified the basis of the legitimacy argument. Kaplow is 
remarkably candid about his own doubts on this score. In the first footnote 
of this discussion he confesses: “This subsection does not explore what 
legitimacy means or why it might be valuable. Of course, given the 
resulting ambiguity of the subject, one is unavoidably more uncertain about 
the relevance of any analysis of it.”287 Without any analysis of what 
legitimacy is and why it is valuable, one wonders how he could possibly 
believe that he has produced any arguments against the thesis that 
participation is required for legitimacy. 
Interpreting Kaplow charitably, we might construe his argument as the 
claim that the concept of legitimacy is itself so ambiguous that its value 
must reduce to something else. If this is his actual claim, it is radically 
underdeveloped. What is ambiguous about legitimacy? If the problem is 
truly ambiguity, that is, multiple possible meanings, why can we not 
resolve the ambiguity by choosing the best conception of legitimacy? 
Perhaps Kaplow means instead that legitimacy is fatally vague, but, once 
 
 282. See Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication, supra note 3, at 395–96. 
 283. Kaplow argues that in this case, legitimacy reduces to accuracy. See id. at 395. 
 284. Kaplow’s remarks on this case are underdeveloped: 
If the procedures do not produce more accuracy, but citizens mistakenly think that they do, 
there arises a familiar problem in governance that there is no point in attempting to illuminate 
here. (As an analogy, one might ask whether the government should adopt a highway plan 
that results in more loss of life because most citizens mistakenly believe otherwise.) 
Id. at 395 n.263. He might argue that it would be wrong for government to decieve citizens—although 
given his welfarist framework, he could not rely on any deontological prohibition on deception. 
 285. Id. at 395 & n.264. Kaplow refers back to his own critique of the dignity argument. Id. 
 286. Id. at 395. 
 287. Id. at 395 n.262. 
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again, he has no argument for that proposition either. Crucially, the 
participatory legitimacy thesis is not reducible to any of his four 
interpretations, and, hence, is not open to his objection. 
4. The Moral Harm Objection 
An objection to the independent value of participation from a 
deontological perspective has been developed by Ronald Dworkin. 
Dworkin considers the argument that process has what Laurence Tribe calls 
“intrinsic value.”288 Tribe’s argument was that a background right of 
political morality to participation is justified by the “idea that to be a 
person, rather than a thing, is at least to be consulted about what is done 
with one.”289 Dworkin counters that 
[t]he language about talking to people rather than dealing with them, and 
about treating them as people rather than things, is of little help here, as 
it generally is in political theory. For it does not show why the undoubted 
harm of faceless decisions is not merely bare harm, and statements about 
what treatment treats a person as a person are at best conclusions of 
arguments, not premises.”290 
This argument rests on Dworkin’s distinction between two kinds of harm, 
which he calls “bare harm” and “moral harm.” Dworkin defines moral 
harm as follows: 
[T]he violation of a right constitutes a special kind of harm, and people 
may suffer that harm even when the violation is accidental. We must 
distinguish, that is, between what we might call the bare harm a person 
suffers through punishment, whether that punishment is just or unjust—
for example, the suffering or frustration or pain or dissatisfaction of 
desires that he suffers just because he loses his liberty or is beaten or 
killed—and the further injury that he might be said to suffer whenever 
his punishment is unjust, just in virtue of that injustice. I shall call the 
latter the “injustice factor” in his punishment, or his “moral” harm.291 
Moral harm does not depend on any psychological state; rather it “is an 
objective notion which assumes that someone suffers a special injury when 
treated unjustly, whether he knows or cares about it, but does not suffer that 
injury when he is not treated unjustly, even though he believes he is and 
does care.”292 
 
 288. TRIBE, supra note 153, at 503–04. 
 289. Id. 
 290. See DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 106, at 102. 
 291. Id. at 80. 
 292. Id. 
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Thus, Dworkin’s argument is that the proponents of an irreducible 
value for process and participation have not explained why exclusion (or 
other process flaws) give rise to moral harm. Given his definition of moral 
harm, this amounts to an argument that no explanation has been given as to 
why the denial of a right of participation is unjust. Dworkin’s argument 
then, at bottom, is like Rosenberg’s, but with a deontological twist. It does 
not present a positive case against the thesis that process has irreducible 
value, but it does question the sufficiency of the arguments raised on behalf 
of that thesis. If it can be shown that a denial of participation is unjust, then 
that denial will give rise to moral harm, and Dworkin’s objection will be 
answered. The participatory legitimacy thesis is, in fact, an argument that 
shows that the denial of a right to participation does inflict moral harm—
understood in Dworkin’s special technical sense. 
5. The Objection from the Inseparability of Substance and Procedure 
Yet another argument against the participation model is suggested by 
Larry Alexander. In a somewhat different context, he questions whether 
there are independent rights to procedural due process. He argues that 
“because the procedure for applying a [substantive] rule [of law] can 
always be viewed as part of the substance of the [substantive] rule itself, a 
concern for procedure apart from substance verges on incoherence.”293 This 
argument rests on a concealed premise that is false. The premise of the 
argument is that the procedure for applying a substantive rule of law can 
always be viewed as part of the substance of the substantive rule itself. 
Let’s assume that this premise is true. From this premise Alexander draws 
the conclusion that a concern for procedure apart from substance verges on 
incoherence. 
Alexander’s argument is still incomplete. It assumes the following: If 
X can always be viewed as part of Y, then the distinction between X and Y 
is incoherent. But, of course, this premise is false. Seahorses can be viewed 
as part of the ocean, but it is not the case that the distinction between 
seahorses and the ocean is incoherent. We have already established that the 
entanglement of substance and procedure does not mean that the distinction 
between these two concepts is incoherent. Indeed, the point of the thought 
experiment of acoustic separation between substance and procedure can be 
stated in language similar to Alexander’s: the procedure for applying a 
substantive rule of law can always be viewed as distinct from the substance 
 
 293. Larry Alexander, The Relationship Between Procedural Due Process and Substantive 
Constitutional Rights, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 323, 325 (1987). 
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of the substantive rule itself. Alexander’s argument, if reconstructed, is 
logically valid but unsound because it rests on a false assumption. 
Nonetheless, Alexander makes an important point. Sometimes 
substantive rules are adopted with specific procedures attached—some 
administrative schemes are of this sort. But our primary question—what is 
a fair procedure?—and the fact that procedures sometimes vary with 
substance does not moot that question. Indeed, Alexander’s formulation of 
his point assumes that we can recognize the difference between a 
substantive rule and the procedures for applying it. Moreover, it is 
undeniably a fact that many procedures are transsubstantive294 in many, if 
not all, contexts. Procedures frequently come in largely undivided clumps; 
for example, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Administrative 
Procedures Act. Whatever the merits of Alexander’s argument in the 
context in which he advanced it, the argument does not establish that the 
notion of an irreducible value to process based on a background right of 
political morality to participation is incoherent. 
6. The Counter-Example of Legislation 
Yet another argument against the irreducible value of participation has 
been put forth by Robert Bone. Bone suggests that the argument for a right 
of participation grounded on respect for the dignity of litigants proves too 
much because it would create a right, not present in law, to direct 
participation in the legislative process: “A state that sets the legal driving 
 
 294. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Federal Rules Fifty Years Later: Discovery Vices and 
Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237 (1989). 
The term transsubstantive originated with the late Robert M. Cover in For James Wm. Moore: Some 
Reflections on a Reading of The Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718 (1975). Of course, the question of whether 
procedural rules ought to be transsubstantive is a live one. For a variety of viewpoints, see Stephen B. 
Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 693, 716–17 (1988); Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly 
Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Body of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 
137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2079–81 (1989); Mitchell A. Lowenthal & Howard M. Erichson, Modern 
Mass Tort Litigation, Prior-Action Depositions and Practice-Sensitive Procedure, 63 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 989, 1028 (1995); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 494, 526–27 (1986); Linda Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts Revisited: The Proliferation of Ad Hoc 
Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2131, 2175–78 (1989); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Halting Devolution or Bleak 
to the Future: Subrin’s New-Old Procedure as a Possible Antidote to Dreyfuss’s ‘Tolstoy Problem,’ 46 
FLA. L. REV. 57, 78–84 (1994) (favoring nontranssubstantive discovery rules); Stephen N. Subrin, 
Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural 
Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2042–43, 2048–51 (1989); Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and 
Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the Case for Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 
27 (1994); Carl Tobias, The Transformation of Trans-Substantivity, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501 
(1992). 
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age at sixteen, for example, is not required on dignity grounds to give each 
person an individualized hearing before deciding that the person’s age 
disqualifies her for a license.”295 Bone is right to observe that rights to 
participation do not have the same implications for legislation as they do 
for adjudication. Both legislation and dispute resolution implicate 
procedural justice, but the general idea of procedural fairness operates 
differently in the two contexts. When the context is the legislative process, 
a right to participation is expressed in the right to vote, the principle of one 
person, one vote, and the freedom of expression. These are rights to 
individual participation in the legislative process, but they take into account 
the impracticability of rights of direct participation by citizens on the floor 
of a legislative body. In different contexts, individual rights of participation 
assume different forms. 
One way to see the error in Bone’s argument is to examine its flip 
side. Suppose that the question was whether there is a group right to 
participate in the legislative process by democratic election of 
representatives. It might be argued that such a group right is absurd, 
because if such a right existed, it would dictate that democratic majorities 
have the right to participate in the decision of individual cases by the 
passage of ex post facto laws and bills of attainder. This argument is an 
enthymeme—it includes an unstated assumption that the form of a right to 
participation cannot vary with context. But this unstated premise is 
obviously false—participation in lawmaking can take a different form in 
adjudication and legislation. The same goes for Bone’s argument. Once the 
missing premise is stated, it becomes clear that the argument, while valid, 
is unsound. 
As we have already noted, the notion that there is an irreducible value 
to process is the subject of wide agreement once we move to the realm of 
democratic politics. One might argue that correct outcomes are all that 
really matter and the democratic process is valuable only insofar as it 
contributes to correct outcomes. But surely the more widely held view is 
that an undemocratic regime violates an important human right, even if it 
legislates as well as or even better than a democratic regime. The example 
of legislation establishes that the form of participation may vary with the 
procedural context, but it does not establish that process has no value apart 
from outcomes. 
 
 295. Bone, Day in Court, supra note 209, at 281. 
SOLU12.DOC 11/30/2004 9:41 AM 
2004] PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 301 
7. The Argument That Representation Supercedes Participation 
Another objection to the idea that participation is essential for 
legitimacy is suggested by Owen Fiss. His core idea is that representation 
supersedes participation as the basis for procedural legitimacy. Fiss’s 
version of the argument addresses doctrine, but his argument can be 
transformed into an argument about procedural justice. Fiss claims that 
what the Constitution guarantees is not a right of participation, but rather 
what I will call a “right of representation”: not a day in court but the 
right to have one’s interest adequately represented. The right of 
representation provides that no individual can be bound by an 
adjudication unless his or her interest is adequately represented in the 
proceeding.296 
Importantly, Fiss formulates his claim in terms of the representation of 
interests and not of individuals: 
[T]he representation that I speak of is not a representation of individuals 
but a representation of interests. It is not that every person has a right to 
be represented in structural litigation, but only that every interest must be 
represented. If an individual’s interest has been adequately represented 
then he or she has no further claim against the decree. The right of 
representation is a collective, rather than an individual right, because it 
belongs to a group of persons classed together by virtue of their shared 
interests.297 
Corresponding to Fiss’s argument about the Due Process Clause, we can 
construct a parallel (Fissian) argument about procedural justice.298 That is, 
we could argue that it is adequate representation of interests (and not 
participation) that confers legitimacy on adjudicative procedures. 
The Fissian argument that representation supersedes participation has 
some obvious attractions. Much hangs on what counts as adequacy. For 
example, if adequacy is measured by contribution to accuracy, then the 
argument for supersession is simply a restatement of the argument that 
participation reduces to accuracy. If adequacy reduces in this way, the 
Fissian supersession objection is an old argument in a new bottle. We can, 
therefore, put this possibility to the side. 
 
 296. Fiss, supra note 208, at 970–71. 
 297. Id. at 972. 
 298. Of course, the argument that I will present is not Fiss’s own—although it is inspired by his 
argument. To the extent that the argument has merit, Fiss deserves the credit, but if the argument fails, 
the fault is mine. If “Fissian” suggests too strong a connection between Fiss and the argument, “quasi-
Fissian” could be substituted. 
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It might be argued, however, that representation (and not 
participation) creates legitimacy that is not reducible to accuracy. By way 
of analogy to the case of legislation, it could be argued that individuals do 
not have an individual right to participate in the legislative process itself;299 
representative democracies are legitimate so long as interests are 
adequately represented. Moreover, it might be argued that even in the case 
of traditional litigation, various types of litigants are represented by others. 
Thus, wards are represented by guardians, beneficiaries by trustees, and 
persons with mental disabilities by guardians ad litem. At first blush, it 
might seem that the Fissian objection runs into the fact that in ordinary 
cases, there is an individual right of participation. Parties ordinarily 
represent themselves, and representation is the second-best substitute for 
participation. At this point, however, the Fissian objector would have a 
powerful counter: the case in which individuals directly participate might 
be seen as a special case of adequate representation. In some cases, an 
individual is simply the most efficient and accuracy-enhancing 
representative of his or her own interests. If this Fissian maneuver worked, 
then we would have undergone a classic duck-rabbit300 shift in perspective. 
Before the shift, we saw participation as the norm and adequate 
representation as the exception. After the shift, we come to see that 
representation is the norm and participation is simply a special case. 
But the Fissian duck-rabbit maneuver will not work. Participation is 
not plausibly seen as a special case of adequate representation. The Fissian 
conjuring trick is to redefine the object of adequate representation, “not a 
representation of individuals but a representation of interests.”301 Fiss may 
well be right that when group rights are at stake, the relevant interests are 
the interests of groups, but in individual litigation, the interests at stake are 
the interests of individuals. But now the interests drop out. We are 
concerned about individual interests because we are concerned about 
individuals. Interests themselves have no moral standing. Individuals 
represent themselves, not because they are the best or most efficient 
representatives of their own interests; individuals represent themselves 
 
 299. See supra Part V.D.6. 
 300. The duck-rabbit is from Wittgenstein. See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 250, at 194. 
 
The duck-rabbit can be seen as a duck or as a rabbit. Most readers should be able to force a perspective 
shift at will. 
 301. Fiss, supra note 208, at 972. 
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because they are human persons, who act on their own behalves, define 
their own interests, and speak for themselves. If it looks like a duck, walks 
like a duck, and quacks like a duck, it is a duck. 
8. The Contractarian Objection 
The contractarian objection is based on the idea of hypothetical 
consent. As explained by Bone, the idea is the following: 
The ex ante argument supposes that a procedure is fair to a party if a 
rational person in the position of the party would have agreed to the 
procedure before the dispute arose. In deciding whether to agree, a 
rational person weighs the costs and benefits that he expects from the 
procedure.302 
As applied to the value of participation, the idea is that a rational person 
would choose to forgo the option to participate if that option would be 
neither cost beneficial nor accuracy improving. Because Bone has provided 
a thorough and convincing treatment of the general form of the 
contractarian objection,303 we can confine ourselves to a single point. 
Whether rational persons would bind themselves to process without 
participation will depend on the structuring of the initial choice situation. 
For example, if the choice situation is structured so that the interests of 
rational persons are solely in economic payoffs, preference satisfaction, or 
objective welfare, then they will be willing to forgo rights of participation 
that do not produce these payoffs. On the other hand, if rational persons are 
conceived as having an overriding interest in having reasons to consider 
themselves as legitimately bound by erroneous decisions, then they will 
choose participation over accuracy and cost. In other words, the 
contractarian argument can easily become question begging. For this 
reason, the real work of contractarian accounts of procedural justice 
consists in the arguments that justify the set up of the initial choice 
situation. 
9. The Ineffability Objection or the Absence of an Explanation 
At this point, we are in a position to observe that several of the 
objections to the irreducible value of process share a common form. 
Although they are cast in the guise of affirmative reasons to believe that 
 
 302. Bone, supra note 6, at 496. Bruce Hay and Rosenberg are strongly associated with this 
argument. See Hay, supra note 7; Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, The Individual Justice of Averaging 
(John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus. Discussion Paper No. 285, 2000) at http:// 
www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/285.pdf. 
 303. See Bone, supra note 6. 
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there is no irreducible value to process, they turn out, on close inspection, 
to rest on a burden-shifting move, that is, on questions rather than 
arguments. In the absence of a clear explanation of why process should 
count aside from cost or outcomes, many argue that there is something 
mysterious or ineffable about the claim that participation itself has intrinsic 
value. For example, Bone asserts that “[t]he conventional understanding of 
American adjudication supposes that it is primarily a means to the end of 
producing outcomes that conform in some close way to the substantive 
law.”304 But if this is so, Bone argues, “then the demands of dignity should 
be satisfied in most situations by outcomes meeting the quality 
standards.”305 If we assume that accuracy alone is important, then “it is 
difficult to see what institutional value there could possibly be in 
guaranteeing participation beyond what is needed for”306 accurate 
decisions. 
The ineffability objection, in its various forms, founders when 
confronted with the participatory legitimacy thesis. Legitimacy may be an 
abstract idea of political philosophy but it is not ineffable. Indeed, the idea 
that political processes should be legitimate is one of the most familiar and 
widely accepted views in all of political theory. It is certainly no more 
controversial than the utilitarian assumption that only consequences count 
or the welfarist idea that subjective preferences are the sole criterion of 
goodness. Legitimacy is no more obscure than the deontological idea of 
autonomy. Quite the contrary, the idea of legitimacy, as a matter of 
practical politics, enjoys greater comprehension, acceptance, and 
argumentative potency than these rival notions. Indeed, the ability of 
ordinary folk to see the connection between legitimacy and participation is 
well confirmed by social science.307 It is a strange irony of contemporary 
academic discourse that the straightforward and obvious value of 
participation has come to be seen as obscure. This irony is compounded 
when we realize that rival accounts of procedural justice rest on deeply 
controversial assumptions. 
In sum, my assessment of the state of play is this: although there is a 
convincing argument that outcomes count, there is no convincing argument 
for reductionism. That is, none of the critics has given good and sufficient 
reason for the proposition that participation lacks independent value. 
Indeed, critics sensitive of the view that process counts because some level 
 
 304. Bone, Day in Court, supra note 209, at 281. 
 305. Id. at 281–82. 
 306. Id. at 282 (emphasis added). 
 307. See supra note 213 (collecting social psychology literature). 
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of participation is required by a concern and respect for individual dignity, 
admit to lingering doubts about their own critiques.308 
VI.  PRINCIPLES OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
Accuracy, cost, and participation must all play a role in a theory of 
procedural justice. But if such a theory is to be sufficiently specific to do 
actual work as a standard against which a system of procedure can be 
measured, then the relationship between accuracy, cost, and participation 
must be ordered and articulated. In this part, I restate the conclusions we 
have reached so far in the form of two principles of procedural justice. 
A. THE STATEMENT OF THE PRINCIPLES 
Consider the following formulation for a set of principles that express 
a conception of civil procedural justice: 
1. The Participation Principle: The arrangements for the resolution 
of civil disputes should be structured to provide each interested 
party with a right to meaningful participation, as specified by 
the following conditions and provisos: 
a) The Interest Condition. The right to participation should 
extend to all persons who will be the subject of final 
binding adjudication and to all other persons with a 
substantial interest that, as a practical matter, will be 
finally determined. 
b) The Scope Condition. The right of participation should 
include the following minimum: 
(1) Notice. The arrangements for civil dispute resolution 
shall include advance notice to the individuals 
specified in the interest condition; 
(2) Opportunity to Be Heard. The arrangements for civil 
dispute resolution shall afford an equal and 
meaningful opportunity to present evidence and 
arguments that are relevant to the dispute. 
c) The Impracticability Proviso. In the event that actual notice 
or an opportunity to be heard is impracticable, the absent 
interested individual shall be provided with an adequate 
legal representative and the proceeding shall be structured 
so as to give full and fair consideration to the interests of 
 
 308. See DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 106, at 102–03; Bone, Personal and 
Impersonal Litigative Forms, supra note 209, at 287. 
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the absent individual. Represented persons should be 
afforded practicable opportunities to challenge the 
adequacy of their representation. 
d) Fair Value of Procedural Justice Proviso. Such 
arrangements shall ensure the fair value of the basic 
liberties, including the right to reasonable attorneys’ fees 
in suits for relief from violation of such liberties. 
2. The Accuracy Principle: The arrangements for the resolution of 
civil disputes should be structured to maximize the likelihood 
of achieving the legally correct outcome in each proceeding, 
subject to the following provisos. A procedure may depart 
from the maximization of accuracy only for the following 
reasons: 
a) The Substantive Rights Proviso. In order to ensure that 
the process of adjudication does not unfairly infringe on 
the substantive rights guaranteed by the basic liberties, 
such as the rights of privacy and freedom of speech; 
b) Fair Distribution of the Risk of Inaccurate Adjudication 
Proviso. In order to provide for a fair distribution of the 
risk of inaccurate adjudication; 
c) Systemic Accuracy Proviso. In order to maximize 
systemic accuracy, so long as the procedures are 
announced in advance and create general rules with 
which parties can comply by making a reasonable good 
faith effort; procedures may also be arranged to maximize 
systemic accuracy where the arrangement will not result 
in inaccuracy in particular cases; 
d) Costs of Adjudication Proviso. In order to ensure that the 
systemic costs of adjudication are not excessive in 
relation to the interests at stake in the proceeding or type 
of proceeding. 
3.  Ordering of the Principles and Provisos. These principals shall 
be satisfied in lexical order, such that satisfaction of the 
Participation Principle shall take priority over satisfaction of 
the Accuracy Principle. The Provisos to the Accuracy 
Principle are also ranked in lexical order. In cases of conflict, 
the first proviso shall take precedence over the rest, the second 
proviso shall take precedence over all but the first, and so 
forth. 
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Before proceeding further, we should observe that these principles require 
interpretation and exposition if they are to serve as the foundation for a 
fully developed conception of procedural justice. 
B. THE PRINCIPLES IN RELATIONSHIP TO THE THREE MODELS 
The principles bear a direct relationship with the considerations raised 
by the three simple models of procedural justice discussed in Part IV.B. 
Each principle attempts to capture the core intuition or considered 
judgment that underlies one or more of the models, and the complex 
structuring of the principles attempts to remedy the deficiencies of each and 
the inconsistencies of all by providing a proper lexical ordering and 
enumeration of exceptions. 
Consider first the relationship between the accuracy model and the 
Accuracy Principle. The Accuracy Principle expresses the accuracy model 
and attempts to rectify the deficiencies of that model. Recall that the first 
deficiency was that the accuracy model suffers from a general problem of 
fit, because a variety of procedural rules do not aim at accuracy; for 
example, the rules of claim and issue preclusion prevent the relitigation of a 
claim or issue, even when it can be shown that the prior adjudication was 
clearly wrong. The Accuracy Principle acknowledges that accuracy may be 
balanced against costs in the Costs of Adjudication Proviso. 
A second deficiency of the accuracy model was that it failed to 
distinguish between systemic accuracy and case accuracy. The Systemic 
Accuracy Proviso resolves this ambiguity and attempts to strike a fair 
balance between systemic accuracy and accuracy in the particular case. On 
the one hand, the basic statement of the Accuracy Principle expresses the 
judgment that procedural justice aims to resolve the case that is being 
decided accurately; the baseline notion is that case accuracy takes priority 
over system accuracy. Our notion of procedural justice requires the fair 
treatment of individuals, and making systemic accuracy the baseline would 
fail to take the differences between individuals seriously. 
On the other hand, there are situations in which systemic accuracy can 
be promoted without treating the individual unfairly. Where a rule 
promoting systemic accuracy is announced in advance and parties can 
reasonably comply with the rule, imposing a case-accuracy distorting 
sanction is not unfair to those affected—the opportunity to comply places 
the responsibility for the distortion on the party who disobeyed the 
procedural rule. 
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The balancing model is expressed in two of the provisos to the 
Accuracy Principle. The Costs of Adjudication Proviso reflects the notion, 
expressed in the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, that the maximization 
of accuracy must be balanced against the costs of adjudication.309 The 
Violations of Substantive Rights Proviso expresses the idea that so-called 
balancing should not be limited to the costs of adjudication but should 
include considerations of fairness and respect for basic substantive rights. 
These provisos express the core intuitions of the balancing model. 
The participation model as refined by my investigation of the value of 
participation is reflected in the Participation Principle. This principle 
recognizes that procedural legitimacy requires a basic right of notice and 
opportunity to be heard in all cases in which the basic rights of 
participation are practicable. The lexical ordering of the principles 
expresses both (a) the notion that a concern for accuracy does not trump the 
concerns for legitimacy underwriting the requirements of notice and an 
opportunity to be heard and (b) the notion that once these requirements are 
met, a fair procedure should aim at legally correct outcomes. 
C. THE PRINCIPLES IN RELATIONSHIP TO THE STRUCTURE OF EXISTING 
DOCTRINE 
The principles and their ordering do not map perfectly onto existing 
doctrine, and this should not be surprising. The structure of existing 
doctrine has been determined by a pattern of historical development, and 
much of contemporary procedure is frozen legal history. Nonetheless, the 
substance of the two principles is reflected in the general contours of the 
procedural law of the United States. 
1. The Participation Principle 
The central idea of the Participation Principle—that notice and an 
opportunity to be heard are essential to procedural fairness—is frequently 
found in judicial opinions:310 “The principle is as old as the law, and is of 
 
 309. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1978). 
 310. Mason v. Eldred, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 231, 239 (1867). See also Kaggen v. I.R.S., 57 F.3d 163, 
167 (2d Cir. 1995) (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (stating that “basic considerations of procedural fairness 
demand an opportunity to be heard”); Eash v. Riggins Trucking Co., 757 F.2d 557, 579 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(en banc) (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (stating that “the principles of procedural fairness embedded in the 
Constitution . . . require adversary proceedings including notice and an opportunity to be heard unless 
the events occurred within the view of the court.”); Am. Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 
1230, 1244 (3d Cir. 1975) (“One of the basic tenets of American jurisprudence is that procedural 
fairness requires that each party have notice of the issues involved and an opportunity to be heard at a 
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universal justice, that no one shall be personally bound until he has had his 
day in court.” Some courts have gone so far as to make explicit that this 
aspect of procedural fairness may not be balanced against other 
concerns.311 
There is, however, a potential problem of fit in this respect between 
the Participation Principle and the Supreme Court’s decision in Mathews v. 
Eldridge. It might be argued that Mathews adopted the balancing model, 
and, hence, that existing doctrine implicitly assumes all rights of 
participation may be denied if the balance of costs and benefits favors this 
result. It could be further argued that support for this theory is found in 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,312 in which the Supreme 
Court allowed the rights of contingent beneficiaries to a trust to be 
adjudicated without any actual notice to the beneficiaries.313 
These arguments, however, fail on closer inspection.314 Mathews and 
Mullane are fully consistent with the Participation Principle. Mathews does 
not stand for the proposition that all participation can be denied if the 
balance of costs and benefits favors this result. Instead, Justice Powell’s 
opinion for the Court states, “This Court consistently has held that some 
form of hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a 
property interest,”315 and “the fundamental requirement of due process is 
the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner.’”316 Furthermore, “the essence of due process is the requirement 
 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”); In re Hourani, 180 B.R. 58, 68 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) 
(“Notice is a central tenet of procedural fairness and assures justice and fair dealing by giving creditors 
an opportunity to present and contest the status of their claims.”); Potvin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 63 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 202, 208 (Ct. App.) (equating “procedural fairness” with “notice of the charges brought against 
the individual and an opportunity to respond to those charges”), superseded, 941 P.2d 1121 (Cal. 1997); 
Milenkovic v. Milenkovic, 416 N.E.2d 1140, 1148 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (“The essence of due process is 
procedural fairness, as embodied in the elements of notice and opportunity to be heard.”); Nelson v. 
Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1211 (Utah 1983) (“Timely and adequate notice and an opportunity to be 
heard in a meaningful way are at the very heart of procedural fairness.”). 
 311. One district court stated the importance of procedural fairness this way: 
We cannot accept defendants’ contention that the essential elements of fundamental 
procedural fairness—advance notice of any serious charge and an opportunity to present 
evidence before a relatively objective tribunal. . . . must be dispensed with entirely because of 
the need for summary action or because the administrative problems would be too 
burdensome. 
Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (citations omitted). Accord Lathrop v. 
Brewer, 340 F. Supp. 873, 880 (S.D. Iowa 1972); Meola v. Fitzpatrick, 322 F. Supp. 878, 885 (D. Mass. 
1971). 
 312. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
 313. Id. at 317–18. 
 314. See supra Part IV.B.2.a. 
 315. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 319, 333 (1978). 
 316. Id. (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). 
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that ‘a person in jeopardy of serious loss [be given] notice of the case 
against him and opportunity to meet it.’”317 Similar language appears in 
Justice Jackson’s opinion in Mullane.318 Thus, the broad language of 
Mathews is consistent with the proposition that the Participation Principle, 
as expressed in the rights to notice and some opportunity to be heard, is 
lexically prior to the Accuracy Principle and its Cost of Adjudication 
Proviso. More technically, in Mathews itself, application of the balancing 
test resulted in the denial of a right to a pretermination hearing,319 but the 
opinion does not suggest that no violation of the Due Process Clause lies 
where a deprivation of benefits that constitute a property interest is 
accomplished with no hearing. 
The interest condition triggers the right to notice and an opportunity to 
be heard. In particular these rights are triggered for “persons who will be 
the subject of final binding adjudication and to all other persons with a 
substantial interest that as a practical matter would be finally determined.” 
This triggering condition is reflected in the rights of participation generally 
afforded by existing law. For example, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 
contemplates dismissing an action if the absence of a party who cannot be 
joined “might be prejudicial to the person or those already parties.”320 It 
also favors joinder of an absent party if “the person claims an interest 
relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of 
the action in the person’s absence may . . . as a practical matter impair or 
impede the person’s ability to protect that interest.”321 Similarly, Rule 24 
affords a right of intervention (which, of course, is just a right of 
participation) 
when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or 
transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so 
situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair 
 
 317. Id. at 348–49 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171–72 
1951) (Frankfurther, J., concurring). 
 318. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313 (“Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract 
words of the Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that 
deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for 
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.”); id. at 314 (“An elementary and fundamental 
requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably 
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and 
afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”). 
 319. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 340–41. 
 320. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b). 
 321. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a). 
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or impede the applicant’s ability to protect that interest, unless the 
applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties.322 
The Participation Principle also requires the fair value of procedural 
justice in a proviso: the arrangements for resolution of civil disputes shall 
ensure the fair value of the basic liberties, including the right to reasonable 
attorneys’ fees in suits for relief from violation of such liberties. This 
proviso demonstrates that the system of procedure should be structured so 
that inequalities of litigation resources cannot operate to deprive 
individuals of the fair value of their basic liberties, such as the freedom of 
speech. Current law reflects this idea through the provision of attorneys’ 
fees for successful lawsuits challenging the violation of an individual’s 
basic federal rights.323 This is, of course, a large topic unto itself. For the 
purposes of this Article, which focuses on procedural justice at a high level 
of generality, we can simply note that this proviso is added for reasons that 
would take our investigation far afield of our core concerns, and hence that 
a detailed investigation ought to be postponed until another occasion. 
2. The Accuracy Principle 
The second principle is the Accuracy Principle, which requires that 
civil procedures be structured so as to maximize the chances of achieving 
the legally correct outcome in each proceeding and is subject to four 
provisos. Participants in the system—judges and those who draft rules of 
procedure—believe that the system is designed with accuracy as a primary 
goal. We have already examined the evidence for this proposition in our 
discussion of the accuracy model; the current system of procedure is 
understood as engaged in a search for truth.324 
The first proviso to the Accuracy Principle permits a departure from 
accuracy where an accuracy enhancing procedure would lead to the 
violation of another fundamental right. This proviso allows for departures 
from accuracy that ensure that the process of adjudication does not unfairly 
infringe on the substantive rights guaranteed by basic liberties, such as the 
rights of privacy and freedom of speech. This proviso is reflected in the 
structure of current doctrine in a variety of ways. Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(c) allows a trial court judge to limit discovery by entering a 
protective order;325 one reason for granting such an order is to protect 
 
 322. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a). 
 323. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 (2000). 
 324. See supra Part IV.B. See also supra notes 158–159 (collecting sources identifying the search 
for truth as the goal of the system of adjudication). 
 325. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
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substantive rights, such as the right to privacy.326 Similarly, various 
privileges protect substantive rights when the search for truth collides with 
confidentiality.327 
The second proviso to the Accuracy Principle allows departures from 
the goal of case accuracy that have the purpose of providing for a fair 
distribution of the risk of inaccurate adjudication. In civil litigation, the 
goal of fair distribution of the risk of error is reflected in the preponderance 
of the evidence standard for the burden of persuasion, and departures from 
the standard are justified on the ground that a shift would more fairly 
allocate the risk. Thus, the Supreme Court has justified departure from the 
preponderance standard in child custody cases on the ground that a fair 
distribution of the risk of error requires the departure.328 Another example 
is the requirement for clear and convincing evidence that a party signing a 
cognovit note expressed a waiver of the right to notice that was “voluntary, 
knowing, and intelligently made.”329 Here, inequality in the risk of error 
protects the constitutional right to notice, which the Participation Principle 
suggests is a prerequisite for procedural fairness. In this case, the stakes are 
unequal (the monetary recovery on the cognovit note versus the protection 
of the fundamental dignity of the individual) and, hence, an unequal 
distribution of the risk of error is not inconsistent with fairness to the 
parties. 
The third proviso allows departure from the goal of case accuracy in 
order to maximize systemic accuracy if the procedures are announced in 
advance and create general rules with which parties can comply by making 
a reasonable good faith effort. We explored the tension between case 
 
 326. Cf. Dominick C. Capozzola, Discovering Privacy, L.A. LAW., Nov. 2003, at 28 (arguing that 
discovery orders should be narrowly tailored to protect legitimate privacy rights and interests). 
 327. See, e.g., Bruce P. Brown, Note, Free Press, Privacy, and Privilege: Protection of 
Researcher-Subject Communications, 17 GA. L. REV. 1009, 1028–29 (1983). 
 328. Specifically, the Supreme Court justified the departure in this manner: 
Even accepting the court’s assumption, we cannot agree with its conclusion that a 
preponderance standard fairly distributes the risk of error between parent and child. Use of 
that standard reflects the judgment that society is nearly neutral between erroneous 
termination of parental rights and erroneous failure to terminate those rights. For the child, the 
likely consequence of an erroneous failure to terminate is preservation of an uneasy status 
quo. For the natural parents, however, the consequence of an erroneous termination is the 
unnecessary destruction of their natural family. A standard that allocates the risk of error 
nearly equally between those two outcomes does not reflect properly their relative severity. 
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 765–66 (1982) (citation and footnote omitted). 
 329. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185–86, 187 (1972) (assuming that the same 
standard of proof applies to waiver in the civil context as in criminal cases, and citing criminal cases). 
See Leonard v. Clark, 12 F.3d 885, 889–90 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Overmyer, 405 U.S. at 187; Davies v. 
Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 1390, 1394–95 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
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accuracy and systemic accuracy in connection with the accuracy model.330 
The existing procedural landscape reflects the systemic accuracy proviso in 
myriad ways. Statutes of limitations and discovery sanctions, for example, 
frequently lead to an inaccurate result in the particular case, but are 
justified at least in part on the basis of the contribution they make to 
systemic accuracy.331 
The fourth proviso authorizes departure from the goal of accuracy to 
ensure that the systemic costs of adjudication are not excessive in relation 
to the interests at stake in a proceeding or type of proceeding. We have 
already discussed this proviso at length; it is reflected in procedural due 
process cases like Mathews and Mullane. These cases have enshrined the 
fourth proviso as a basic component of due process jurisprudence. 
VII.  THE PROBLEM OF AGGREGATION 
In this part, we apply the two principles of procedural justice and the 
participatory legitimacy thesis to the central problem of contemporary civil 
procedure in the United States—the problem of aggregation. Traditional 
procedure, especially the civil action and individual trial, has been 
challenged by the advent of the mass wrong—asbestos torts, tobacco torts, 
systemic misrepresentation, and so forth. In response, lawyers, judges, and 
legal scholars have advocated a variety of techniques for aggregation. 
These techniques have included expanded use of the class action and its 
close cousins, the theory of virtual representation and sampling. This part 
addresses whether and how the technologies of aggregation can be squared 
with the Participation Principle. 
A. TECHNOLOGIES OF AGGREGATION 
Individual participation is costly, and so the system of procedure is 
under pressure to aggregate. The system has responded to these pressures 
with a variety of procedural innovations—technologies of aggregation. 
Three such techniques are (1) the class action, (2) the doctrine of virtual 
representation, and (3) sampling or aggregated trials. 
 
 330. See supra Part IV.B.1.b. 
 331. Cf. Elizabeth A. Wilson, Suing for Lost Childhood: Child Sexual Abuse, the Delayed 
Discovery Rule, and the Problem of Finding Justice for Adult-Survivors of Child Abuse, 12 UCLA 
WOMEN’S L.J. 145, 166–67 (2003) (discussing policy considerations of statutes of limitations and 
discovery rules to “ensure the accuracy and fairness of the judicial process”). 
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The class action is the most familiar technology of aggregation.332 
Class actions aggregate by allowing an individual named party to act as a 
representative of a class. From our perspective, it is important to 
distinguish between two types of class actions. 333 In a mandatory class 
action, class members have no choice regarding their membership in the 
class and, hence, may not preserve the right to individual participation in 
any proceeding that will bind them.334 In an opt-out class action, individual 
class members may elect out of the class to preserve the right of individual 
participation.335 A civil action may not proceed as a class action until the 
class is certified; a judicial determination that the named party (or parties) 
is an adequate representative is a prerequisite for certification.336 
The doctrine of virtual representation provides a second technology 
for aggregation.337 One way of understanding virtual representation is as a 
class action without the formalities. The individual litigant in the first 
action acts as the representative of a party with similar interests in a 
subsequent action, but no class is certified and the representative 
relationship is only recognized after the fact when the doctrine is asserted 
in the subsequent action. Virtual representation is always mandatory. 
Because the first action does not proceed on a class basis, there can be no 
notification of absent parties that they have a right to opt out. 
A third technology of aggregation is sometimes called “sampling” or 
“aggregate trial.”338 The idea is to take representative cases, try them, and 
then use the results as factual findings in cases that were not tried. The 
 
 332. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. See generally John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 
78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419 (2003) (discussing the class action as an aggregation device). 
 333. See Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 1602 
(2003) (distinguishing opt-out and mandatory class actions); Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence 
Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 153 (2003) (“The operation 
of the class action today as a rival to the conventional institutions of public lawmaking cries out for a 
normative account of the distinction drawn between mandatory and opt-out class actions, for the 
distinction defines the binding effect of class settlements.”). 
 334. See Laura J. Hines, Challenging the Issue Class Action End-Run, 52 EMORY L.J. 709, 716 
(2003). 
 335. See id. 
 336. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 337. See Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms, supra note 209; Howard M. Erichson, 
Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of Coordination Among Counsel in Related 
Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381, 458 (2000) (discussing virtual representation as informal aggregation); F. 
Carlisle Roberts, Virtual Representation in Actions Affecting Future Interests, 30 ILL. L. REV. 580 
(1936); Johnson, supra note 256. 
 338. See Kenneth S. Bordens & Irwin A. Horowitz, The Limits of Sampling and Consolidation in 
Mass Tort Trials: Justice Improved or Justice Altered?, 22 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 43 (1998); Michael 
J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and 
Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815 (1992). 
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most famous example is Cimino v. Raymark Industries, Inc.,339 an asbestos 
case tried during 1990 in Texas. Cimino involved 2,298 plaintiffs. In an 
initial phase, various “common issues” were resolved. These issues 
included which products contained asbestos, which products were 
dangerous, which defendants manufactured the products, and so forth. The 
plaintiffs were then divided into five injury categories. From these five 
categories, 160 cases were randomly selected and presented to two separate 
juries. The results were then applied to the plaintiffs whose cases were not 
tried.340 Without substantial changes in current doctrine, sampling is 
voluntary, not mandatory341—although the use of mandatory sampling has 
been suggested.342 
B. THE PARTICIPATION PROBLEM 
Technologies of aggregation can create a problem of participation. 
Consider, for example, the following hypothetical.343 Suppose that a 
mandatory class action is the solution to the problems created by a mass 
tort. We might imagine such a class action in response to a harmful 
substance (“the chemical”) that affects hundreds of thousands of 
individuals—think of tobacco or asbestos. To simplify the example, 
suppose that exposure of those affected by the chemical is relatively 
uniform and the persons who were exposed are easy to identify. The plan 
for the class action is to proceed in two phases. In phase one, a trial will be 
held on various issues such as breach of the relevant standard of care and 
causation. In phase two, a quasi-administrative procedure will distribute the 
damage award, if any, to the members of the class. Let us further suppose 
that the named parties will get a hearing on class certification and the 
adequacy of representation, but that no collateral challenges to either 
certification or adequacy are permitted. Absent class members will be 
 
 339. Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 653, 664–65 (E.D. Tex. 1990), vacated in 
part, 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 340. See Bordens & Horowitz, supra note 338, at 45–46. 
 341. The Fifth Circuit held that the plan devised by the District Court in Cimino violated the 
defendant’s right to a trial by jury. Cimino, 151 F.3d at 320–21. The same argument would invalidate 
sampling imposed against the wishes of plaintiffs. 
 342. Cf. R. Joseph Barton, Note, Utilizing Statistics and Bellwether Trials in Mass Torts: What 
Do the Constitution and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Permit?, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 199, 
215 (1999) (raising the question “whether mandatory statistical sampling violates a plaintiff’s due 
process rights”). 
 343. Let us put to the side whether such a class action would be permitted by existing law. Under 
Rule 23, if the described class action were certified under Rule 23(b)(3), then opt-out and participation 
rights would be afforded under Rule 23(c)(2). If the class were certified under Rule 23(b)(1), then the 
participation in the class would be mandatory. 
SOLU12.DOC 11/30/2004 9:41 AM 
316 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:181 
finally bound by the decision; the doctrine of claim preclusion or res 
judicata will apply. What this means is that class members will be bound 
by the decision (a) whether it is correct or erroneous, (b) whether it is for 
the plaintiffs or the defendant, (c) whether the absent parties’ claims are 
substantially the same as that of the class members, and (d) whether 
representation was, in fact, adequate. 
What opportunities for participation would this procedure afford? The 
answer to this question is virtually none. In the hypothetical, a mandatory 
class action would afford absent class members neither the right to opt out 
of the class and pursue their own individual lawsuits nor the right to be 
represented by counsel in the class proceeding. Class members might be 
permitted to participate in the class certification hearing by making an 
appearance or by letter, but once the certification decision is made, this 
right drops away. Class members would not be allowed to participate 
directly via a collateral challenge to the judgment (for example, by filing 
another lawsuit) because of the doctrine of claim preclusion. 
Should we be concerned about the absence of a right to participate? 
Both the accuracy model and the balancing model suggest that the answer 
to this question could be no. If we determine that the aggregate level of 
accuracy would be enhanced by a mandatory class action as compared to 
individual trials, then the accuracy model gives us no reason to prefer a 
system of individualized trials. From the perspective of the balancing 
model, the case against individualized trials is likely to be even more 
compelling. Individualized participation is expensive as compared to a 
mandatory class action. The balancing model would allow rights of 
individual participation if they are cost justified, either by enhancing 
accuracy or because of a subjective taste for participation. Hypothetically, 
let us suppose that rights of individual participation would be neither 
accuracy enhancing nor cost justified. 
If we accept the participatory legitimacy thesis, however, then it is not 
clear that our hypothetical mandatory class action meets the requirements 
of procedural justice. The first principle of procedural justice, the 
Participation Principle, states that civil dispute resolution shall afford an 
equal opportunity to affected individuals to present evidence and arguments 
that are relevant to legal rules and equitable considerations that should 
govern the dispute as a matter of substantive law. Given the hypothetical 
facts we have described, there is a prima facie case that the mandatory class 
action would violate the Participation Principle. Persons who will be finally 
bound are given no opportunity to participate. 
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However, the first principle of procedural justice does include an 
impracticability proviso: in the event that actual notice or an opportunity to 
be heard is impracticable, the absent interested individual shall be provided 
with an adequate legal representative and the proceeding shall be structured 
so as to give full and fair consideration to the interests of the absent 
individual. The application of the impracticability proviso to any actual 
mass tort case will depend on the facts. It is certainly possible that 
affording equal rights of individual participation would be impracticable. 
Consider two scenarios. On one hand, if the effect of affording such rights 
was to consume the resources available for compensating plaintiffs, then 
the result would be self-defeating. On the other hand, if affording a right of 
participation is consistent with substantially just outcomes, then the case 
against such a right is much weaker. It is true that rights of participation 
may impose costs, but legitimacy is the kind of value that warrants the 
expenditure of significant resources. 
Returning to the hypothetical, let us hypothesize that affording rights 
of participation is practicable. For example, we might assume that allowing 
opt-out rights, while adding costs without appreciable accuracy gains, 
would not produce costs that would bankrupt the defendant or be wildly 
disproportionate to the stakes involved. This hypothetical provides a test 
case for the two principles of procedural justice—the Participation 
Principle and the Accuracy Principle—as compared to the rival theories 
offered by the accuracy model and the participation model. The two 
principles would require that class members be afforded opportunities for 
participation that are practicable. Both the accuracy model and the 
balancing model would require that such a right be denied. 
In the context of this hypothetical, the participatory legitimacy thesis 
provides reasons of political morality to affirm the two principles and reject 
its rivals. Does this result cohere with our intuitions and considered 
judgments about the hypothetical? Readers must answer this question for 
themselves. My guess is that many readers will agree that participation is 
required for legitimacy under these circumstances. But I am also certain 
that readers strongly committed to consequentialist theories, such as 
welfarism or utilitarianism, will reject the conclusion that practicable 
participation is required as a matter of procedural justice for situations in 
which its costs exceed its benefits. I might ask these readers the following 
question: do you have any reason for denying the right to practicable 
participation that does not depend on some version of the controversial 
proposition that only consequences count? If not, then the argument may 
reach a dialectical impasse at precisely this point. 
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C. STRUCTURING AGGREGATION TO ALLOW PARTICIPATION RIGHTS 
One of the lessons of the mandatory class action hypothetical is that 
rights of participation are not necessarily inconsistent with aggregation. 
Individualized litigation is not the only alternative to aggregation. There are 
a variety of modalities of participation that are consistent with technologies 
of aggregation. Briefly, these modalities include the following: 
• Opt-out rights. We can allow absent class members to opt out 
and pursue individual litigation. 
• Participation rights. We can allow class members to enter an 
appearance in a class action. The Participation Principle does 
not require that these participation rights be attached to a right 
to hold out (that is, to veto settlement or other agreements 
between the class representatives and other parties). 
• Certification hearings. Even if class members are not allowed to 
participate directly in the litigation, it may nonetheless be 
practicable to provide a right to participate in the class 
certification process, including, for example, the right (1) to 
argue for a more limited class definition, (2) to advocate the 
creation of subclasses, or (3) to argue against the adequacy of 
representation. 
• Settlement hearings. If a class action settles, raising familiar 
questions about conflicts of interest between class counsel and 
class members, absent class members can be given rights of 
participation in settlement hearings. 
• Issue hearings. The concept of allowing limited participation by 
class members in specific hearings need not be confined to 
certification and settlement. At crucial stages of the litigation, 
class members could be afforded the right to submit written 
briefs, make oral presentations, and even to present evidence. 
The enumeration of exemplary modalities of participation helps dissolve a 
false dichotomy—the choice between individual litigation with maximal 
rights of individual participation and aggregation without any rights of 
individual participation at all. The participatory legitimacy thesis requires 
meaningful participation, but it does not require individualized litigation. 
As Michael Saks and Peter Blanck conclude, “When well done, the 
aggregated trial does not deny any of the instrumental values of due 
process, particularly from the viewpoint of defendants. Moreover, the value 
of procedural participation, central to legitimate judicial process, is not 
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necessarily compromised in aggregated trials for either class members or 
defendants.”344 
D. AGGREGATION IF PARTICIPATION RIGHTS ARE IMPRACTICABLE 
There may be actual cases in which individual rights of participation 
in any meaningful form are impracticable. In these cases, the principles of 
procedural justice permit participationless mandatory aggregation—as 
would the accuracy model and the participation model. It might be argued, 
however, that these special cases undermine the participatory legitimacy 
thesis. We can express this argument in the form of a dilemma. The first 
horn of the dilemma is based on the premise that the participatory 
legitimacy thesis implies that aggregation without participation is always 
illegitimate. If this premise is true—the argument continues—then the 
Participation Principle is incorrect and should be modified by deleting the 
Impracticability Proviso. The second horn of the dilemma is based on the 
opposite premise that the participatory legitimacy thesis implies that 
aggregation with participation is sometimes legitimate. If this premise is 
true—the next step of the argument would go—then it undermines the 
participatory legitimacy thesis itself. If a binding decision can be legitimate 
without participation for reasons of practicability, then such decisions can 
also be justified by other practical considerations, such as accuracy and 
cost. 
Although the dilemma expresses a real concern, it relies on false 
assumptions. The first horn of the dilemma assumes that aggregation 
without participation is always illegitimate, but this assumption is incorrect. 
Normative legitimacy, like other normative concepts, does not demand the 
impossible or the impracticable. Moreover, legitimacy is not an “all or 
nothing” concept. Procedures with full rights of participation may confer a 
greater degree of legitimacy, but procedures with minimal participation still 
confer some legitimacy. The second horn of the dilemma assumes that 
impracticability (as a ground for denying rights of participation) cannot be 
distinguished from accuracy and cost. This assumption is also false. 
Impracticability as a reason for denying rights of participation is 
substantially different that marginal improvements in accuracy or cost. 
When rights of participation are impracticable, there is, in theory, a 
choice for the design of a system of civil adjudication. One option is to 
require impracticable participation and, hence, to deny rights by making 
 
 344. Saks & Blanck, supra note 338, at 830. 
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remedial procedures unavailable. This option is unattractive both because it 
produces inaccurate outcomes and because the rights of participation it 
affords are illusory. The other option is to adopt participationless 
procedures that provide the most accurate outcome available at a 
reasonable cost. The theory of procedural justice embodied in the 
Participation Principle requires the second option. When participation is 
impracticable, then accuracy and cost should shape procedural design. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The real work of procedure is to guide conduct. It is sometimes said 
that the regulation of primary conduct is the work of the general and 
abstract norms of substantive law—clauses of the constitution, statutes, 
regulations, and common law rules of tort, property, and contract. But 
substance cannot effectively guide primary conduct without the aid of 
procedure. This is true because of three problems: (1) the problem of 
imperfect knowledge of law and fact, (2) the problem of incomplete 
specification of legal norms, and (3) the problem of partiality. The solution 
to these problems is particularization by a system of dispute resolution—in 
other words, a system of procedure. A theory of procedural justice is a 
theory about the fairness of the institutions that do the job of 
particularization. 
A theory of procedural justice must answer two problems. The easy 
problem of procedural justice is to produce accurate outcomes at a 
reasonable cost. Of course, what is easy in theory may be difficult in 
practice. A very high order of art and science may be required to design 
actual systems of civil adjudication that achieve accuracy at a reasonable 
cost while minimizing collateral violations of substantive rights. But the 
practical problems of procedural architecture should not obscure the 
obvious: procedural justice aims at accuracy and efficiency. In the abstract, 
these goals are shared by both the theorists and practitioners of procedural 
design. 
The hard problem of procedural justice marks the point at which 
consensus about shared goals gives way to controversy. The hard problem 
of procedural justice goes deep. Procedural justice is necessarily imperfect 
because perfect accuracy is unattainable and approaching the unattainable 
would be unjustifiably costly. The fact of irreducible procedural error is 
that even the best system of civil procedure that human ingenuity can 
design will make mistakes. This fact gives rise to the hard problem of 
procedural justice. How can litigants who will be finally bound by a 
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mistaken judgment regard themselves as under an obligation to comply 
with the judgment? Framing the hard question of procedural justice 
suggests the key to the answer. The participatory legitimacy thesis makes 
clear what outcome reductionism obscures: because a right of participation 
must be afforded to those bound by judicial proceedings in order for those 
proceedings to serve as a legitimate source of authority, the value of 
participation cannot be reduced to a function of the effect of participation 
on outcomes; nor can the value of participation be reduced to a subjective 
preference or feeling of satisfaction. 
Solving the hard problem of procedural justice clears the way for the 
formulation of principles of procedural justice. The Participation Principle 
requires that the arrangements for the resolution of civil disputes be 
structured to provide each interested party with a right to adequate 
participation. The Accuracy Principle requires that the arrangements for the 
resolution of civil disputes be structured to maximize the chances of 
achieving the legally correct outcome in each proceeding. Together, the 
two principles provide guidance where guidance is needed, both for the 
architects of procedural design and reform and for judges who apply 
general procedural rules to particular cases. 
 A theory of procedural justice is one thing; the practice of procedural 
design and application is another. We are tempted to sacrifice procedural 
fairness on the altar of substantive advantage. This temptation is strong and 
persistent—after all, much good can be done. Desirable outcomes can be 
reached and costs can be minimized. We can easily rationalize the sacrifice 
of procedural justice from a consequentialist perspective. The measurable 
marginal benefits of participationless procedure may exceed the marginal 
costs. In the end, however, these rationalizations ring hollow. Procedure 
without justice sacrifices legitimacy. Law without legitimacy can only 
guide action through force and fear. Procedure without participation may 
command obedience, but it cannot win principled allegiance. When we 
sacrifice procedural justice on the altar of substantive advantage, we risk a 
very great evil. But when we regard ourselves as bound by the principles of 
procedural justice, we produce a very great good—we give citizens a  
principled reason to respect the outcomes of civil process. 
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